Between meaning and essence:explaining necessary truth by Schieder-Hestermann, Jakob
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 













Download date: 26. Sep. 2019
Between Meaning and Essence - Explaining Necessary Truth 
Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
Doctor philosophiae 
(Dr. phil.) 
eingereicht an der Philosophischen Fakultät I 
der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin 
im Rahmen des Joint PhD Programms mit dem King’s College 
London 
Dissertation submitted to  
Philosophischen Fakultät I of Humboldt University Berlin 
as part of the Joint-PhD Program between Humboldt University 
Berlin 
and King’s College London 
von/by Jakob Schieder-Hestermann 
Präsidentin der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin:  
Prof. Dr. ing. Dr. Sabine Kunst 
Dekanin der Philosophischen Fakultät I:  
Prof. Dr. Gabriele Metzler 
Gutachterinnen und Gutachter/Examiners: 
1. Prof. Dr. Tobias Rosefeldt
2. Prof. Dr. Keith Hossack
3. Prof. Dr. Barbara Vetter
Datum der Disputation: 30. Mai 2017 

Abstract 
An explanation of why some truths are necessarily true needs to 
make intelligible how it is that a truth is guaranteed to be true. 
The thesis argues that a promising starting point for an 
explanation of necessity can be found in Kant’s containment-
account of analyticity, for it explains how the truth of a judgment 
is guaranteed by its structure and the relationship between its 
constituents. This, however, can merely be a starting point for a 
general explanation of necessary truth, for it is both too narrow, 
and presupposes a contentious view of concepts. The thesis thus 
explores how the general strategy, explaining necessary truth by 
certain relationships between the constituents of representations, 
can be expanded to cover further necessary truths, for example a 
posteriori necessities and essentialist claims. It is argued that the 
explanation can be generalized by focussing on what it is that 
constitutes reference between representations and the objects they 
represent as well as how these representations come together to 
form truth-evaluable representations. Necessary truth, on this 
account, is a property of truth-evaluable representations which a 
representation has in virtue of the appropriate relationship 
between what is required for its truth, and the way in which the 
reference of its constituents is determined. The appropriate 
relationship guarantees the truth of the representation. After 
applying the theory to a range of examples, interesting parallels to 
essentialist accounts of necessity emerge and it is argued that the 
proposed explanation gets the relationship between essence and 
necessity right and may even be used to elucidate what essences 
are. 
Zusammenfassung 
Eine Erklärung, warum manche Wahrheiten notwendigerweise 
wahr sind, sollte verständlich machen, warum es für diese eine 
Wahrheitsgarantie gibt. Einen interessanten Ansatz für eine solche 
Erklärung liefert Kants Definition analytischer Wahrheiten als 
solche, die bereits in einem Begriff enthalten sind. Die 
notwendige Wahrheit analytischer Sätze kann hier über das 
Verhältnis ihrer Bestandteile erklärt werden. Diese Erklärung 
kann jedoch nur der Anfang einer generellen Erklärung von 
Notwendigkeit sein, denn einerseits sind nicht nur analytische 
Urteile notwendig, sondern auch andere, andererseits basiert die 
Erklärung auf einer umstrittenen Theorie von Begriffen. Die 
Dissertation untersucht nun, ob und wie die Strategie, 
Notwendigkeit über das Verhältnis zwischen den Bestandteilen 
von Repräsentationen zu erklären dennoch ausgeweitet und 
verteidigt werden kann, um zum Beispiel auch a posteriori 
Notwendigkeiten und essentialistische Urteile zu erfassen. Indem 
auf die die Referenz-Relation konstituierenden Fakten Bezug 
genommen wird, wird gezeigt, dass eine solche Erklärung 
tatsächlich möglich ist. Notwendige Wahrheit ist demnach eine 
Eigenschaft von wahrheitsfähigen Repräsentationen, die diese 
aufgrund des Verhältnisses zwischen den für die Wahrheit der 
Repräsentation nötigen Fakten und den Fakten, die die Referenz 
der Bestandteile der Repräsentation bestimmen, hat. Stehen diese 
in einem bestimmten Verhältnis, wird die Wahrheit der 
Repräsentation garantiert. Nachdem dieser Ansatz auf eine Reihe 
von Beispielen angewendet wird, zeigen sich interessante 
Parallelen zu essentialistischen Theorien von Notwendigkeit und 
es lässt sich zeigen, dass der Ansatz das Verhältnis zwischen 
Essenzen und Notwendigkeit richtig darstellt und es sogar erlaubt, 
ein besseres Verständnis davon zu entwickeln, was Essenzen sind. 
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Introduction 
The necessary is the purview of philosophy. But what is it to be 
necessary as opposed to being merely contingent? How is it that 
some things just cannot fail to be the case? The present thesis 
seeks to give answers to these questions. 
I am not the first to attempt an answer. The last century has seen 
many attempts, including a rejection of the very question, ranging 
from a denial of the reality of necessity to the contention that 
necessity is fundamental and not to be further explained. Along 
the way preconceptions about the strict separation of the a 
posteriori natural sciences and allegedly a priori philosophy were 
swept away. In spite of much progress in the study of modality 
generally, a better understanding of the relationships between 
different modal concepts, a rich philosophical discussion, and 
diversity of opinions on the source of necessity, a satisfactory 
answer to the question what necessity is, is still lacking. I shall 
argue that this situation can be remedied. An illuminating, non-
circular, intelligible, and general explanation of metaphysical 
necessity can be given. 
Here is the view in a nutshell: Necessary truth is a property of 
truth-evaluable representations which it has in virtue of the 
appropriate relationship between what is required for its truth, and 
the way in which the reference of its constituents is determined. 
The appropriate relationship guarantees the truth of the 
representation. 
This proposal, I shall argue, takes what is right about approaches 
to necessity which proceeded from analyticity, truth in virtue of 
meaning, without having to commit to conventional truth, and it 
takes what is right about accounts that proceed from truth in 
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virtue of essence, without having to commit to a primitive notion 
of truth in virtue of essence. Thus the theory sits comfortably 
between two views of necessity that seem diametrically opposed, 
but should better be conceived of as two faces of the same coin. 
The first of these positions is an explanation of necessary truth in 
terms of analyticity. On this view, which was popular in the first 
half of the twentieth century among empiricists, necessary truth is 
to be equated with truth in virtue of meaning, where truth in virtue 
of meaning just amounts to conventional truth as opposed to 
factual truth.  This position seemed to have the benefit of 1
accounting for necessity in a way that is compatible with 
empiricist principles, for coming to know about a necessary truth 
means knowing a linguistic convention, a knowledge that is 
unproblematic for members of the relevant linguistic community. 
The main trouble with this view is that it misrepresents the role 
conventions play in contributing to truth. For all that linguistic 
convention can plausibly do, is to say that a sentence or word is to 
mean something or other, not also make it the case that what it 
says really is the case.  
It may be that some conventions do legislate that a certain 
sentence is to always express a truth. Such a sentence may 
properly be said to be true by convention. This truth by 
convention, however, is not to be equated with necessary truth, 
for a sentence, even if it is to be used to only express truths, may 
express a different, contingent truth on each occasion of use. 
Consider “I am here now”: According to the standard (and 
simplified) semantic treatment this sentence, whenever uttered by 
someone, expresses a truth. But the truth that is expressed at each 
 For a short and clear statement of this view see Ayer (1936a).1
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occasion is always a different, contingent truth. This suggests that 
conventional truth doesn’t give us what we wanted an explanation 
of. We wanted to know what it takes for the content of a sentence 
to be guaranteed to be the case, but instead we only got an 
explanation of how a sentence can be guaranteed to express some 
content that is true. So truth in virtue of meaning, even if it may, 
in a limited number of cases, tell us something interesting about 
sentences, cannot tell us anything interesting about necessary 
truth. 
If analyticity is this easily rejected as an explanans of necessity, 
the natural move is to turn away form the word to the world, to 
the essence of things. Turning Quine’s warning on its head that 
“meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the 
object of reference and wedded to the word”  one may seek to 2
move the explanation of necessity back to the things the necessary 
truths are about, or more precisely, to their essence. Necessary 
truths, on this view, are those which are true in virtue of the 
essence of objects.  
The trouble with this view, however, is to make sense of the 
notion of truth in virtue of essence. For it seems that the same 
insight that already spoke against truth in virtue of meaning also 
speaks against truth in virtue of essence: Necessary truths, just 
like contingent truths, are true in virtue of what they say really 
being the case. It is just that what they say could not have failed to 
be the case. So how does the fact that some essential properties 
play a role in the truthmaking make it the case that a proposition 
is necessarily true? It is not clear how an answer may go, and so 
 Quine 1951a, p. 22.2
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this problem at the very least shows that the essentialist position is 
in need of clarification. 
The explanation of necessity to be defended in the following 
occupies a middle ground between these two positions: The 
essentialist is right that necessary truth is not just a matter of 
convention. Truth must be grounded in the world. Necessity is not 
subject to conventions in the way advertised by the 
conventionalist. The essentialist, however, moves the source of 
necessity completely away from what is said to be necessary, 
making it a mystery how necessary truth arises.  
The analyticity-theorist, on the other hand, was right that 
necessary truths, in some way, do seem to be a matter of 
definition and meaning, but misidentifies the way meaning plays 
a role in giving rise to necessary truth.  
The right position to take, I suggest, is the following: Necessity is 
not to be found exclusively in the meaning of words, nor is it to 
be found exclusively in the essence of things, it is to be found in 
the way world and representation interact.  
The first step towards such a theory of necessity is to take a closer 
look at what the objects are which are said to be necessarily true. 
The analyticity theorist takes sentences to be appropriate objects, 
for they are subject to the conventions which allegedly guarantee 
their truth. However, we have seen that this focus on sentences is 
wrong for the purpose at hand, because conventional truth is not 
identical to necessary truth: a sentence that is guaranteed to 
express something true, is not thereby guaranteed to say 
something that is necessarily true. Thus, instead of taking 
sentences to be the objects that are necessarily true, I propose to 
take representations as the objects of study.  
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Representations, in contrast to sentences, have their 
representational properties essentially. They are not, however, 
what has classically been known as propositions, for 
representation tokens are not abstract objects, and they do not 
play the same theoretical role in a theory of meaning. Rather, a 
token sentence cum meaning, or a mental state with its content are 
examples of representation. Representations are individuated by 
their representational properties. Different token representations 
are of the same type in virtue of having the same representational 
properties.  
Taking representations to be the objects whose necessary truth is 
to be explained, leads us away from a narrow picture of 
representation based on a communication model of language and 
a contingent association of words and sentences with meanings, 
and thus allows for a more fruitful way of considering truth and 
reference.  
Once we help ourselves to representations, we can ask what the 
representational properties are whose investigation may tell us 
something interesting about necessary truth. The first property is, 
not surprisingly, truth. What is it that determines the truth of a 
representation? To answer this, we have to distinguish between 
truth-evaluable representations and referential representations. 
Referential representations are the constituents of truth-evaluable 
representations and may be either singular, referring rigidly to one 
object, or general, potentially referring to a number of objects. A 
truth-evaluable representation is true, if the referents of its 
constituents stand in the appropriate relation to each other. The 
representation expressed by the sentence “Ravens are black” for 
example, is true, if the referents of the referential representation 
expressed by ‘ravens’, are among the referents of the referential 
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representation expressed by ‘black’. Call the relationship between 
the referents of the constituent referential representations required 
for the truth of a truth-evaluable representation its requirements 
for truth. This is the first ingredient to the explanation of 
necessary truth.  
The second ingredient is reference. Reference is a relation that 
holds between a referential representation and the object or 
objects it refers to. It is not a primitive relation, however. There is 
an explanation for why it holds. It holds in virtue of properties of 
the representation, call these the representation’s reference 
determining properties, and in virtue of properties of the referent 
itself, call these the reference realizing properties. What the 
reference realizing properties of an object are, is determined by 
the reference determining properties of the representation, in the 
sense that once it is settled what the reference determining 
properties of the representation are, it is also settled what 
properties an object would have to have to be the referent of the 
representation. 
With requirements for truth and reference realizing properties in 
hand, we have everything we need for an explanation of why 
some representations cannot fail to be true: It so happens that 
sometimes the reference realizing properties determined by the 
constituent referential representations are related such that the 
requirements for truth of a truth-evaluable representation are 
guaranteed to be satisfied. In this case the representation cannot 
fail to be true, it is necessarily true. 
This explanation positions itself between the essentialist and the 
analyticity theorist, for it recognizes that it is something about the 
objects that partly explains necessary truth, that is, its reference 
realizing properties. However, the reason these properties of the 
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object are so special lies in their being constitutive of reference, 
and so their connection to necessary truth can be explained. 
The suggested explanation of necessary truth takes its inspiration 
from a Kantian account of analyticity, which says that a judgment 
consisting of a subject concept and a predicate concept is analytic, 
if the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept.  From 3
this account an explanation of necessary truth similar to the 
present explanation can be given: Concept containment 
guarantees that the referents of the subject concept are among the 
referents of the predicate concept. Since this is just what is 
required for the truth of a subject-predicate judgment, the 
judgment cannot fail to be true. 
The Kantian account of analyticity, however, is much too narrow 
to serve as a model for a general explanation of necessary truth, 
for concept containment is just not a very ubiquitous 
phenomenon. So to gain a proper understanding of necessary truth 
generally, a framework is needed that goes beyond simple 
subject-predicate judgments and concepts that contain each other. 
It is the task of the representation-framework to fill this role, and 
so to go beyond the simple case of concept containment.  
So far this is a very rough sketch, but a first idea of how an 
explanation of necessary truth that strikes a balance between truth 
in virtue of essence and truth in virtue of meaning may have 
emerged. It is the purpose of the thesis to convince you that this 
explanation is a good and illuminating explanation of necessary 
truth. I want to use the rest of the introduction to give an overview 
over how the argument will proceed and give a short abstract of 
the points I discuss in each chapter. 
 Kant’s famous containment-definition of analyticity can be found in his 3
Critique of Pure Reason (KrV A 6-7; Kant (1998)).
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The thesis is divided into two parts. The first is an introductory 
part in which I clarify what I take to be a good philosophical 
explanation of necessary truth, consider the merits and challenges 
of previous theories of necessity, and discuss in some more detail 
earlier attempts at utilizing analyticity in an explanation of 
necessary truth.  
The second part starts by laying out the broadly semantic 
framework in which the theory is to be spelled out. It proceeds by 
stating the official explanation of necessary truth in terms of the 
developed concepts, applies it to a number of examples, considers 
how the account relates to other kinds of necessity, shows how it 
solves a range of apparent puzzles, compares the explanation to 
essentialist theories of necessity, and finally argues that all this 
gives us reason to believe that the present explanation is a good 
philosophical explanation of necessary truth. 
Part I 
Chapter 1: Explaining Necessity 
I argue that it is the task of a philosophical explanation to give an 
account of what it takes, constitutively, for something to be, or to 
be of a certain kind. So an explanation of necessary truth should 
tell us what it takes, constitutively, for a representation to be 
necessarily true. I argue that a constitutive philosophical 
explanation is not achieved by giving a conceptual or 
metaphysical reduction, even though both methods are important 
philosophical tools that may help in the construction of a 
constitutive explanation. The quality of a given philosophical 
explanation can be judged by considering how well the theory 
fares with respect to three general desiderata: non-circularity, 
generality, and intelligibility. 
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Chapter 2: Explanations of Necessity 
The most prominent theories (or classes of theories) of necessity 
are evaluated with respect to their explanatory merits. Genuine 
modal realism, reductive ersatzism, primitivism, and essentialism, 
with the exception of reductive ersatzism, succeed in their attempt 
to give an explanatorily non-circular account of necessity. As such 
these theories do not face simple knock-down arguments. 
However, each theory’s claim to being the best theory of 
necessary truth is hampered by different deficits in satisfying the 
intelligibility requirement. Genuine modal realism asks us, against 
common sense, to believe in many other concrete worlds. 
Different versions of primitivism, as well as essentialism, use 
explanantia that themselves seem in need of further explanation, 
so these theories only move us marginally closer to a satisfactory 
understanding of what it takes for a representation to be 
necessarily true. If a better theory of necessity is to be given, it 
must be non-circular, general, and score higher in terms of 
intelligibility than its competitors. 
Chapter 3: Analyticity and Necessity 
The notion of analyticity and its relation to necessity is explored. 
First, the main traditional problems of an account of necessary 
truth in terms of analyticity are laid out and suggested fixes in the 
literature discussed. The theories as well as the fixes are found to 
be lacking, since they do not solve the basic problem of the 
theory: Analyticity on these orthodox accounts is conceived of as 
a property of sentences, but the property of a sentence to be 
guaranteed to express a true proposition and the property of being 
necessarily true are different properties that apply to different 
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objects, and so truth in virtue of meaning cannot explain 
necessary truth.  
More recent accounts of analyticity have therefore given up either 
their explanatory ambitions of explaining necessary truth, or they 
take a more anti-realist approach to talk of necessity. While both 
reactions are understandable in light of the problems faced by 
accounts of analyticity, looking back at the Kantian account of 
analyticity in terms of concept containment helps to elucidate 
what is right about an explanation of necessary truth in terms of 
analyticity. Since Kant does not conceive of analyticity as a 
property of sentences, but of judgments, an explanation of 
necessary truth suggests itself. This explanation is not nearly 
general enough to account for all necessary truths, but it provides 
a blueprint of how a more general explanation may proceed. 
Part II 
Chapter 4: Representation, Reference, and Truth 
A semantic framework in which representations are the primary 
objects of study is developed. The more traditional 
communication model of meaning and semantics is contrasted 
with the new framework in which representations are considered 
as having their representational properties essentially. We can 
distinguish between truth-evaluable representations and 
referential representations, where referential representations are 
the constituents of truth-evaluable representations. Their central 
representational features are truth and reference. Neither truth nor 
reference are taken as primitive, however.  
A reference relation holds in virtue of properties of the 
representations and in virtue of properties of the referent. The 
former are the reference determining properties and the latter are 
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the reference realizing properties. Reference realizing properties 
are determined by the reference determining properties. This 
gives us a criterion for type-identity of referential representations: 
Referential representations are of the same type, iff they 
determine the same reference realizing properties.   4
A truth-evaluable representation is true, if the referents of the 
constituent referential representations are appropriately related. 
The relation between the referents required for the truth are the 
requirements for truth of the representation. What the respective 
requirements for truth are, depends on how the truth-evaluable 
representation is constituted by the referential representations. 
With the concept of requirements for truth in hand, we can give a 
criterion for type identity of truth-evaluable representations: 
Truth-evaluable representations are of the same type, iff they have 
constituents of the same type and the requirements for truth are 
the same. Finally some reasons for adopting this representation-
framework for an explanation of necessity are considered. 
Chapter 5: An Explanation of Necessity 
The explanation of necessary truth is spelled out in detail: A truth-
evaluable representation is necessarily true (if it is), because its 
requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied by the 
relationship between the reference realizing properties determined 
by the constituent referential representations. This explanation is 
defended against a possible circularity worry. I argue that the 
proposed explanation, prima facie, satisfies the desiderata for a 
 Talk of referential representations determining reference realizing properties 4
should be taken as shorthand for reference determining properties of referential 
representations determining reference realizing properties.
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good philosophical explanation. That it really satisfies them is 
argued for in the following chapters. 
Chapter 6: Applying the Theory 
The theory is put to use in a number of example cases. The 
simplest examples are, unsurprisingly, conceptual truths along the 
lines of Kant’s own example of unmarried bachelors. The 
proposed explanation, however, has the resources for going 
beyond such simple examples and also explains the necessity of 
representations involving relations, as well as logical truths.  
A complication and a familiar puzzle arise in cases of necessarily 
true representations that involve singular representations, for it 
seems that the necessary truth of such representations implies the 
necessary existence of the object the truth is about. In the present 
framework this puzzle and related puzzles involving mere 
possibilia and impossible objects, can be satisfactorily solved by 
clarifying what the requirements for truth of the necessarily true 
representations are. 
Once these puzzles are solved, I argue that the theory also 
explains the necessary truth of essence attributions and, more 
tentatively, of mathematic truths.  
Chapter 7: Varieties of Necessity 
The proposed explanation of necessary truth is primarily an 
explanation of metaphysical necessity. I defend that the necessity 
explained is indeed metaphysical necessity, by arguing that it is 
the strongest kind of necessary truth which still yields an 
intelligible notion of possibility. I go on to propose that weaker 
kinds of necessary truth, for example nomic or practical necessity, 
can be accounted for by the familiar strategy of relativizing to a 
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set of background-conditions. Recent challenges to this monist 
account of necessity are discussed, but found wanting. 
Chapter 8: Essence and Representation 
The present analytic theory of necessity occupies a middle ground 
between theories of necessity in terms of analyticity and 
essentialist theories. In this chapter the challenge the essentialist 
faces in accounting for its central explanatory notion, truth in 
virtue of essence, are discussed in detail. The challenge is not 
easily surmountable, but the present explanation of necessity also 
provides an explanation of essence, thus suggesting that the 
explanatory relations run neither from essence to modality, nor 
from modality to essence, but that both are explained by a third: 
the elements of the present theory.  
Essences, in the representation-framework, can be identified with 
the reference realizing properties determined by singular 
representations. By doing so, the role essences play in an 
explanation of necessary truth becomes intelligible and, in 
addition, an explanation of what makes some properties of objects 
so special as to count as essential to the object can be given. 
While the present theory may diverge in spirit form some 
essentialist intuitions, it is a means of better understanding what 
essences are. 
Chapter 9: Evaluating the Explanation of Necessity 
The final chapter summarizes the diverse points that speak in 
favor of the theory. I argue that there is good reason to take the 
theory to be true, because it provides a non-circular, illuminating 
and intelligible as well as general explanation of metaphysical 
necessity that appears extensionally adequate, accounts for 
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puzzles about possibilia and necessary existence, explains what 
essences are, and along the way makes only minimal assumptions 
about the nature of representation and its connection to the world. 
All this, I argue, makes the suggested approach well suited to 





Chapter 1: Explaining Necessity 
Philosophers typically try to explain very general phenomena: 
Epistemology, for example, is concerned with knowledge and 
justification generally, ethics is concerned with the good and right 
life generally, metaphysics with the general structure of the 
universe, and so on. A typical kind of question to ask for a 
philosopher in all these subfields is “what is X?” where X is some 
central object of inquiry in the domain in question. In 
epistemology a question is “what is knowledge?”. In ethics it is 
“what is the good?”. And in a branch of metaphysics it is “what is 
necessity?”. While questions of this kind are routinely asked and 
answered by philosophers, it is not always explicit what would 
constitute a good answer to them. The diversity of answers 
indicates that, apart from substantial disagreement, there is no 
uniform understanding of the philosophical project. 
It is the purpose of this first chapter to survey some of the 
methods one may use to answer the philosophical question “what 
is necessity?” and to develop some very general criteria a good 
answer to this question should satisfy.  To sharpen these general 5
remarks, I will in the second chapter see how popular theories of 
modality have fared with respect to the desiderata. 
1. Methods of Philosophical Investigation 
Some strategies for answering questions of the form “what is X?” 
can be discerned. There is, for example, classical conceptual 
analysis, further, there are a number of similar, but at least 
 These desiderata are not intended to apply to all projects taking place under the 5
broad roof of philosophical inquiry. But they apply to the explanatory project I 
embark on here: explaining necessity.
!16
apparently distinct methods: explication and metaphysical 
reduction. Finally, there is what we may call constitutive 
explanation. In the following I will introduce each of these 
methods, unpack some of the assumptions and requirements for 
such an explanation to work, argue that they can all be conceived 
of as being in the business of moving us towards constitutive 
explanations and give some general criteria of adequacy for these 
explanations. 
Conceptual Analysis 
One historically quite popular answer to philosophical questions 
is to give a conceptual analysis of the concept standing for some 
X.  What exactly a conceptual analysis is, is not quite clear, but, 6
as the name says, we may think of it as proceeding from the dual 
assumption that the concept of X is complex, that is, that it can be 
analysed in the literal sense, broken down into constituents 
(which are themselves concepts) and that this breaking down of 
the concept tells us something interesting about the object of 
inquiry, for example knowledge, the good, necessity, etc.   7
The first assumption is a condition for the possibility of an 
analysis, for if the concept to be explained is not complex, there is 
nothing into which it can be analyzed.  The second assumption is 8
needed, because otherwise it would be unclear how conceptual 
analysis can tell us anything about the subject matter we are 
 No assumptions about what concepts are, will currently be made. Also no 6
complications in terms of indexical words, associated with different concepts 
from context to context are taken into account, as this would be an unnecessary 
complication in relation to the modest aim of this chapter. 
 For an overview over different conceptions of analysis in the history of 7
philosophy up to today see Beaney (2014).
 In some philosophical debates it has been claimed that no analysis is possible. 8
Famously, Moore claimed that ‘good’ was indefinable (Moore 1903)
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trying to gain insight into, for philosophy generally is interested in 
concepts only in virtue of the concept telling us something about 
the subject matter. 
To get a better grip on what is involved in a conceptual analysis, 
let me introduce an obvious, but non-philosophical example: ‘red 
ball’. The concept ‘red ball’ is quite straightforwardly a complex 
concept, so the first condition is satisfied. It is built up from the 
simpler concepts ‘red’ and ‘ball’.  How does analyzing this 9
complex concept into its constituents help us to find out 
something about the subject matter, that is, red balls? It tells us 
something about what red balls are: We come to know by the 
decomposition of the concept that every red ball is both a ball and 
that it is red. The way in which the decomposition of a concept 
can tell us something (necessary) about red balls has its roots in 
how the reference of a complex concept is determined from the 
reference of its constituents: The reference of ‘red ball’ is 
determined in such a way that it picks out those objects which 
satisfy both the condition of being red and of being a ball. So the 
extension of ‘red ball’ will be the intersection of the simpler 
concepts ‘red’ and ‘ball’. We may state this in the canonical form 
as a (necessitated) biconditional: Something is a red ball, iff it is 
red and it is a ball. It seems that the present conceptual analysis 
has given us some answer to the admittedly not very substantial 
question “what is a red ball?”.  
While this provides a nice model for answering questions of the 
form “what is X?”, the assumptions that have to be made point to 
 There is no need at present to go into detail about how concepts come to build 9
up each other, as this will depend on the favorite theory of concepts. With 
respect to the second assumption at work in conceptual analysis, we can say, 
however, that being built up by concepts entails that the reference of complex 
concepts is determined by the reference of simpler constituent concepts.
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some potential problems with the universal applicability of this 
strategy. The most important problem is this: Are the concepts 
denoting the philosophically interesting phenomena complex in 
the way that ‘red ball’ is complex? It seems that there is no 
guarantee for this to be the case. Worse, it seems that virtually no 
analysis of an interesting philosophical concept has been 
satisfactory and so there is, prima facie, good reason to believe 
that philosophical concepts do not exhibit the structure required 
for conceptual analysis.   10
Against this skeptical worry it may be objected that for reference 
to be possible, concepts must be complex and we just haven’t 
been able to arrive at satisfactory decompositions yet. But this 
cannot be a good line of argument, as at least the simplest 
concepts from which others are built up must have their reference 
determined in a different way and if we need a different account 
of reference for them, it is not obvious that it cannot be used for 
more general philosophical concepts as well.  
Suffice it to say, while conceptual analysis, in its pure form 
introduced above, seems to have an eminent tradition in 
philosophy, it is doubtful that it is the best and only method to 
arrive at answers to philosophical questions.  
Before moving on to other strategies for answering philosophical 
questions, it is helpful to get clear on the explanatory relations at 
play in a conceptual analysis. I have talked of philosophical 
explanations, but this may be considered to be slightly odd given 
that the question we started out with was not a question asking 
why something is the case, but rather a question about what 
something is. But from the answer to the what question, we get 
 Williamson (2002) forcefully makes this point for the concept knowledge.10
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answers to a number of why questions. We do, for example, get 
an answer to the why question why this object (pointing to a red 
ball) is a red ball. Answer: because it is red and a ball. If we can 
give an analysis of a complex concept, we come to know what it 
takes to be of the kind the concept describes. What it takes to be a 
red ball, for example, is being red and being a ball: The 
constitution relations holding between the complex concept and 
the simple concept guarantee that objects in the extension of ‘red 
ball’ are all and only the objects in the intersection of the concepts 
‘red’ and ‘ball’.  
If the preconditions of a conceptual analysis are satisfied, it 
provides us with an answer to philosophical questions. It is 
doubtful, however, whether these preconditions are satisfied in the 
case of many philosophical concepts and so different ways of 
explaining what it takes for something to be a necessary truth 
need to be explored. 
Explication 
Our ordinary concepts, while some of them may be complex, are 
not always philosophically interesting: they are often 
idiosyncratic and may be ill suited for, say, scientific 
explanations. Consequently, analyzing them, even if possible, is 
not always the most interesting thing a philosopher can do. 
Rather, philosophers can offer helpful constructions, or 
reconstructions of interesting concepts in terms of well 
understood constituents. This is what we may, following Carnap, 
call the explication of a concept: “The task of making more exact 
a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life […], or 
rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept, 
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belongs among the most important tasks of logical analysis and 
logical construction. We call this the task of explicating, […].”   11
Explication, in a sense, turns conceptual analysis on its head. 
Instead of breaking down concepts, concepts are built up. This 
method seems especially adequate when considering technical 
concepts, which may be introduced in this way.  
The answers to philosophical questions of the form “what is X?” 
we gain from this exercise, however, is the same as in the case of 
conceptual analysis and the explanatory relations run just as 
described above. The difference between conceptual analysis and 
explication lies in the way we arrive at these judgments: Instead 
of breaking down concepts, we construct concepts.  
Since the methodology is different from conceptual analysis, 
some of the challenges to conceptual analysis just do not arise. 
There are different challenges, however, which mirror the 
challenges to conceptual analysis, but reflect the difference in 
methodology. A problem that does not arise for explications is the 
question whether the target concept is complex. Since the concept 
is explicitly constructed, it is bound to be complex. Also, there is 
no need for the constructed concept to match any of our pre-
theoretical concepts, rather, what is required is that the concept 
plays the role it is supposed to play, for example in scientific 
explanations.  
Two other problems, however, arise when explication is used in 
philosophical explanations. First, it is unclear how interesting a 
constructed concept is in each case and whether it covers the 
interesting cases we intended to fall into the extension of the 
philosophical concept in the first place. Second, the choice of well 
 Carnap (1947), p. 7/8.11
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understood primitives may be too limited to construct concepts 
for everything we want to have a concept of, such that the method 
cannot be universally applied.  
The reconstructive project of conceptual analysis and the 
constructive project of explication are rarely ever performed in 
their pure form. Most conceptual analyses have a revisionary, or 
constructive element and most explications orient themselves 
towards existing concepts. So both conceptual analysis and 
explication can be understood as complementary methods in the 
philosopher’s toolbox. As both will yield the same kind of answer 
to the philosophical question of what something is, it is to be 
expected that both methods will serve the purpose of giving an 
adequate answer to philosophical questions, if the preconditions 
for their applicability are satisfied.  
A note on biconditionals 
Explications as well as conceptual analyses are usually expressed 
in the analytic philosopher’s favorite form: as (necessitated) 
biconditionals. Biconditionals are a convenient way of expressing 
conceptual analyses as well as explications, but one needs to be 
careful not to take every true and necessary biconditional to 
express a conceptual analysis. For biconditionals by themselves, 
even if necessary, do not tell us anything about the explanatory 
relations that hold between its two sides. 
To have an example where a biconditional may express a 
conceptual analysis, take again the example of the ‘red ball’ 
above. Since the concept ‘red ball’ is built up of the concepts ‘red’ 
and ‘ball’, the following biconditional is guaranteed to hold: 
Something is a red ball, iff it is red and a ball. The necessary truth 
of the biconditional itself does not tell us why it holds of 
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necessity, so it does not tell us anything about the relation that 
holds between the concept on the left hand side and the concepts 
on the right hand side of the conditional. The necessity of the 
conditional may be guaranteed in another way than by concept-
containment. This comes out clearest in cases of necessarily 
coextensive concepts like ‘being the number 2’ and ‘being the 
smallest prime number’. Plausibly, no conceptual containment 
relations hold between these two concepts, but nonetheless the 
biconditional “something is the number 2 if and only if it is the 
smallest prime number” is necessarily true.  
This example is likely to not be alone. Even in cases where a 
concept seems to be amenable to analysis, as for example in the 
case of ‘bachelor’ being analysed in terms of the concepts 
‘unmarried’ and ‘male’, it needs to be shown that the necessary 
truth of the biconditional “someone is a bachelor, iff he is 
unmarried and male” is indeed due to conceptual containment 
relations that determine the reference of the complex concept in 
terms of the simpler ones. This is not obvious and needs to be 
supplemented with some conception of how concepts do come 
together to form complex concepts. 
This illustrates that giving a philosophically interesting answer to 
questions of the kind “what is X?”, does not only involve finding 
a different way of expressing what has already been said with a 
biconditional, but rather to find a reformulation that allows for an 
adequate constitutive explanation of the phenomenon in question. 
What constitutive explanations are, shall be discussed in the 
following, but first let us look at metaphysical reduction. 
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Metaphysical reduction 
Conceptual analyses as well as explications offer what is known 
as reductions: That the red ball is a red ball requires of it nothing 
but being red and being a ball. This reduction is achieved in virtue 
of the complex concept having the simpler concepts as 
constituents.  
It is important to be clear, however, about what is reduced in a 
conceptual analysis: It is not the complex concept that is reduced, 
for it is the constitution of the concept that explains what 
something is. Rather it is the features of objects that fall in the 
extension of the concept which are reduced to other, more 
primitive, features. In the case of ‘red ball’ what is reduced is the 
feature of being a red ball. It is reduced to the two simpler 
features of being red and being a ball.  
Despite this metaphysical character of the reduction flowing from 
a conceptual analysis, philosophers have made a distinction 
between conceptual reduction and metaphysical reduction, 
intended to extend reductions to cases in which there is no 
apparent conceptual connection.  The feature meant to be 12
preserved in metaphysical reductions is that what is to be reduced 
is, in some sense, nothing over and above what it is reduced to. 
What is to be avoided in contrast to standard conceptual analysis, 
is the need for a conceptual containment relation for this 
reduction to be effected.  
The need for metaphysical reduction comes up most urgently, if 
conceptual analysis is conceived of as purely a priori. For it 
seems that some true reduction-claims are not knowable a priori. 
The simplest such cases are a posteriori identity claims like 
 See for example Hale (2013), Chapter 3, for a distinction between conceptual 12
and metaphysical reduction, as applied to an explanation of necessary truth.
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“Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Hesperus is nothing over and above 
Phosphorous (and vice versa), after all, there is just one object. 
Similar examples can be given in the case of properties. Consider, 
for example, the putatively necessary truth that everything that is 
water is H2O. Since there is apparently no conceptual containment 
involved in these cases, the reductive claim cannot be justified 
with respect to any conceptual containment relations. 
However, it should be noted that at the level of metaphysics, the 
reductive claim in all cases, including conceptual analysis cases, 
is, if complete, an identity claim: being red and being a ball just is 
being a red ball, being H2O just is being water, being Hesperus is 
being Phosphorus. The difference between conceptual analysis 
and metaphysical analysis lies in the way in which these identity 
claims are justified. In the case of conceptual analysis and 
explication it is concept constitution that does the trick. In the 
case of metaphysical reduction it is some other reason we have for 
believing that both concepts (water and H2O, Hesperus and 
Phosphorus) denote the same objects. In the case of Hesperus and 
Phosphorus this may be justified by a causal theory of reference 
along Kripke’s lines, in the case of water and H2O some version 
of Putnam’s theory of reference determination for natural kinds 
may be used to justify the identity claim.  13
In what follows, I will, when discussing attempts at reductive 
theories of necessity, not distinguish between conceptual and 
metaphysical reductions, as there is no difference in kind of the 
reduction, there just is a difference in the underlying explanation 
of how the reference of the concepts is determined and resulting 
from that, a difference in their epistemological properties. 
 see Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) for sketches of externalist theories of 13
reference.
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Nonetheless, what runs under the label of metaphysical reduction 
is a welcome addition to the philosopher’s toolkit, as it widens the 
scope of conceptual interrelations beyond that of (arguably rare) 
containment-relations and moves the focus away from a mere a 
priori methodology. 
2. Explanation and Reduction 
Answers to philosophical questions should not only tell us how 
we may reformulate something with the help of some necessary 
biconditional, rather, they should be explanatory of what it takes 
to be X, where X is some philosophically interesting property like 
knowledge, necessity, or truth.  
A philosophical explanation of this kind should not tell us how 
something came to be, that is, it should not be a genealogical 
explanation, rather, it should tell us how the thing in question is 
what it is constitutively.  
The difference between a genealogical explanation and a 
constitutive explanation is best brought out by example: draw a 
triangle on a sheet of paper. Then ask yourself: why is there a 
triangle? One answer is that there is a triangle, because you just 
drew the triangle. This is the genealogical explanation. But there 
is another possible answer: there is a triangle, because there is a 
closed figure with straight sides and three corners on the sheet of 
paper. This is the constitutive explanation of why there is a 
triangle. What we are looking for in philosophy is constitutive 
explanation.  
What I call constitutive explanation has in recent years gained a 
lot of attention in the philosophical debate under the label of 
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“grounding”.  I will deliberately leave the distinction between 14
genealogical and constitutive explanation at the intuitive level and 
will not enter into the quite extensive debate on grounding. The 
sense of explanation at issue, I take it, is clear enough by example 
and will be further clarified in what follows.  
Given that philosophical explanation is constitutive explanation, 
how are conceptual analysis and metaphysical reduction adequate 
tools in arriving at such an explanation? In answering this 
question a puzzle arises right at the outset: what conceptual 
analyses as well as metaphysical reductions supply us with are, at 
bottom, identities; they give us a further way of literally saying 
the same thing. It is even a criterion of adequacy of reductions 
and analyses that what is said on either side of the biconditional is 
the same. But if so, how is explanation by conceptual analysis or 
metaphysical reduction ever possible? For explanation is 
commonly, and rightly, taken to be irreflexive. That is, nothing 
can explain itself.   15
This problem is reminiscent of the paradox of analysis, just at the 
metaphysical level. The paradox of analysis goes like this: Given 
that it is a criterion of adequacy for philosophical analyses that the 
analysans has the same meaning as the analysandum, a correct 
analysis just amounts to an uninformative triviality, provided that 
meaning is known by all competent speakers of the language or 
users of the conceptual framework. For in this case, the identity 
should be transparent to all parties involved in the philosophical 
 For a collection of recent work on grounding, see Correia and Schnieder 14
(2012). Further introductory discussion can be found in Rosen (2010) and 
Trogdon (2013). For a more skeptical approach see Wilson (2014).
 The literature on grounding recognizes that problem as well and gives an 15
answer similar to the one given here. See for example the introduction to Correia 
and Schnieder (2012), or see Rosen (2010).
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discussion and no question about the correctness of the analysis 
should arise.  So either the analysis is trivial, or it is inadequate. 16
Both horns of the dilemma seem unattractive.  
One standard solution to the apparent paradox is to deny that 
giving an identity is always uninformative. For identities can be 
informative, if they are not knowable a priori, as the classic 
example of “Hesperus is Phosphorus” shows. So given that 
sameness of meaning is not always a priori and transparent to all 
involved in the debate, it may be that an adequate analysis is 
informative after all.  
This solution to the paradox of analysis solves the problem as it 
was stated above. However, by just focussing on the epistemic 
dimension of the paradox of analysis, the proposed answer misses 
the somewhat deeper metaphysical dimension of the paradox. If 
philosophical explanation is to explain what something is, what 
necessity is, what knowledge is, what the good is, it does not 
suffice to find a different way of saying that something is 
necessary, or known, or good. For this would not tell us anything 
about the philosophical phenomenon in question, it would just tell 
us something about the representations we use.  So ‘solving’ the 17
paradox by making sameness of meaning a posteriori is merely 
an epistemic fix, just as the difference between metaphysical 
reduction and conceptual reduction is merely an epistemic 
difference: We need a more thoroughly metaphysical answer to 
the paradox of analysis. 
 A formulation of the paradox of analysis can be found in the collection “The 16
Philosophy of G.E. Moore” in the essays by Langford (1942) and Moore (1942). 
For a summary see Beaney (2014).
 This is not to say that conceptual interconnections and identities are not 17
philosophically interesting, it is just to say that they usually don’t provide us 
with an answer to constitutive philosophical questions.
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To see how a solution may go, let us look at an example. Assume 
we would come to know by conceptual analysis that knowledge 
just is justified, true belief. Then we may ask of a particular piece 
of knowledge: why is this knowledge? The answer may seem to 
be: because it is a justified, true belief. The answer seems 
adequate, because what it is to be knowledge just is being a 
justified, true belief. The paradox of analysis arises, because, 
according to the conceptual analysis, being a justified, true belief 
just is the same as being knowledge. So “x is a justified, true 
belief” and “x is knowledge” both represent the same fact. And so 
it may seem that when we say “something is knowledge, because 
it is a justified, true belief”, we are saying nothing more than 
“something is knowledge, because it is knowledge”. The 
irreflexivity requirement on explanation is violated.  
The solution lies in taking the explanatory relation not as holding 
between the fact that x is knowledge and the conjunctive fact that 
x is a justified, true belief, for these are indeed identical according 
to the conceptual analysis. Rather, the explanatory relation holds 
between x’s being knowledge and the facts that x is justified and 
that x is a true belief. So the explanation-relation does not connect 
two single identical facts, but a fact and the distinct facts it takes 
for it to obtain. This is even more explicit if we ask what it takes 
for something to be a justified, true belief. The answer is that it 
takes something to be both justified and a true belief. The 
conjunctive fact is explained by each of its conjuncts obtaining, 
not by the conjunctive fact itself. 
This helps to make explicit the role of conceptual analysis and 
metaphysical reductions in a philosophical enquiry: It is to make 
explicit what it takes for something to be the case, by giving us a 
representation of an identical fact for which we have a clearer 
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idea of what it takes for it to obtain. The analysis makes 
transparent what it takes for something to be the case.  
So conceptual analysis as well as metaphysical reduction are 
methods in our toolbox for arriving at constitutive explanations. 
However, it should be clear that they are far from being the only 
methods for arriving at such explanations. For it may be that 
either the conceptual or linguistic resources are not enough to 
rephrase every philosophically interesting concept, or that, even if 
some rephrasing is possible, it does not move us closer to seeing 
what it would take for something to be of the philosophically 
interesting kind. So when evaluating reductions, we do not only 
have to check whether the analysans means the same as the 
analysandum, we also have to check whether the analysis moves 
us closer to an understanding of what it takes for something to be 
of the philosophically interesting kind. 
The understanding of philosophical explanation as giving 
constitutive explanations will guide the following inquiries, as it 
allows for an inclusive methodology and at the same time it 
allows for the formulation of some standards against which 
different proposals for explanation may be evaluated. In what 
follows some general criteria for evaluating an explanation of 
necessity will be given, before the next chapter surveys some 
proposals for the explanation of necessary truth. 
3. The Explanation of Necessity 
We can use the remarks on analysis and explanation to develop 
general criteria for what an explanation of necessity should 
accomplish. Three general desiderata for an adequate explanation 
of necessity can be distinguished: Non-circularity, generality, and 
intelligibility, broadly construed. I will discuss each in turn.  
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Non-circularity, as was pointed out above, is a standard 
requirement on explanation. It says that the explanans should not 
be contained in the explanandum. The special, but also most 
obvious case of circularity is triviality where something is directly 
explained by itself. Since irreflexivity is a standard requirement 
on explanations and non-circularity is a corollary of it, given 
transitivity, it should not be a controversial requirement, but also 
one that is not too hard to avoid.  The kind of circularity at issue 18
in explanations, however, should be distinguished from circularity 
as it occurs in conceptual analyses. For circularity in conceptual 
analyses is problematic, not because it violates irreflexivity, but 
because no complex concept can contain itself as constituent.  19
The second requirement is generality. Unlike the non-circularity 
requirement, generality is not a binary matter, but a matter of 
degree. It says that a philosophical account of necessity should 
equip us with a template for explaining why each instance of a 
necessary truth is a case of necessary truth. A perfectly general 
account of some philosophical phenomenon gives an explanation 
of why each fact of the relevant kind holds. A less than general 
account gives an explanation of only some instances of the 
phenomenon.  
An example for a less than general explanation would be an 
explanation of what knowledge is that only explains knowledge 
gained via the auditory senses. It would thus fall short of what a 
 Transitivity may not hold generally for all kinds of explanations, but arguably 18
it holds for full philosophical explanations. For a proposal on the logic of the 
connective ‘because’ see Schnieder (2011), but also Fine (2012).
 Work on circularity has helped to elucidate the problematic and unproblematic 19
features of circularity. See Keefe (2002) for some ways in which circularity may 
be tolerated. When applying the criterion, I will take these insights into account.
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philosophical explanation of knowledge is supposed to do: giving 
an account of knowledge generally.  
A lack of generality, however, may not always be a bad thing. It 
may also be indicative of a false expectation that the phenomenon 
in question is uniform. In such a case, the discovery of a non-
general explanation may help us to understand that a phenomenon 
we conceive of as uniform is in fact quite disparate. 
Consequently, care must be taken when applying the criterion of 
generality in the particular case to take into account the possible 
disparity of the phenomenon. Still, a comparative judgment 
between theories is, other things equal, possible: A theory that 
gives a wholly general explanation is, other things equal, better 
than a theory which only gives a partial explanation. 
The final requirement is intelligibility.  This is a rather loose 20
requirement and a catch all phrase for a range of different sub-
requirements, among them the classical theoretical virtues of 
simplicity and elegance, but also something we may call 
believability, the requirement that the theory should be somewhat 
credible. Nonetheless, it is important that these virtues are not 
assessed singly, but under the heading of the goal these 
requirements aim at: a theory that helps us to further our 
understanding of the world and thus makes intelligible what it 
takes for a certain phenomenon of philosophical interest to obtain. 
One important indicator for intelligibility is whether the theory 
requires us to take up a number of beliefs we would not have 
thought to be independently plausible or whether it requires us to 
 The phrase intelligibility is used for lack of a better catch all phrase for a 20
number of theoretical virtues. It should not be thought to imply that a theory 
which scores low on this requirement can literally not be understood, rather, a 
theory that scores high on this requirement, fits better with our overall world-
view.
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let go of beliefs we regard to be obvious or well justified. The 
reason this requirement matters is that it helps us assess how well 
the theory fits into our overall picture of the world and relates to 
our other beliefs. If it is radically revisionary in a number of 
ways, there is need for very strong independent reasons to believe 
in the theory.  
The need for a good fit with beliefs is especially urgent in the area 
the theory is about. If a theory of knowledge, for example, 
classifies most of what we take to be knowledge as non-
knowledge, it is probably not a good theory of knowledge, but 
possibly a theory of something else. Equally, if a theory of 
necessity classifies a lot of truths which we would take to be 
necessarily true as non-necessary (or vice versa) there is at least 
defeasible reason to believe that something about the theory is 
wrong. 
These three criteria, non-circularity, generality, and intelligibility 
will be the guide in assessing different prominent theories of 
modality, as well as my proposal in the second part. In the 
following chapter the most influential contenders for a theory of 
modality are presented and assessed against the developed 
requirements. 
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Chapter 2: Explanations of Necessity 
Some methods used for giving philosophical explanations as well 
as very general criteria for a successful theory of necessity were 
discussed. In this chapter, the abstract discussion will be made 
more concrete by looking at some popular approaches to the 
explanation of necessity. This will help to better understand the 
different projects that have been pursued when explaining 
necessity as well as their strengths and weaknesses. The 
discussion, however, is neither intended as a complete survey of 
theoretical options, nor as a refutation of any of them. The 
intention is to get a clearer picture of the challenges popular 
approaches face and what it is that may make them unsatisfactory. 
I will start out with one of the most influential theories, genuine 
modal realism as spelled out by David Lewis, move on to (non-
primitivist) Ersatz-Theories, before considering primitivism as a 
possible way to respond to the challenges these theories face. 
Finally essentialism, which has regained popularity only 
relatively recently, will be discussed.  
Before starting, a caveat is in order. I will not discuss each 
position in sufficient detail to reflect all intricacies of the vast 
research literature on each that has been accumulating during the 
last half century. Rather, I will attempt to give a generic outline of 
each theory that gives the basic idea behind each a reading that is 
as charitable as possible. The lack in detail will be weighed up by 
the benefits for exposing the explanatory relations each theory 
posits and the resulting challenges they face. 
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1. Possible Worlds - Genuine Modal Realism 
The starting point for possible world theories of modality are two 
biconditionals:  21
(Nec) Necessarily p, iff in every possible world p 
(Pos) Possibly p, iff in some possible world p 
The two biconditionals associate talk of necessity with 
quantification over possible worlds, or more intuitively, over 
possibilities. This association has some intuitive basis in our 
everyday ways of speaking. We can, for example, either say that it 
possibly rains in the afternoon, or we can say that there is a 
possibility that it will rain in the afternoon. Both ways of 
expressing possibility seem to get the same information across. 
Similarly in the case of necessity: There is no possibility in which 
p is false, expresses the same as necessarily p.  
Apart from this intuitive evidence possible worlds are the 
standard way of conceiving of the structures used to give formal 
semantics for modal expressions.  So it seems that there is good 22
reason to take the biconditional above to be true.  
While the truth of the biconditionals is quite uncontroversial, it is 
an open question, whether the right hand side of the biconditional 
gets us any closer to an understanding of what it takes for a 
proposition to be necessarily or possibly true. That is, it is not so 
obvious that the proposed direction of explanation is helpful as a 
constitutive explanation of possibility and necessity. 
The proponent of genuine modal realism thinks that a genuine 
explanation of modality is provided by possible worlds. He 
believes that we should take the right hand side of the 
 The theory is most famously defended by David Lewis in his (1986) and 21
already suggested in Lewis (1973).
 See for example Kripke (1959) and Kripke (1963), but also Marcus (1995)22
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biconditional as literally quantifying over possible worlds. Truth 
at those possible worlds is to be understood in the same sense as 
truth in the actual world, just that the world in question is a 
different world. According to David Lewis, we should think of 
those other worlds as concrete individuals, just like our world, 
which are different worlds from the actual world in virtue of not 
being spatiotemporally connected to our universe.  
If we intend to take talk of truth at possible worlds seriously, as 
explaining what it takes to be necessarily true, this surely is the 
way to go. For it seems to deliver the most straightforward 
understanding of what truth at a possible world consists in: 
ordinary truth at a different point in modal space.   23
If we take the possible worlds to explain modality, however, we 
face a dilemma. Either we have to accept that there are a lot, 
really a lot, of concrete universes spatiotemporally disconnected 
from ours, one for every possible difference to our world, or we 
have to take all our possibility talk to be false and every truth as 
necessarily true, because we cannot bring ourselves to believe that 
there are all these other concrete universes.  24
For the analysis to provide us with a good philosophical 
explanation, all the possible worlds really must exist and be 
 To account for some intricacies involving identity across possible worlds, 23
Lewis (1983, 1986) introduces counterpart-theory, which can be understood to 
be his official theory of necessity. This complication will not concern us 
presently, as it also implies the necessity of the biconditional above and it also 
requires the existence of concrete possible worlds.
 To get some feeling for how many concrete possible worlds there would have 24
to be for our possibility talk to be true, think about the world in which you now 
have one hair less than you actually do, or a world in which there is one less 
grain of salt in your meal, and so on. We get a vast number of worlds, even 
before we get to the more ordinary possibilities, like the possible rain in the 
afternoon. 
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delimited by what is possible. But what reason do we have to 
believe that there are all these concrete possible worlds?  
David Lewis answer to that question is the following: “Because 
the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is 
true.”  The hypothesis is serviceable, according to Lewis, 25
because it allows us to give a host of philosophical explanations: 
With possible worlds we can explain necessity and possibility. 
With possible worlds we can explain essences and other modal 
notions. With possible worlds we can explain counterfactual 
conditionals in terms of similarity of possible worlds. With 
possible worlds we can explain what propositions are. With 
possible worlds we can explain what properties are.   26
Still, as Lewis admits, “Modal realism does disagree, to an 
extreme extent, with firm common sense opinion about what there 
is.”  He takes this to be a price worth paying. 27
The Lewisian evaluation of the tradeoff between firm common 
sense opinion and alleged theoretical benefits has not been widely 
shared. Most philosophers have taken common sense opinion to 
win out and opted for a different view of what possible worlds 
are. The case against concrete possible worlds has further been 
bolstered by doubts that a possible worlds framework can deliver 
the benefits advertised. There is, for example, good reason to 
doubt that sets of possible worlds are propositions, because all 
necessarily true propositions would come out as identical.  Also, 28
 Lewis (1986) p.325
 Lewis (1986) shows how this may be done in great detail.26
 Lewis (1986) p. 13327
 This is a fairly standard objection to an analysis of propositions in terms of 28
sets of possible worlds and there are some ways to alleviate the strength of the 
objection, but it remains the case that sets of worlds will not be fine-grained 
enough to serve as propositions. For an overview and a recent discussion see 
Hanks (2009)
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essences may not be analyzable in terms of possible worlds.  29
Similar doubts may apply to the other alleged benefits of 
accepting possible worlds. 
The details, however, will not be of further concern here, let me 
instead go over the desiderata for a good philosophical 
explanation, to see how the theory fares with respect to them. 
The first desideratum for a good philosophical explanation is non-
circularity. This desideratum is satisfied, even though it has been 
challenged by some.  To see this, consider how the explanation 30
of the necessity of an arbitrary necessary truth p is achieved: We 
need two components for the explanation. First, we need to be 
told what it takes for a proposition to be necessary. This part of 
the explanation is given by the biconditional (nec): To be 
necessarily true is to be true in all possible worlds. Second, we 
need it to be the case that p really is true in each possible world. 
So given that p is necessarily true, it is necessarily true that p, 
because p is true in each concrete world. So necessary truth is 
explained by truth at multiple places in modal space. What it takes 
to be necessarily true is truth at all such “locations”. 
Some may be inclined to object, that to delimit the possible 
worlds, we need to make reference to what is possible, but this is 
a misunderstanding of Lewis’ position. Which worlds exist does 
not depend at all on what is necessary and what is possible. To get 
all the possibilities we want, we have to believe that there are a lot 
of them, but that itself is not part of the explanation and Lewis has 
 Fine (1994).29
 For some attempts along these lines see Divers and Melia (2002) and (2003), 30
(2006). These attempts, however, should better not be read as alleging 
circularity, rather as doubting that there is adequate reason to believe that there 
are enough possible worlds, safe by giving a modal account of them. A rejoinder 
can be found in Cameron (2010a) and (2012).
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a way of distinguishing between different worlds that is non-
modal: Different worlds are spatiotemporally disconnected from 
each other. So I conclude that the requirement of non-circularity 
does not threaten genuine modal realism in its explanatory 
ambitions. 
The second requirement is generality, and at least if the 
hypothesis that there are a lot of other possible worlds is correct, 
it will hold. For if there are all these worlds, then the suggested 
explanation works quite generally for any necessary truth. It even 
offers a nice way to conceive of other, more restricted kinds of 
possibility, by quantifying over a subset of all possible worlds.  31
So there is no obvious quarrel with this requirement either. 
The theory does have a fairly big deficit in satisfying the third 
desideratum, intelligibility, however. For genuine modal realism 
asks us to start believing in the existence of a lot of other concrete 
possible worlds. This is a fairly heavy burden, for while we might 
sometimes be inclined to believe in physical theories of parallel 
universes, we surely have no good independent reason to believe 
that there is a world for every way our world could be. This 
speaks strongly against the proposed explanation, for if we take 
seriously our belief that there are no other worlds apart from ours 
and we also take the analysis to be correct, we will arrive at the 
conclusion that every proposition is necessary and nothing that is 
not actually true is possible. This, however, seems to be plainly 
false, for some things that are not actually the case are surely 
possible.  
While Lewis takes this to be a reason to believe that there are 
really quite a lot of different possible worlds, it is more likely to 
 How this may be done is described by Lewis here (1986)31
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be taken as a reason to think that the biconditional, if it requires 
quantification over concrete worlds on the right hand side, is 
false. From this point of view, the postulated existence of a 
pluriverse of possible worlds seems like a classic reductio ad 
absurdum.   32
A charitable way of interpreting the findings here is this: If there 
should be no good way to explain necessary truth without 
recourse to concrete possible worlds, then this constitutes some 
reason to believe that there are all these concrete possible worlds. 
However, we have no good reason to take the theory to give us a 
good explanation, given that we don’t believe that there are all 
these possible worlds.  
So in the following I will take Lewis by his word when he writes: 
“I acknowledge that my denial of common sense opinion is 
severe, and I think it is entirely right and proper to count that as a 
serious cost. […] I still think the price is right, high as it is. Modal 
realism ought to be accepted as true. The theoretical benefits are 
worth it. Provided, of course, that they cannot be had for less.”  33
The discussion in the following is intended to show that this 
proviso does not hold. There is a way to have an explanation of 
necessity for less, and that is a reason to think that Lewis’ analysis 
is false. 
2. Possible Worlds - Non-Primitivist Ersatzism 
Lewis’ genuine modal realism has been influential in the 
discussion on modality, but it has not found many adherents. The 
 Lewis (1986) acknowledges this criticism and discusses it under the label of 32
the “incredulous stare”, but ultimately dismisses it, by challenging his opponents 
to come up with a better theory. A detailed critique along similar lines can be 
found in Jubien (2008).
 Lewis (1986) p.13533
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majority of philosophers have preferred to keep the biconditionals 
(nec) and (pos), but to read ‘possible world’ as referring to some 
more uncontroversial representational entities, or collections 
thereof.  A possible world, on this view, may be a set of 34
propositions or a set of sentences. Since we are likely to believe 
that there are, at least in some sense, propositions or sets of 
sentences, the doubts about the existence of possible worlds 
would be alleviated and we might get an explanation of necessity 
and possibility out of (nec) and (pos) after all. 
Since possible worlds on these accounts are supposed to be some 
kind of representation, the relevant notion of truth will not be 
regular truth at a world, but rather something like truth according 
to the world-story. To simplify, we may take worlds to be sets of 
propositions and truth at a world to be membership in that world-
representing set. To make this difference in what it is to be true at 
a world explicit, (nec) and (pos) can be modified in the following 
way: 
(nec*) necessarily p, iff p is a member of every world-making set 
of propositions 
(pos*) possibly p, iff p is a member of a world-making set of 
propositions  35
The biconditional should, as in the case of genuine modal realism, 
give us a recipe for giving an explanation of what it takes to be 
necessarily true for any necessarily true proposition p. The 
explanation would accordingly run as follows: p is necessary, 
because it is a member of every world-making set of propositions. 
 Most famously Adams (1974) and Plantinga (1978) . Arguably, these writers 34
are not committed to a non-primitivist version of ersatzism and so may not be 
subject to the worries outlined here.
 I borrow the phrase ‘world-making’ from Lewis (1986) p. 142 ff. 35
!41
Once again care must be taken not to trivialize the explanation, 
but the way in which the explanation should be understood has 
been outlined above. 
At first glance, this may seem like a fairly good explanation. 
Surely there are propositions (or if you do not like propositions, 
there are sentences or other representations) and so there are quite 
a few sets of them. So there is no worry, as in the case of genuine 
modal realism, that the relevant sets may not turn out to exist. 
However, there is another problem, which, if it is to be solved, 
threatens to make the explanation circular: There are sets of 
propositions which clearly do not represent possibilities. Given 
that both the proposition that it is raining here right now and the 
proposition that it is not raining here right now exist, a set 
containing both propositions exist. But it cannot be that both form 
a world-making set or are members of a world-making set, for it 
is not possible that it is both raining and not raining. So while it 
may be uncontroversial that there are enough sets of propositions, 
there are too many and we need a way of identifying the ones that 
are world-making, that is, the ones that represent genuine 
possibilities. The trouble is that there seems to be no general way 
to do that which does not itself invoke what is possible.  
We may take the world-making sets to be those that consist only 
of propositions whose conjunction is possible. But in that case, 
we will get a circular explanation for the propositions which are 
such conjunctions: A proposition is possible, because it is a 
member of a world-making set of propositions, and a proposition 
is a member of a set of world making propositions, because the 
propositions jointly represent what is possible. Here no 
explanation of what it takes to be possible is achieved, the 
explanation is circular. 
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There are ways of cutting down on the sets of propositions that do 
not obviously lead to circularity. One may, for example, take the 
world-making sets to be maximal sets of propositions, that is, sets 
of propositions that only have constituents that either contain a 
proposition or its negation, thus avoiding overt contradictions. 
But this will not suffice, as not only logical contradictions are 
impossible. It is, for example, also impossible for something to be 
both a bachelor and married, or to be a closed three sided figure in 
euclidian space and being a square.  36
One may still insist that there are ways to identify the world-
making sets of propositions without overtly relying on necessity 
and possibility. This may work. One may, for example, specify the 
world-making sets as those that are consistent, where consistency 
is not itself explained in terms of necessity and possibility. But 
this will leave us with the primitive notion of consistency that 
seems just as much in need of explanation as necessity and 
possibility, and so it does not fare well with respect to the 
intelligibility-requirement on explanation. This option will be 
further discussed in the section on primitivism, so let me put it 
aside for the moment.  37
It is instructive so see why genuine modal realism does not have a 
problem of circularity while reductive ersatzism does. The modal 
realist can help himself to possible worlds, because what exists is 
not itself a modal matter. The space of possible worlds may turn 
 See Lewis (1986) for an extensive discussion of the problems of ersatzism and 36
especially the circularity worry. The version of ersatzism I outlined here comes 
closest to the linguistic ersatzism Lewis critiques.
 Keefe (2002) explores ways in which circularity may not be harmful in 37
philosophical explanations. She explicitly takes a certain ersatzist-view to be an 
example of a non-harmfully circular philosophical analysis. However, she takes 
the notion to incompatibility as primitive in her example. Thus subscribing to a 
version of primitivism, whose merits I discuss in the following section.
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out to be very different from what we take to be possible. There 
may be 17 worlds, or there may be just one. That there is just one 
is of course what we would ordinarily think, and thus one is 
inclined to reject the biconditionals (nec) and (pos). Lewis 
disagrees and thinks that a pluriverse of possible worlds really 
exists. Importantly, however, both hypotheses may turn out to be 
the case independently of what we take to be possible.  
The situation for the ersatzist is different, as there are no worries 
about there not being enough sets of propositions. Rather, the 
worry is that there is no non-circular way to pick out a privileged 
portion of them, the world-making sets, that have the nice feature 
of representing only what is possible. And so the problem is not 
that the analysis in terms of (nec*) and (pos*) is incorrect given 
our opinion of the truth of the biconditionals, but rather that there 
is no way of spelling out what a world-making set is that doesn’t 
make the explanation circular and thus unacceptable as an 
explanation of necessity. 
To sum up, while ersatzism does not require us to start believing 
in many concrete possible worlds, it has difficulties gaining 
explanatory currency from the biconditionals (nec*) and (pos*), 
as the explanation is likely to be circular. This is the most 
important reason why most ersatzers will likely opt for some 
version of primitivism. 
3. Primitivism 
The primitivist about modality is dissatisfied both with Lewis’ 
modal realism, and with the reductive ersatzist way of finding 
substitutes for possible worlds. So while she may still accept the 
possible-world biconditionals, she does not think that they are to 
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be used in an explanation of modality.  Rather, it is to be 38
accepted that some (broadly) modal notions just cannot be further 
explained. The task is then to find one such notion that is as 
intelligible as possible and to show that all other modal notions 
can be explained in terms of it. 
Primitivism, I want to point out, is something of a misnomer, as 
every philosophical explanation takes some notions as primitive, 
that is, as understood in the context of the attempted explanation. 
The label ‘primitivism’ as opposed to ‘reductionism’ derives from 
an unnecessarily restrictive view of philosophical methodology, 
where conceptual reduction is seen as the only method. In this 
framework it makes sense to claim that no reformulation of 
necessity claims is possible in terms of concepts that are not part 
of some suitably delimited class of modal notions.  That no such 39
reformulation is possible, however, is not a sign that the 
explanation is defective, or somehow worse off than a reductive 
explanation. For it may just be a contingent fact about our 
conceptual framework, or about our vocabulary that no such 
reformulation is possible. Once we take a broader view of 
philosophical explanation as constitutive explanation, whether a 
conceptual reduction is possible or whether only an explanation 
with the help of other modal notion is possible, is not relevant to 
an assessment of the quality of the explanation. What is relevant, 
however, is whether the explanans itself is well understood, 
 Lewis (1986) classifies Primitivism as a kind of ersatzism: Magical ersatzism. 38
I prefer to keep genuine ersatzism distinct from primitivism, for the latter 
explicitly rejects the need for an explanation of at least some modal notions, and 
is broader than a primitivism based merely on possible worlds.
 What counts as a “modal notion” is somewhat unclear. The present debate, 39
however, does not depend on having a clear idea of what counts as a modal 
notion.
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regardless of its status as ‘modal notion’. This is what the 
primitivist has to watch out for, and it is one of the key 
weaknesses of primitivist theories of necessity. To get a flavor of 
some such proposals, let me present two. 
Robert Stalnaker suggests to think of possible worlds as ways the 
world might be, where “ways the world might be“ are properties 
of the actual world and are taken as primitive in an explanation of 
necessity. He writes: “The moderate realist [Stalnaker himself] 
believes that the only possible worlds there are—ways things 
might have been—are (like everything that exists at all) elements 
of our actual world.”  Ways the world might be are properties of 40
the actual world and so what it takes for something to be possible 
is that it is a way the world might be. Other writers accept 
different primitives. Jennifer Wang for example takes the notion 
of incompatibility between properties to be her primitive modal 
notion and shows how we can use it to elucidate what is possible 
and what is necessary.  A proposition, according to her, is 41
possibly true, because the properties it predicates are not 
incompatible properties of something. 
Different primitivist proposals may seem like a fairly good 
philosophical move vis-à-vis genuine modal realism or the 
circular attempts at ersatzist reduction, but its explanatory merits 
depend on whether we have a good idea of what it takes for the 
primitive of the theory to obtain. So, as far as possible, there 
should be no further interesting question to be asked about what it 
takes for the primitive to obtain. It should, for example, be clear 
without further explanation what it takes for two properties to be 
incompatible. Or it should be clear without further explanation 
 Stalnaker (2003) p. 3240
 Wang (2013a), (2013b)41
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what it takes for something to be a way the world might be. I have 
my doubts that the particular notions suggested here really move 
us closer to a constitutive account of what it takes to be 
necessarily true, but there may be other explanations, broadly 
within the primitivist camp, which may do a better job.  42
Since in the following a theory of necessity will be suggested that 
does not have to take modal notions as primitive, I will contend 
myself with these remarks for now. What I will have to show, is 
that the theory I develop scores higher in terms of intelligibility. 
That is, it should be clearer what it takes for the primitives of the 
theory to obtain. 
4. Essentialism 
Using essences as a way of explaining necessary truth has 
recently gained some popularity. This is especially due to Kit 
Fine’s counterexamples to the standard modal analysis of essence. 
The standard analysis says that the essential properties of an 
object just are the ones it has in every possible world in which it 
exists. However, it seems that not every property an object 
necessarily has, should count as part of the essence of an object. 
Consider Socrates and the singleton set containing only Socrates. 
It is both necessary that if the singleton of Socrates exists, then it 
has Socrates as a member, and that if Socrates exists, then he is 
the member of the singleton containing him. But intuitively it is 
not essential to Socrates to be a member of the singleton 
containing him, just as it isn’t part of Socrates’ essence to be such 
that triangles in euclidian space have an angle-sum of 180 
degrees, even though both are properties Socrates has necessarily. 
 A recently popular line of argument is to ground modality in dispositions or 42
potentialities. See for example Borghini and Williams (2008), and Vetter (2015).
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Consequently the necessary properties of an object cannot be 
identified with its essential properties.   43
Even if these counterexamples may be countered by restricting 
the kinds of properties allowed in a specification of essence, they 
are suggestive of a different direction of explanation running not 
from modality to essence, but from essence to modality.  The 44
explanation suggested by Kit Fine runs as follows: Necessary 
truths are necessary by being true in virtue of the essence of the 
objects they are about.  It is, for example, necessary that Socrates 45
is human (if he exists), because it is part of Socrates’ essence to be 
human. It is necessarily true that p or not p, because it is part of 
the essence of the combination of logical connectives that they 
yield the truth value ‘true’ if the input is the same proposition. 
Similar explanations can be given for other necessary truths. 
The essentialist theory gives a noncircular and general 
explanation of what it takes for a truth to be necessary. The non-
circularity condition is satisfied, if essences themselves are not 
spelled out in terms of necessity. The explanation runs, 
schematically, as follows: p is necessarily true, because its truth 
flows from the essence of objects (x,y…). There is no obvious 
reference to modality in the explanation, and so to guarantee non-
circularity, the essentialist is committed to not giving an 
explanation of what it is to flow from the essence of something in 
modal terms. Since that was the advertised theory in the first 
place, it is fairly certain that the non-circularity requirement is 
satisfied.  
 Fine (1994) p. 4ff.43
 For a suggestion along these lines see Wildman (2013), for another defense of 44
the modalist position see Paul (2006)
 Fine (1994) p. 9. Other philosophers defending an essentialist theory of 45
modality are Lowe (2008b) and Hale (2013)
!48
The generality-desideratum is also likely to be satisfied, provided 
that essences are rich enough to cover all necessary truths in need 
of explanation. So in principle at least, the explanation of 
necessity in terms of essence should turn out to be general.   46
The trouble with the explanation of necessity in terms of essence 
lies, as so often, with the last desideratum: intelligibility. The 
trouble is twofold. First, it seems that essences themselves are in 
need of explanation. Second, some clarification of what it takes 
for a truth to flow from the essence of something or what it is to 
be true in virtue of essence would be desirable. These two points 
will be elaborated on in chapter 8 of part two, so presently I will 
be content with just giving an outline of the two potential 
problems. 
The first problem comes out best when considering why 
philosophers have taken essence to be explicable in terms of 
necessity. The reason was philosophical dissatisfaction with the 
concept of essence itself and the reasonable hope that an 
explanation of modality may be easier to come by than an 
explanation of essence. While these hopes may not be justified, 
given the theories of necessity surveyed here and the apparent 
counterexamples to such analyses, it still remains to be seen 
whether a good explanation of what it takes to be (part of) the 
essence of something can be given. Some attempts have been 
made to think of essence as given by a real definition, but, as 
before, it is at least unclear that this helps to clarify the notion.  47
 Fine (2002) himself has some doubts about it and seems to believe that some 46
other kinds of modality, for example, natural necessity, should be accounted for 
differently. Some of these intricacies are discussed in Part II, Chapter 8 of the 
present thesis.
 see Fine (1994), and Lowe (2001) for attempts to account for essence in terms 47
of real definition.
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The second problem amounts to the question of how the fact that 
something is (part of) the essence of something gives rise to the 
necessary truth of a proposition involving the object which has 
this essence. Why, for example, should the fact that Socrates is 
essentially human, make the proposition that Socrates is human 
necessarily true? The answer an essentialist may be prone to give 
is the following: being human is part of what it is to be Socrates, 
and so Socrates cannot exist without being human. So it is 
necessarily the case that he is human, if he exists. The trouble 
with this answer is that being part of the essence of something is 
identified with being a necessary condition for an object’s 
existence. But if essence just is a necessary condition for the 
existence of Socrates, then essence is again explained in modal 
terms, which the essentialist cannot do on pain of circularity. So, 
just as in the case of primitivism, it is unclear what it takes for the 
explanans, being true in virtue of essence, to be the case. The 
challenge for the essentialist is therefore to give some answer to 
what it takes for a truth to be “true in virtue of essence” and how 
this gives rise to necessity. 
All this is not to say that there is no way to make this theory 
work, and even a certain primitivism about truth in virtue of 
essence may be a viable fallback position, but it highlights the 
downside of a theory of necessity in terms of essence. 
Summing up 
I outlined four prominent ways of giving a theory of modality and 
discussed some of their drawbacks as well as strengths. I did not 
give a knockdown-arguments against any of the positions, but 
some general understanding of the difficulties of giving a theory 
of modality could, I hope, be gained: Reductive possible world 
theories face the problem that they need to give a non-circular 
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account of what possible worlds are. The only account which 
succeeds in this endeavor, genuine modal realism, either requires 
us to believe in a pluriverse of other concrete worlds, or yields 
that nothing non-actual is possible. Both options seem a high 
price to pay. The way out, taking uncontroversial ersatz-entites to 
play the role of possible worlds, fails, because the only way to 
delimit the ersatz-entities is by recourse to possibility and is thus 
circular. These findings may push one towards accepting some 
primitivism about modality and thereby incur a certain risk that 
the primitives of the theory are themselves in need of explanation. 
Proponents of essentialism incur a similar risk. For its basic 
explanatory notion, truth in virtue of essence, may itself be in 
need of further explanation.  
So it is safe to say that the biggest challenge for a viable theory of 
modality is that the explanans itself must be intelligible, such that 
there is no interesting further constitutive question about what it 
takes for it to obtain.  48
 I do not want to exclude the possibility that there is always some such further 48
question to be asked. Indeed it is quite likely that there is always some such 
further question to be asked. However, these questions should be philosophically 
less interesting than the original question.
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Chapter 3: Analyticity and Necessity 
An explanation of necessity that was omitted in the above list is 
the once popular, now scarcely defended view that the necessary 
truths just are the analytic truths. In the following this theory and 
some of its problems will be discussed. The difficulties of such a 
theory, I argue, justify today’s almost universal contempt for it. 
However, something insightful can nonetheless be gained from 
some of the roots of these theories. In particular, the conception of 
analyticity advanced by Kant will be shown to provide us with a 
partial blueprint of how a successful explanation of necessity may 
be effected. 
1. Necessity as Analyticity 
Not so long ago analyticity, necessity, and a priority were used 
almost interchangeably: Whatever is a necessary truth is also 
analytic and can be known a priori.  Or so the consensus went. 49
The reasons for adopting this position were typically a strong 
commitment to the empiricist principles of logical positivism, but 
can also be motivated without the theoretical baggage: Many 
standard examples of necessary truths are either tautologies 
(consider: p then p, p or not p), or follow from definitions, 
(consider: bachelors are unmarried men, knowledge is justified 
true belief, etc). Since analytic truths are, on the view abstracted 
from Frege, transformable into logical truths with the help of 
 See for example Ayer (1936a) and (1936b), but also Carnap (1947) and 49
(1952).
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definitions, these examples should all count as analytic.  And 50
since logical truths are uncontroversially knowable a priori, and 
the definitions are just an analysis of meaning, which can be 
carried out in an a priori manner as well, the necessary and 
analytic truths are all knowable a priori. The converse direction is 
also supposed to hold. The reasoning for this is not as 
straightforward, but assuming that a priori conceptual analysis is 
the only philosophical method which provides a way of arriving 
at necessary truths, it is natural to suppose that all three concepts 
are coextensive. The apparent fact that all analytic truths are 
necessary as well as knowable a priori still leaves open the 
explanatory relations between these properties of sentences or 
propositions. But a certain picture suggests itself: both necessity 
and a priority may be explained by analyticity. The reasoning for 
this proceeds from the dual observation that analyticity is truth in 
virtue of meaning, and that meaning is a matter of convention. 
With analyticity as truth by convention we get an explanation of 
the necessity as well as a priority of the truths that are true by 
convention: They are a priori, because conventions are something 
that everyone who is party to the group in which the convention 
holds knows and so does not have to figure out from observation. 
And they are necessary, because their truth is required by the 
 Frege, (1884) GLA §3 p. 14-15 writes something slightly different: “Es 50
kommt nun darauf an, den Beweis zu finden und ihn bis auf die Urwahrheit 
zurückzuverfolgen. Stößt man auf diesem Wege nur auf die allgemeinen 
logischen Gesetze und Definitionen, so hat man eine analytische Wahrheit, 
wobei vorausgesetzt wird, dass auch die Sätze mit in Betracht gezogen werden, 
auf denen etwa die Zulässigkeit einer Definition beruht.” His concern is thus not 
so much with transformability into logical truths, but with the ingredients of a 
proof of the analytic truth.
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conventions, if the convention is constitutive of the meaning of 
the true sentence.  51
At a time, this view may have seemed so obvious, that it hardly 
needed spelling out, but from today’s perspective it seems, to say 
the least, confused. This is for two main reasons. First, it seems 
that there are clear counterexamples to the claim that analyticity, 
necessity, and a priority are coextensive. Second, it is unclear 
how some truth-bearer can be true by convention, even if it is 
admitted that meaning was purely a matter of convention. The 
counterexamples to necessary truths being a priori show that 
there is a need to at least supplement the account to be able to 
accommodate those necessary truths which cannot be known a 
priori. The second criticism is stronger, because it shows that the 
underlying concept of truth by convention is in need of serious 
reevaluation. I will go over both objections in turn.  52
The stock examples for necessary a posteriori truths come from 
Kripke and Putnam. Kripke asks us to consider the identity 
statement “Hesperus is Phosphorus”. Since identities are 
necessarily true, if the names are rigid designators, it is 
necessarily true that Hesperus is Phosphorus.  But, as is well 53
known in philosophical circles since Frege, it is not a priori 
 Here is what Ayer (1936a) p. 20 has to say about it: "They [the analytic and a 51
priori propositions] make no statement whose truth can be accepted or denied. 
They merely lay down a rule which can be followed or disobeyed."
 Historically, Quine’s criticism of the very distinction between analytic and 52
synthetic sentences was very influential. I will, however, not discuss Quine’s 
points explicitly here, as the points I do discuss partly incorporate them. Where 
they don’t, Quine’s criticism focusses largely on the idiosyncrasies of his 
specific opponent, and are thus only of marginal interest to the general project of 
assessing the merits of a theory of necessity in terms of analyticity. The 
interested reader may consult the following works by Quine for his attacks on 
the distinction: Quine (1951a), Quine (1960), Quine (1976).
 Kripke (1980)53
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knowable that Hesperus is Phosphorus, as it was a quite 
substantial empirical discovery that both names denote the same 
planet, that is, Venus.  Another example comes from Putnam, 54
who shows with the help of his twin-earth thought experiment 
that water necessarily has its molecular structure (H2O).  55
Obviously, the molecular structure of water was discovered and 
can only be discovered a posteriori. Both examples show that 
necessity and a priority can come apart, and if analytic truths are 
considered to be a priori on the grounds that they are true by 
convention, then the examples show that not all necessary truths 
are true by convention. This constitutes a significant blow to the 
view that necessity can be explained by analyticity. At least it 
shows that the explanation cannot work in the simple way 
envisaged above.  
There have been attempts at modifying the original theory to 
accommodate the counterexamples. Alan Sidelle, for example, 
argues that even though these necessary a posteriori truths are a 
posteriori, their necessity still derives from an analytical core plus 
some non-modal a posteriori premises.   56
The idea utilizes some of the insights that have been gained in the 
study of meaning. Consider indexical expressions like ‘I’, ‘here’, 
and ‘now’. ‘I’ when uttered by me, denotes me, when uttered by 
you, it denotes you. So on different occasions of use, in a different 
context, a different referent is determined. Still, in some sense, ‘I’ 
when uttered by me, has the same meaning as ‘I’, when uttered by 
you. This core meaning, or character, as it is commonly called 
following Kaplan, stays the same. Formally, character can then be 
 Frege (1948)54
 Putnam (1973) and (1975)55
 Sidelle (1989)56
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viewed as a function or rule from a context to a referent, and may 
plausibly be taken to be a matter of convention.  According to 57
the causal theory of reference advanced by Putnam and Kripke, 
which was designed to account for the reference of names or 
natural kind terms, names and natural kind terms work similarly: 
While there is no change of reference with changes in context, we 
can nonetheless split up what determines the reference into a 
conventional part and an external part. The conventional part 
says, for example that the name is to refer to the person to which 
it has been given, while it is fixed externally who it was given to. 
Similarly in the case of water: the conventional part of what 
determines reference is that the natural kind term water is to refer 
to that substance which was named water. Which substance was 
named water is again fixed externally, it just so happens that it 
was actually H2O. We can think of the core meaning, or character, 
in these cases as a function from a context of introduction to a 
referent, and also view it as a matter of convention.   58
Sidelle’s idea is that we may admit that it is not a priori knowable 
that water is H2O, because we do not know what the substance 
that was named ‘water’ is. Similarly in the case of “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus”. But we do know the core-meaning of the terms a 
priori, since it is a matter of convention, and so at least the 
following conditional is knowable a priori: If the substance at the 
name-giving ceremony was H2O, then necessarily, water is H2O. 
Thus we come to know, by finding out that the substance is 
indeed H2O, that water is necessarily H2O. But the necessity, 
Sidelle suggests, is explained by the conventions, because the 
 For the still standard treatment of indexicals see Kaplan (1977).57
 Gillian Russell (2008) introduces this terminology as well as a more detailed 58
formal treatment.
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only a posteriori element in arriving at the necessary truth that 
water is H2O, is the non-modal premise that H2O is the substance 
indicated at the name-giving ceremony. The premise involving the 
necessity, however, is knowable a priori, and thus we should 
conclude that necessity is explained by convention. 
The suggestion of splitting up the external factors and the internal 
factors of reference determination was taken up by philosophers 
of language as well as defenders of conceptual analysis, and now 
often runs under the broad label of two dimensional semantics.  59
While the insight that reference determination of words works via 
conventional and non-conventional elements is unobjectionable, 
even if contestable in the individual case, Sidelle’s suggestion 
does not quite show that we should conceive of necessity as being 
a matter of conventional truth, for it doesn’t follow from the fact 
that we can know the conditional premise a priori, that its truth is 
merely a matter of convention.  60
The last point is an instance of the second problem of 
conventionalist theories of necessity: How can conventions 
possibly make a sentence true? Surely it is at least partly a 
conventional matter what the content of some sentence is. But that 
seems to be all linguistic conventions can do: they tell us what 
proposition is expressed by a sentence. They cannot also do the 
job of making what is expressed the case. Here is how Paul 
Boghossian puts the point succinctly: “Isn't it generally true - 
indeed isn't it in general a truism - that for any statement S, S is 
true iff for some p, S means that p and p. How could the mere fact 
 see for example: Jackson (2000), Chalmers (2006), Russell (2008). Chalmers 59
and Jackson use the two-dimensional framework explicitly to account for the 
epistemology of modality.
 This point is forcefully made by Yablo (1992) in his review of Sidelle’s book. 60
He attributes the basic point to Lewy (1976)
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that S means that p make it the case that S is true? Doesn't it also 
have to be the case that p?”  Just as it is partly a matter of 61
convention and partly a matter of what is the case that the 
sentence “the sun is shining” is true, it is partly a matter of 
convention and partly a matter of what is the case that the 
sentence “all bachelors are unmarried” is true. This rather obvious 
observation is a strong argument against the conventionalist 
thesis. If it has to be the case for the sentence “all bachelors are 
unmarried” to be true that really all bachelors are unmarried, then 
it is false that its truth is due to its meaning, for it is due to the 
world being such as the sentence says it is. This observation 
shows that no sentence, not even the ones we would want to count 
as analytic, are true by convention, or as it is sometimes put, true 
in virtue of meaning.  
It also reveals a confusion by the conventionalist about what the 
objects that are said to be necessarily true are. For what is 
necessarily true is not a sentence, but what is expressed by the 
sentence. At the very least it is an interpreted sentence, a sentence 
with its full meaning. Assume, for reductio, that it is sentences 
that are necessarily true. Assume the sentence “All bachelors are 
men” was written on the wall of Humboldt University. As of now, 
 Boghossian (1996), p. 364. For similar points see also: Yablo (1992), Lewy 61
(1976), Harman (1996), Salmon (1993), Hale (2002) p.305/p.306. Williamson 
(2006), p.8 footnote 8 puts it this way: “It is widely acknowledged that ‘Vixens 
are female foxes’ is true not simply because it means that vixens are female 
foxes but because it means that vixens are female foxes and vixens are female 
foxes, just as ‘Vixens are hunted’ is true not simply because it means that vixens 
are hunted but because it means that vixens are hunted and vixens are hunted. Of 
course, it is necessary that every sentence which means that vixens are female 
foxes is true, and merely contingent whether every sentence which means that 
vixens are hunted is true, but that does not show that ‘Vixens are female foxes’ is 
true in virtue of meaning in any interesting sense, [...], in the absence of an 
independently established connection between meaning and necessity.” 
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this expresses a necessary truth. But imagine that the use of the 
word ‘bachelor’ changes to not only include men, but more 
people on the gender-spectrum. Then the sentence as written on 
the wall will turn out to be false at some point. Consequently, it 
cannot be the uninterpreted sentence that is necessarily true, but 
must be the sentence cum meaning. This admittedly rather trivial 
point goes to show that the object which is in the business of 
being true or false, and so necessarily true or false, is not the 
sentence independently of its meaning, but only the fully 
interpreted sentence.  
The sense in which a sentence is (at least partly) subject to 
conventions, in contrast, is in the uninterpreted sense. It may, for 
example, be that some sentence (in the uninterpreted sense) is 
subject to a convention that it is always to be interpreted such as 
to turn out true. While such a convention may render the sentence 
(at least as long as the convention applies) true, it would do so 
only by appropriately adapting the interpretation such that it 
always says something that is true. Real examples of such cases, 
with less explicit conventions, exist for sentences with only 
partial conventional meaning: Consider the sentence “I am here 
now”. This sentence, whenever uttered by someone, turns out 
true, because the contextual features for completing the 
interpretation of the sentence are to be selected such that ‘I’ 
denotes the speaker of the context, ‘here’ denotes the place of the 
(speaker of) the context, and ‘now’ denotes the time of the 
utterance.  Consequently, whenever uttered, the sentence will 62
 This is a simplification, for there are cases in which this does not hold. 62
Consider, for example, answering machines, where the line “I am not here right 
now” is both quite common and usually true. Such cases are discussed under the 
label of “the answering-machine paradox”. See for example Sidelle (1991). The 
simplification will suffice for the moment, however.
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express a truth. However, just because this sentence is such that 
the conventions render it true whenever uttered, what it expresses 
is not necessarily true. To the contrary, what it expresses at each 
utterance is a contingent truth: I could have been at another place 
than I am now.   63
This shows that the conventionalists have confused the objects 
that can properly be said to be necessarily true and the objects that 
are subject to conventions. This confusion in turn leads to a 
confusion between two different properties, which apply to two 
different kinds of objects: truth by convention, which applies to 
sentences, and necessary truth, which applies to representations 
with a full meaning or to propositions.  Since some sentences 64
that are true by convention can be representations that are not 
necessarily true, a conventionalist theory of necessary truth is 
bound to fail. 
This is all rather well known territory in the current philosophical 
discussion, but there have recently been some suggestions as to 
how the concept of analyticity, conceived of as a property of 
sentences, can nonetheless play some role as respectable 
philosophical concept, and how necessity may nonetheless be 
explained as arising from conventions.  
 Gillian Russell (2010) recently made a similar point in a paper, arguing that 63
conventionalism about necessity would have to wrongly classify sentences like 
“I am here” as necessarily true. She does not offer the same diagnosis though.
 García-Carpintero and Pérez Otero (2009) offer a similar diagnosis in their 64
defense of analyticity against Boghossian’s argument. They write (p. 240-241): 
“The probem with it [arguments like Boghossian’s] as a refutation of that view 
[that there are analytic truths] lies in that it assumes a dichotomy of candidates 
for the role of truth-bearer that is not exhaustive. It assumes two kinds of bearers 
of truth and modally qualified truth: on the one hand, linguistic items 
individuated merely by their “formal” (phonological or graphic, and syntactical) 
properties; on the other, Platonistic propositions - propositions whose nature and 
properties do not depend on facts about thinkers, in particular facts about the 
intentions and conventions guiding them.”
!60
The first line of reasoning is adopted by Gillian Russell, who 
updates the concept of analyticity and argues that it should play a 
role in epistemology distinguished from a priori knowledge.  65
However, she explicitly rejects that this conception has any role to 
play in an explanation of necessary truth. Russell’s basic idea 
derives from the suggestion that we can sometimes split up the 
factors contributing to the content of sentences into different 
factors, for example into character plus context, which only 
together determine a reference. Russell’s suggestion is that this 
picture of language is still too simple. Rather we should not only 
allow for traditional context-sensitivity and the correlative notion 
of character, but also acknowledge that reference determination 
may be sensitive to what she calls a context of introduction of a 
word. This idea derives from the causal theories of reference 
advocated by Kripke and Putnam, where the situation at the 
context of introduction of a word plays an important role in 
determining its reference. Analytic truths, Russell argues, are then 
to be understood as those which cannot fail to express some truth, 
no matter how the context of introduction and the context of 
utterance are varied. Here is how she puts it: "A sentence S is true 
in virtue of meaning just in case for all pairs of context of 
introduction and context of utterance, the proposition expressed 
by S with respect to those contexts is true in the context of 
evaluation.”  66
 Russell (2008)65
 Russell (2008) p. 56. Russell also gives a further definition not depending on 66
the modal framework, in terms of containment of what she calls reference 
determiners (2008, p. 100). Reference determiners should be thought of as the 
core conditions that have to be satisfied for reference of a word to be 
determined, and may need to be supplemented by the context of utterance or 
context of introduction to determine a reference.
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This definition deliberately makes analyticity, or truth in virtue of 
meaning, a property of only partially interpreted sentences. What 
is expressed by these sentences need not be necessarily true, such 
that contingent truth like “I am here” (at least under simplified 
assumptions) turn out to be analytic. Russell claims that even 
though this notion of analyticity explains neither necessary truth, 
nor the a priori, it has interesting epistemic consequences. 
However strong the last claim may turn out to be, by explicitly 
making analyticity a property of sentences, and denying that 
analyticity explains necessary truth, the account escapes the 
criticism leveled against more traditional accounts of truth in 
virtue of meaning. I will put the account aside for the present 
discussion, however, as the current project is the explanation of 
necessary truth, for which a different conception of analyticity is 
needed. 
A different answer to the challenge that conventions are not what 
makes propositions true consists in taking a more globally anti-
realist approach to necessity. Answers along these lines are 
advocated by Cameron, Sider, and in more detail by Thomasson.  67
Cameron argues that instead of taking truth to be a matter of 
convention, we may take necessity itself to be a matter of 
convention: The way we divide up all truths into the necessary 
and contingent is itself a matter of convention. Cameron invokes 
an analogy to elucidate the view: Just like whether a city is on one 
 Cameron (2010b), Thomasson (2013) and a forthcoming book. Ted Sider 67
(2003) usefully distinguishes between a “governance” and a “classification” 
conception of necessity. On the governance conception the source of the truth 
itself lies in the (source of the) necessity of the truth. Truth in virtue of meaning 
would be an example of this kind of conception. On the classification 
conception, however, truth comes first and its necessity is explained by 
something else. Sider suggests that while the governance conception is 
untenable, a classification conception can possibly be worked out.
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side of a border or on the other is, in a sense, just a matter of 
convention, of where we choose to draw the border, whether a 
truth falls on the necessity-side or the contingency-side of the 
necessary-contingent divide, is a matter of where we draw the 
boundary.  This does not mean that it is arbitrary or that there is 68
no fact of the matter on which side of the border the city is, or 
whether a truth is necessary or contingent, but it is in virtue of 
complex social facts that some truths count as necessary or 
contingent respectively. What these facts are, Cameron suggests, 
can be found out by investigating why we use modal idiom.  
Thomasson similarly argues, that we should take our attributions 
of necessity to not have their ground in any special way of being 
true, but rather in our using necessary truths for normative 
purposes. More specifically, we use modal idiom to express rules 
of language. To support her thesis, Thomasson shows in great 
detail how we can move from expressions of semantic rules to 
modal-attributions and back and cites a range of evidence of 
where modal idiom is used in just this way. 
Some, but possibly solvable, problems for such accounts remain, 
for example, how to account for de re modality and other kinds of 
necessity such as nomic necessity. But these difficulties shall not 
concern us at present. I merely note that even if it can be 
convincingly shown that modal talk is sometimes, or even often, 
used in normative contexts, for example to point to rules of 
language, it does not quite establish the truth of the neo-
conventionalist claims. For the claim cannot only be that they are 
thus used, but that this use is constitutive of what ‘necessarily’ 
means. This, however, should be taken to be true only if there is 
 Cameron (2010b) p. 35568
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no strong reason to believe that there is an explanation of 
necessity not dependent on us using some (true) sentences in the 
suggested normative way.  
Since I will argue in the following that there is very good reason 
to believe that some truths are substantially necessarily true 
without having to be used in a normative way, I take it that these 
theories, while telling us something interesting about how we can 
make use of necessary truths in certain normative contexts, may 
fail in their more global ambitions to constitutively explain what 
necessary truth is. 
2. Analyticity without Convention 
Leaving aside the normativist accounts outlined above, 
explanations of necessity in terms of analyticity are problematic, 
because they appeal to truth by convention and conventions, 
while plausibly involved in giving meaning to words and 
sentences, cannot make true what a sentence says. However, 
thinking of the property of analyticity as applying to sentences, 
and to take these analytic sentences to be true by convention, is 
not the only way of conceiving of analyticity. It certainly is not 
the way in which Kant, probably the source of much talk of 
analyticity thereafter, thought of it. In what follows, I will show 
how we may think of analyticity without conventions, by moving 
from analyticity as a property of sentences, to analyticity as a 
property of representations. Analyticity, in this broadly Kantian 
spirit, should thus not be taken to be truth in virtue of meaning. 
Nonetheless, the analytic truths in the Kantian sense can plausibly 
be taken to be necessarily true, as well as necessary in virtue of 
meaning (in a sense to be qualified).  
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The Kantian account of analyticity does not start from words and 
sentences, but from concepts and judgments. This makes the 
account non-conventionalist from the start. For while it may seem 
plausible that the meaning of words and sentences is contingently 
associated with them by convention, the content of concepts and 
judgments is essential to the concept and judgment itself.  
Kant provides the following definition of analyticity as a property 
of judgments, a definition in terms of concept containment: 
“In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the 
predicate is thought […] this relation is possible in two different 
ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something 
that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely 
outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection 
with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second 
synthetic.”  69
Note first that there is no mention, neither explicitly nor 
implicitly, of truth or even meaning at all. The objects that are 
said to be analytic are judgments that relate a predicate to a 
subject. Judgments of this kind, it seems to be assumed, are 
composed of concepts and concepts themselves may be composed 
of other concepts.  
What exactly judgments as well as concepts are, according to 
Kant, need not be discussed in detail.  For the account to work, 70
 Kant KrV A 6-7: Translation from Kant (1998).69
 The present remarks are not intended to give an exegetically grounded 70
analysis of Kant’s conception of judgments. I merely note some features of 
judgments and their constituents presupposed by the definition of analyticity. 
Also I do not want to claim that the account of representations developed later is 
Kantian in any sensible way. Rather, the conception of judgments and concepts 
presupposed by Kant’s definition of analyticity has some interesting features that 
differ markedly from newer accounts of analyticity, which take it to be a 
property of sentences.
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however, some general features of judgments and concepts need 
to be presupposed. First, judgments and concepts are not to be 
conceived of as just sentences and words. We should rather think 
of them as types of representations, which have their 
representational features essentially. This allows for them to be 
types of concrete thoughts or statements that are individuated with 
respect to what they represent. How finely we should individuate 
judgments and concepts is an intricate matter and there is no need 
to assume any specific view at the moment. Concepts can be 
thought of as building blocks of both judgments as well as the 
building blocks of more complex concepts, but the mode in which 
they contribute to the judgment and the complex concept 
respectively is different. In judgments, the way in which the 
concepts come together determines what it takes for that judgment 
to be true: In the case of subject-predicate constructions the 
referent(s) of the subject concept must be a subset of the referents 
of the predicate concept. So by constituting the judgment, the 
referents of the concepts are said to stand in a certain relation to 
each other. In complex concepts, the constituent concepts have a 
slightly different (if related) function. Here the reference of the 
complex concept depends on the reference of the constituent 
concepts. In the standard case, the reference of the complex 
concept will be determined to be the intersection of its constituent 
concepts. To use Kant’s own example, consider the concept 
‘bachelor’, which is said to consist of the concepts ‘unmarried’ 
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and ‘male’ and thereby has its reference determined by the 
concepts ‘unmarried’ and ‘male’ to be their intersection.   71
With this background, the broadly Kantian definition of 
analyticity comes quite naturally: Some judgments may say of 
things which are A that they are B, where B is a constituent of the 
concept of A. Analytic judgments are thus very literally analytic. 
One can also give a recipe for constructing them: To arrive at an 
analytic truth decompose a concept (for example A into B and C), 
and form a judgment from the complex concept and (one, or both 
of) its constituents (A is B, A is C, A is B and C).  
How does all this relate to necessity? The connection is fairly 
straightforward, and has to do with the way the simple concepts 
play their role both in the constitution of the judgment, as well as 
in the constitution of the complex concept. The judgement’s truth 
requires a certain relationship between the referents of its 
constituent concepts. In the case of the simple subject-predicate 
judgment, the requirement for its truth is that the referent(s) of the 
subject concept are a subset of the referents of the predicate 
concept.  In the case of analytic judgments the predicate concept 72
is contained in the subject concept. So the reference of the subject 
concept is determined partly by the predicate concept. 
Specifically, the reference of the subject concept is determined 
 Concept constitution is problematic, for it is not clear that constitution always 71
gives rise to the referential dependencies outlined here. Presently we may 
circumvent this problems, by taking concept constitution proper to be that kind 
of constitution which gives rise to the relevant referential dependencies.
 For the moment the case of non-referring subject concepts is neglected. We 72
may generally take such judgments to be true, as seems reasonable in the case of 
bachelor. This is problematic in the case of singular subject concepts. In modern 
discussions, a more complex logical form of the judgment solves the problem. 
But presently it is also not objectionable to have different requirements for truth 
for different subject predicate constructions, as I do not claim that constitution 
settles everything about what is required for truth of a judgment.
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such that it is a condition on being the referent of the subject 
concept that it is also a referent of the predicate concept. 
By considering the constitution of the concept and the judgment, 
we gain two facts about the judgment and the concepts 
constituting it. First, by constitution of the judgment, the subject-
predicate judgment is true, just in case the referents of the subject 
concept are referents of the predicate concept. Second, by concept 
constitution, the referents of the subject concept are referents of 
the predicate concept.  
From these two facts it can straightforwardly be concluded that 
the requirements for truth of the judgments are bound to be 
satisfied, no matter what the actual referents of the concepts are. 
So we can infer the judgment’s necessary truth from 
considerations about how reference is determined and from which 
relation between the referents is required for the truth of the 
judgment. Necessary truth of a judgment thus arises from an 
appropriate relationship between what is required for the truth of 
the judgment, and what determines the reference of the 
constituent concepts. 
This is, it seems, both a straightforward explanation of the 
necessity of a subject-predicate judgment as well as an account of 
analyticity that does not fall prey to the main objection raised 
against accounts of analyticity which take it to be truth in virtue 
of meaning. I will go over both points in turn.  
First, consider the explanation of analyticity of “Bachelors are 
unmarried”. Why is this analytic according to the Kantian 
explanation? Because the predicate concept is contained in the 
subject concept. Why is it true? Because the referents of 
‘bachelor’ are a subset of the referents of ‘unmarried’. Why are 
such analytic judgments interesting? Because they are necessarily 
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true in virtue of how the reference of their constituents is 
determined in relation to what is required for their truth. 
These answers do not talk of truth in virtue of meaning at all, or 
any other special kind of truth for that matter. Meaning, in so far 
as it is understood as what determines the reference of concepts, 
as well as what determines the requirements for truth, does play a 
role in the explanation of analyticity as well as necessity, but it is 
not invoked in an illicit manner in the explanation of why the 
judgment is true, for the role ‘meaning’ plays is just the same role 
it plays in any explanation of why an ordinary, non-analytic 
judgment is true. For consider a true non-analytic subject 
predicate judgment: Cabs are black. Again the judgment’s 
constitution determines what it takes to be true: “Cabs are black” 
is true, just in case the referents of the concept ‘Cabs’ are a subset 
of the referents of the concept ‘black’. In contrast to the 
analyticity case, we have no obvious concept containment 
relations between the concepts ‘Cabs’ and ‘black’, and so nothing 
that guarantees that the relation between the referents required for 
the truth holds. Still the explanation for the truth of the judgment 
is the same: it is true because the referents of ‘Cabs’ are a subset 
of the referents of ‘black’. The relevant difference between the 
two cases is just that in the case of the analytic judgment, the 
reference determination of the constituent concepts was 
appropriately related and it was related such as to guarantee that 
the requirements for truth were satisfied.  
This finding also provides us with an explanation of why the 
particular judgment “bachelors are unmarried” is necessarily true: 
It is necessarily true, because the reference of its constituent 
concepts is determined such that its requirements for truth, 
determined by the constitution of the concepts, are guaranteed to 
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be satisfied. In the present case this guarantee is effected by the 
containment relations holding between the concepts plus the 
subject predicate structure of the judgment.  
It seems, therefore, that Kant’s definition of analyticity, 
appropriately understood, gives us a reasonable, if narrow, 
conception of analyticity, as well as a non-circular and 
illuminating explanation of the necessary truth of some 
judgments. Why, one may wonder, was this account abandoned in 
the subsequent discussion on analyticity?  
Part of the reason was surely that the notion of concept-
containment was perceived as too unclear or metaphorical, 
especially in light of the formal developments in logic at the end 
of the nineteeth and beginning of the twentieth century.  There is 73
some reason to believe, however, that Kant was using a technical 
notion of containment, which did have a clearer meaning than is 
apparent today.  More importantly, there is a way of reading the 74
definition that does not take containment literally, but takes 
seriously the role containment plays in the original definition: 
guaranteeing a referential dependency between the 
representations in subject and predicate position. So a minimal 
understanding of ‘containment’ as mere referential dependency, 
should assuage worries about the metaphorical character of 
containment.  
A further factor that may have played a role in rejecting the 
Kantian definition of analyticity was the shift away from talk of 
concepts and judgments to words and sentences, a shift that was 
facilitated by the development of modern logic. But one of the 
 See Frege (1884)73
 For a recent and detailed, historically rich defense of the concept of 74
containment see Anderson (2015)
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main reasons for the demise of the Kantian view of analyticity 
was probably Kant’s own (justified) insistence that analyticity, if 
conceived of in terms of containment, and concerning only 
subject-predicate constructions, is not very interesting, because 
there just are not that many philosophically interesting analytic 
truths. After giving his definition of analyticity in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, he goes on to show that a large number of truths 
which are apparently knowable a priori, are not analytic at all. 
Mathematical truths, for example, do not seem to exhibit any 
concept-containment, but are nonetheless a priori as well as 
necessarily true. Similar considerations apply in other domains. 
So the trouble with the Kantian containment account, despite its 
merit in explaining some cases of necessary truth, is that it is 
insufficiently general. Possibly, some simple truths like “all 
bachelors are unmarried”, “vixens are female foxes”, truths that 
contain explicitly composed concepts such as “red balls are red”, 
and truths we can build from explicit definitions do count as 
analytic in the Kantian sense. But it is quite unlikely that any such 
account can work for philosophically interesting cases. Thus a 
general explanation of necessary truth in terms of containment is 
not to be had. 
We need to be careful, however, what this reasoning 
demonstrates, and what it does not. It shows that concept 
containment by itself can neither explain a priori knowledge nor 
necessary truth generally. But it does not show that it is not part of 
a good explanation of necessary truth in the cases where there is 
concept containment in the relevant sense. Better still, the way in 
which necessary truth is explained, by an appropriate relationship 
between what determines reference and what it takes for a 
representation to be true, may point us to an explanation of 
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necessity that is much more widely applicable. For the ingredients 
of the kind of explanation, reference determination of constituent 
representation together with an appropriate relation to what it 
takes for a representation to be true, require neither complex 
concepts, nor subject-predicate judgments, but merely something 
that determines the reference of constituent representations, and 
the dependency of truth on the relationship of the referents. This 
may be found in a much wider range of cases. So while the 
narrow Kantian containment analyticity may not be widely 
applicable, a wide conception of analyticity, no more chained to 
containment and subject-predicate judgments, may be a much 
more powerful notion. 
It is the purpose of the second part to develop the framework in 
which such explanations become possible. For now, the important 
lesson is that the definition of analyticity, as given by Kant, does 
not exhibit the biggest traditional problem of analyticity: the 
problem that there is no truth purely in virtue of meaning. For 
analyticity, in the Kantian spirit, is not to be conceived of as truth 
in virtue of meaning, but as necessity in virtue of reference 
determination. 
Summing up 
The best known theories of necessity utilizing analyticity are 
spelled out in terms of conventional truth. Analytic truths, on this 
view, are true by convention alone. This special way of being true 
is also supposed to explain their necessity, as there is no way of 
taking them to be false which does not require a change in 
convention. A welcome consequence for the proponents of the 
account is that the necessary truths may turn out to be knowable a 
priori, if knowledge of conventions can be taken for granted. This 
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forms a tight connection between analyticity, a priori knowledge, 
and necessity, and thus seems to validate the radical empiricism of 
some of its proponents.  
Conventionalist accounts, however, are unsustainable. 
Counterexamples to the a priority of some necessary truths have 
shown that one must either give up analyticity’s connection to a 
priori knowledge or the connection to necessity. But even worse 
for the proponents of this theory, it was convincingly argued by a 
range of philosophers that linguistic convention cannot be what 
makes a sentence true: no sentence is true in virtue of meaning 
alone. The most conventions can do is give the sentence a 
meaning, but for it to be true, what it says needs to be the case. 
This seriously undermines the project of explaining necessary 
truth in term of analyticity. Friends of a conventionalist account of 
necessity may abandon the concept of analyticity, and seek to 
make the attribution of necessity a way of expressing 
conventions. This does not fall victim to the objection, but also 
makes necessary truth a rather insubstantial matter. Friends of 
analyticity, on the other hand, may abandon the search for an 
explanation of necessity and a priori knowledge in terms of 
analyticity, and find some different use for a suitably refined 
version of analyticity.  
Help comes from an unsuspected source: the Kantian 
containment-conception of analyticity. The Kantian account does 
not fall victim to the objection that there is no such thing as truth 
in virtue of meaning, for it does not attempt to account for 
necessity in terms of truth in virtue of meaning, but rather gives 
us a way of explaining necessity in virtue of reference-
determination: The containment of a concept (A) in another (B) 
explains that the reference of the complex concept is determined 
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in such a way as to guarantee that the requirements for truth of the 
subject-predicate judgment “B is A” are satisfied.  
As it stands, this account is much too narrow and, as Kripke’s and 
Putnam’s examples have shown, the link between analyticity and 
a priori knowledge needs to be given up, if a general account of 
necessary truth should be constructed from the basic Kant-
inspired idea.   75
I will devote the second part of this thesis to arguing that 
necessity generally can be explained in this way, once we move 
away from an overly narrow conception of what determines 
reference. The crucial move to make such an explanation 
possible, however, is inspired by the Kantian account of 
analyticity. It is to move away from mere sentences as the objects 
of study, and instead to representations, objects which have their 
representational properties essentially. Analyticity and necessity 
should be conceived of as a properties that apply to 
representations, which hold of truth-evaluable representations in 
virtue of the appropriate relationship between what determines the 
referents of the constituents and what is required for the truth of 
the representation.  
If this explanation can be shown to work generally, I take it to 
provide an illuminating and intelligible explanation of necessary 
truth. Convincing the reader that this is the case, is the project of 
the second part of this thesis. 
 I do not want to claim that the resulting account of necessity is Kant’s account 75
of necessity. In fact, it probably isn’t. What Kant’s account of analyticity does 





Chapter 4: Representation, Reference, and Truth 
The discussion at the end of the last part suggested that a broadly 
Kantian conception of analyticity may provide a blueprint for an 
explanation of necessity. This Kantian conception of analyticity 
made use of judgments, concepts, and containment relations 
between them, not of words and sentences and their meanings, as 
was the case for twentieth-century accounts of analyticity. This 
difference in the objects to which analyticity and necessary truth 
attach is crucial to the project of giving an explanation of 
necessary truth in terms of the relationship between reference 
determination and what is required for the truth of a 
representation. To give a fully general account of necessary truth, 
a framework and new terminology will be developed. The starting 
point of the account are referential and truth-evaluable 
representations. Representations, in contrast to words and 
sentences, have their referential properties essentially.  As such 76
they are the proper bearers of necessary truth, or so I will argue. 
It is the task of the present chapter to develop a detailed account 
of representations and their properties relevant to an explanation 
of necessary truth. To clarify the difference between more 
orthodox accounts of the semantics of words and sentences, and 
an account of the relationship between representations and the 
world, as well as to motivate the move from words and sentences 
 Fine (1994) calls this a “thicker and perhaps more natural conception” of a 76
word, and uses the example of the word bank: On the thin conception this is one 
word which may either denote the bank for sitting or the bank for money. On the 
thicker conception the word ‘bank’ as used for the bank for sitting, is a different 
word from the word ‘bank’ as used for the bank for money. García-Carpintero 
and Pérez Otero (2009) similarly urge us to think of words not just as 
individuated by their formal properties, but also by their meaning.
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to representations, I will first discuss a certain picture of language 
underlying the classical semantic project: the communication 
model. This communication model will then be used as a foil to 
elucidate my own account of representations. 
1. The Communication Model 
Human beings use language to communicate with each other. 
Sentences and their constituent words are the vehicles we use to 
convey information. For words and sentences to play this role in 
human interaction, they need to have a meaning. This meaning is 
known by the members of the community speaking that language, 
and so when a speaker uses a sentence to say something, the 
listener can come to know what the speaker says, by knowing the 
meaning of the sentence.  
We can illustrate this with a simple example: Imagine two card-
players who invent a system for communicating how good their 
hand is: Putting the hand to the forehead means few trumps, 
scratching ones beard means lots of trumps. The meaning of the 
signs is agreed on by both parties beforehand, and so when one 
signals, the other can understand the information in virtue of 
knowing the meaning of the sign. So for the sign-system to work, 
both parties must have agreed upon what counts as a sign, and on 
what the sign means. 
The communication model invites us to think of natural language 
roughly along these lines: words and sentences are the signs used 
to communicate information from speaker to listener. Of course 
natural language is more complicated and speakers don’t sit down 
to agree beforehand on the meaning of the signs, rather the signs 
have acquired their meaning over generations and somehow one 
picks up on the meaning by being part of the linguistic 
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community. The basic idea, however, attaching meanings which 
are known to the parties of the conversation to signs in order to 
use these signs in communication, is the fundamental picture 
behind more complicated models.  
A well known picture, the so called semantic triangle illustrates 
the meaning relations between language, mind, and world, as 
conceived of in a communication model nicely: 
On the picture suggested by the communication model and as 
pictured in the semantic triangle, linguistic items are associated 
with mental items, which, in turn, are about the world. The 
relationship between language and world is thus mediated by the 
mind. 
Thinking of language as a tool for communication in this way 
gives rise to two philosophical questions and one linguistic 
question. The linguistic question is what the meanings of the 
particular signs, that is, word-types and sentence-types are and 
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how the meanings of the words and other subsentential 
components combine to constitute the meanings of sentences. The 
philosophical questions are more general. The first is: what are 
the meanings speakers of a language associate with a word or 
with sentences? The second question is: how do words and 
sentences acquire the meaning they have? The first question is a 
question of philosophical semantics, the second of 
metasemantics.  All three questions are probably not wholly 77
independent of each other, for the answer to the linguistic 
question will constrain the answer to the question of philosophical 
semantics which will in turn inform the answer to the 
metasemantic question. Still, it is useful to keep the questions 
separate to avoid confusion.  
Different answers to the question what the meanings of sentences 
and words are have been given. The natural answer, which we 
may take from the communication model and suggested by the 
semantic triangle is that sentences are associated with certain 
thoughts in the head of a speaker and of the listener, and that 
words are associated with the concepts of the speaker and the 
listener. What is so associated is the meaning of the sentence or 
word. However, to enable successful communication, what is 
associated with a sentence by the speaker should, in some sense, 
be the same as what is associated with the sentence by the listener. 
So what is associated must be a thought or concept with the same 
content. What these contents are, which speakers associate with 
words or sentences, is the matter of some philosophical debate.  
 The distinction between semantics and metasemantics is fairly well 77
entrenched. For an early distinction see Lewis (1975). For recent discussions see 
Burgess and Sherman (2014)
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Some, taking a cue from formal semantics, think that 
propositions, the meanings of sentences, are functions from 
worlds to truth values, others, the proponents of Russellian 
propositions, conceive of propositions as sets of properties and 
objects, and Fregeans think that propositions, or thoughts, are 
constituted from the senses of the constituent words, where the 
sense of a word is not an object or a property, but a mode of 
presentation of an object.  The meanings of words, the concepts, 78
are accounted for similarly, fitting the account of what 
propositions are. Who thinks of propositions as functions from 
worlds to truth values, will think of concepts as functions from 
worlds to extensions, and who thinks of propositions as sets of 
properties and objects, will think of the meanings of words as 
properties and objects, while the Fregean will think of the 
meaning of words as modes of presentation of objects.   79
These different accounts have their strengths and weaknesses, but 
these are discussed by other philosophers at length elsewhere and 
the discussion need not be reiterated here.  The important point is 80
that they all have a common starting point in thinking of words 
and sentences in a communication framework, that is, meanings 
are associated or assigned to words and sentences to enable these 
to communicate information. 
 For an account of meanings as sets of worlds, see Lewis (1983) especially his 78
“General Semantics”, for a Russellian account see Salmon (1983) , and for a 
Fregean account see Evans (1982)
 These accounts of propositions are supposed to clarify the nature of 79
propositions. In a more deflationary spirit one may also follow many of the 
arguments on which the debate turns, if one takes it to be about how we can best 
represent meanings in a model of our language. In that sense, meanings could 
merely model some of the aspects of the words of our natural language, as 
opposed to telling us what meanings are.
 A recent discussion of propositions by prominent philosophers in the field can 80
be found in King, Soames, Speaks (2014)
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On a simple picture, of which the toy language above is an 
example, knowing the meaning of a word or sentence involves 
associating the right concept or proposition with the word or 
sentence. So correctly associating a meaning with a word enables 
a listener of a language to understand the information the speaker 
attempts to transmit. This association or assignment of a word 
with a concept, or of a sentence with a proposition, is a contingent 
matter, and typically taken to be at least partly a matter of 
convention: a community of speakers decides on which word or 
sentence to use to communicate some piece of information, but 
could have used different ones instead.  
This simple picture, which neatly associates word-types with 
concepts and sentence-types with propositions, however, is too 
simple to account for all intricacies of natural language, and thus 
needs to be extended. For in natural language, there is not just a 
simple and stable pairing between word-types and concepts, or 
sentence-types and propositions. The examples in the following 
should give the reader an idea of some complications a 
communication picture faces, and how it may be modified to 
account for these difficulties. 
The most obvious examples where a simple matching between 
meaning and sentence, or meaning and word, fails, are sentences 
involving indexicals. Consider the indexical expression ‘I’ as it 
appears in the sentence “I am in London”. When I utter the 
sentence at the time of writing this, it means that I am currently in 
London, which is true. But if, say, my brother uttered the same 
sentence right now, it would be false, for he is currently in 
Germany. So the same sentence can transport two different pieces 
of information, that is, it can have different meanings. On the 
other hand it seems true to say that the sentence “I am in London” 
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does have the same meaning across different uses. But how can a 
sentence both have the same and a different meaning? The 
solution to this puzzle lies in distinguishing between two different 
kinds of meaning. The first is the meaning, sometimes called 
linguistic meaning, we associate with a certain word- or sentence-
type of a language. This is the meaning of the word-type ‘I’, 
which we know as competent speakers. This meaning by itself, 
however, does not yet give us the information we wish to 
transmit, for in order to actually have such an informational 
content, we need contextual information, namely information on 
who the speaker of the sentence is when it is uttered on a 
particular occasion. Once context is filled in, we do have a full 
content. Thus we need to distinguish between two kinds of 
meaning: what speakers know, if they know the meaning, 
following Kaplan we may call this the character of a word- or 
sentence-type, and the information actually transmitted, which is 
the content of a word or sentence as used in a context.  We may 81
think of the character of a word or sentence as a rule that tells the 
speaker which and how contextual information needs to be taken 
into account to arrive at the desired informational content of an 
utterance. In the case of ‘I’ this rule may be something like: The 
referent of ‘I’ is the speaker of the context. 
It is quite controversial which words and accordingly sentences 
are context-dependent, and which contextual features should play 
a role. The most obvious contextual features are place, time, and 
speaker, but many more have been suggested. Contextualists 
 The distinction as well as the terminology go back to Kaplan (1977). In a 81
formal framework, one may think of the character of an expression as a function 
from contexts to contents. Where contents are again functions from worlds to 
extensions.
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about knowledge, for example, have argued that the degree of 
justification required for something to truly count as knowledge is 
contextually determined by what is at stake in the situation in 
which the knowledge is gained or used.   82
Whether a claim of context dependence is true in each individual 
case, is a matter of some controversy, but what should be well 
taken is that we need to distinguish between at least two kinds of 
meaning, the meaning stably associated by speakers of a linguistic 
community with a word- or sentence-type, that enables them to 
understand, taking contextual clues into account, what the 
informational content of an utterance is, and the informational 
content itself.  The character of a word or sentence is sometimes 83
also called the linguistic meaning, for it is what can be stably 
associated with a word- or sentence-type of a language.  If a 84
language does not contain any context-sensitive expressions, 
content and character do not come apart, but as soon as there are 
context-sensitive expressions, they do. 
This slightly more complicated picture already considerably 
expands the simple communication picture introduced above. 
However, some natural language expressions still do not quite fit 
the expanded picture, because some expressions seem not to have 
a linguistic meaning at all, that is, there seems to be no meaning 
 A nicely spelled out contextualist view of knowledge can be found in Lewis 82
(1996).
 Gillian Russell (2008) suggests that we should not just distinguish between 83
content and character, but also between content character and reference 
determiner, where the reference determiner is a meaning even more partial than 
character, which can be modeled as a function from a context of introduction to 
extensions. This kind of meaning is then supposed to handle cases of direct 
reference.
 Sometimes a further distinction is made between linguistic meaning and 84
character, where the latter is narrowly defined as a function from context to 
propositions.
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“in the head” to be associated with the word. An example of such 
expressions are proper names, for which it seems plausible that 
they refer directly, without the speaker or hearer having any stable 
or common rule in mind for picking out the referent. To use a 
name, a speaker does not have to know anything about its 
referent, she can just pick up on the use of the name in the 
community and make true assertions about the referent. One may, 
for example, know very little about Aristotle and not be able at all 
to pick him out with the information available, but still succeed in 
referring to him in conversation.  Examples like this suggest that 85
not every expression of a language has a linguistic meaning, 
thought of as a set of conditions any competent speaker knows, 
but nonetheless the expression contributes to what a sentence 
says. So some expressions seem to contribute to what is said by a 
speaker without being associated with a content the speaker has in 
mind, but rather by being associated with the object it represents 
directly. 
We have moved from the simple communication model, with its 
stable association of sentence-types with proposition, and words 
with concepts, to a distinction between two kinds of meaning, 
character and content, and on to a further peculiarity: expressions 
without apparent linguistic meaning. It seems safe to say that 
linguists as well as philosophers will find many more such 
peculiarities and further complications, as well as combinations of 
deference phenomena with context-sensitivity in natural language. 
For present purposes, these complications need not be further 
reiterated, they are discussed here to show that the 
 A sketch of such a causal theory of reference can be found in Kripke (1980) 85
and Putnam (1975). Other kinds of deference to the linguistic community, which 
not only involve proper names are described by Burge (1979b).
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communication model has resources to deal with many 
complications, but also illustrate that despite the complications, 
the fundamental tenet of the communication model is the use of 
words as tools in successful communication. To facilitate 
communication, word- or sentence-types are contingently 
associated with meanings, even if the associated meaning is 
sometimes only partial. 
The communication-model sketched here merits further 
exploration by linguists and philosophers alike. For the general 
study of representations, reference and its relation to truth, 
however, the communication model is, I will argue, not the most 
helpful model. It is here introduced as a foil to develop a quite 
different framework that abstracts away from the intricate 
question of how words, as tools in communication, succeed in 
transmitting information, and moves on to ask, how it is that 
representations generally relate to the world. 
The reasons for moving from words to representations are 
methodological: If we want to study necessary truth and how it 
may arise from how reference is determined, it won’t help to 
study sentences and their association with meanings only, for we 
want an account not of how some sentence-type with a certain 
linguistic meaning cannot fail to express something true, but of 
why what a particular sentence says in a context cannot fail to be 
true. The sentence ‘I am here’, for example, given its associated 
linguistic meaning, represents something true in any context in 
which it is uttered, but what it represents is something different on 
each occasion of use, and it is a contingent truth each time. So it 
is not the truth of a sentence or sentence-type which is of interest 
for an explanation of necessary truth, but the truth of what the 
sentence is used to represent.  
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Additionally, sentences are not the only kind of representations 
there are. Different kinds, for example mental representations, 
may represent the same thing as a sentence. So if a sentence 
represents something that is necessary, a mental representation 
that represents the same will be necessarily true as well. But if 
necessary truth was due to the connection between a sentence and 
its meaning, then this could not explain the necessity of the 
content of the mental representation. So, if there is to be any 
chance to explain necessary truth by some features of 
representations, the focus should not be on word- and sentence-
types and their association with linguistic meanings, but on 
representations and their relation to what they represent quite 
generally. 
2. Representations 
Instead of taking word-types as the starting point of theorizing 
about reference, I suggest that taking token representations to be 
the primary objects of study is both more generally applicable, 
and more helpful for understanding the relationship between 
reference, truth, and necessity. 
In what follows the theoretical framework in which 
representations are situated is outlined, and the relevant 
representational properties, reference and truth, discussed. To 
start, it will be helpful to get an intuitive grip on what 
representations are, by listing some properties of representations, 
and by giving examples.  
Token representations have their representational properties 
essentially, and are of a type in virtue of having the same 
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representational properties.  Token representations can be either 86
truth-evaluable or referential. Among the referential 
representations we can distinguish between singular and general 
referential representations. Singular representations essentially 
and rigidly refer to only one object, while general representations 
may refer to more than one object.  
Truth-evaluable representations are constituted by referential 
representations, and the truth of the truth-evaluable representation 
depends on the (actual) reference of the referential 
representations. A truth-evaluable representation representing 
Tobi to be a lawyer, for example, is true just in case the referent of 
the referential representation ⌜Tobi⌝ is a referent of the referential 
representation ⌜lawyer⌝.   87
This example already highlights a difference between classic 
semantic models and the present account of representations. On 
the standard picture introduced by Frege, predicates like ‘is a 
lawyer’ are not to be understood as referential, but as functions 
which yield a truth value relative to some input. The extension of 
such a predicate, or its so called reference, is then the class of 
objects for which it yields the truth value ‘true’. Predicates (in so 
far as they are used as referential representations) in the current 
framework are understood as being general referential 
representations, which have the objects in their extension as 
referents. The truth of the truth-evaluable representation then 
depends on the relationship between the referents of constituent 
 Which properties count as the relevant representational properties will be 86
clarified in the subsequent discussion.
 In the following, I use corner-quotes (⌜…⌝) to talk about representations. 87
Regular quotes will be used for quoting sentences (“…”), and single quotes 
(‘…’) for words or phrases.
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referential representation. A defense of this stance will follow 
after having introduced the relevant terminology. 
Representations are typically concrete objects, which have their 
representational properties essentially. A sentence as used on a 
particular occasion to make an assertion is an example of a token 
truth-evaluable representation, but the representation is not 
identical to that (token) sentence. Rather the sentence is a 
representation only in so far as it is used as a representation. 
Equally, some of the words of the sentence are examples of a 
token referential representation, but the referential representations 
are not identical to the words, which are referential 
representations only in so far as they are used as such.  A 88
representational brain state is another example of a token 
representations, although the representation is not identical to the 
neuronal network realizing the representation.  
So representations can have quite different underlying objects 
which realize them, but are not identical to any of them, as these 
underlying objects do not have the representational properties 
essentially. An analogy may help: The lump of clay that is formed 
like a statue is an example of a statue, but is not identical to any 
statue: a statue could be formed of quite different materials, it can 
be made of clay, it can be made of gold, etc. In this sense the clay-
statue is only an example of a statue. But no statue is identical to 
the material of which it is made, for the material may have existed 
 As mentioned before some may have been gesturing at a similar concept by 88
talking about a ‘thick conception’ of words and sentences, which are supposed to 
be words and sentences cum meaning. For example Fine (1994), and García-
Carpintero and Pérez Otero (2009). 
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before the statue came into existence, and may continue to exist 
after the statue is long gone.   89
Even though different representations can have a quite different 
constitution, the examples used in the following will, due to the 
format of the current piece as a piece of writing, be examples 
involving words and sentences. When I talk about representations 
they will appear in corner quotes (⌜…⌝) and the word appearing 
in the corner quote should be understood as being a representation 
of the same kind as the one as which it is commonly used. I will 
in the following sometimes say that a representation is expressed 
by a word, phrase, or sentence. This way of speaking should not 
be confused with talk of sentences expressing propositions, 
prevalent in the communication-model. 
That representations have their representational properties 
essentially means that their identity depends on them having 
certain representational properties, just like my being essentially a 
person means that my being me does not survive me ceasing to be 
a person, or, just like the statue, which, being essentially a statue, 
does not survive loosing the property of being a statue, even 
though its matter may survive.  
That the representational properties are essential to the 
representation does not mean, however, that there is no 
explanation for why a particular representation has the 
representational properties it does. Just as there is an explanation 
for why the statue is a statue, and there is an explanation for why I 
 There is of course a controversy about whether it is possible that more than 89
one material object can overlap in spatiotemporal location, but I take this 
possibility to be well justified, and I will take it for granted in what follows. For 
a defense see Fine (2003), for a differing opinion see Almotahari (2014).
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am a person, there is also an explanation for why a representation 
is the representation it is. 
These remarks are a first starting point and should give the reader 
an idea of what kind of creatures representations are. Before 
moving on to the official definitions of the core concepts of the 
framework, consider the following example-pairs as further 
illustration of when truth-evaluable representations are token or 
type identical: 
1: 
a) The utterance “Snow is white”. 
b) The utterance “Schnee ist weiß”. 
2: 
a) A sign which says “Free hotdogs here” above a hot-dog stand. 
b) The same sign stacked away under the stairs. 
3: 
a) The utterance by me “I am here now” 
b) The utterance by you “I am here now” 
4: 
a) The utterance “Hesperus is bright” 
b) The utterance “Phosphorus is bright” 
The first example illustrates a case of two sentences used as two 
distinct token truth-evaluable representations, which are of the 
same representation type. The utterance of “snow is white” uses 
different words from the utterance “Schnee ist weiß” and they are 
numerically distinct so they are distinct token representations. 
However, both assertions have the same representational 
properties and consequently they are of the same representation 
type. 
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The second pair illustrates a case where a token representation 
looses its representational properties, and thereby ceases to exist, 
even though the concrete object, the writing on the sign, continues 
to exist. The sign, while in use, indicates where free hotdogs can 
be obtained, but once it is stored away, it is not used any more as 
a representation and so it looses its representational properties and 
consequently ceases to be the representation it was. 
In the third pair we have two distinct token representations, which 
use the same form of words with the same linguistic meaning to 
represent something different. Consequently, the two token 
representation, even though they have the same linguistic 
meaning and use the same form of words, are not of the same 
representation type.  
Finally consider the fourth pair, which is another example of two 
distinct token representations that are of the same type. Their 
representational properties are the same, as both ⌜Hesperus⌝ and 
⌜Phosphorus⌝ are singular representations of the same object, 
Venus, and so the two utterances are representations of the same 
type. The difference to the first case, in which different words 
were used to represent the same state of affairs, merely consist in 
the different words used to represent the same object being words 
of the same language. In the first example the words belonged to 
different languages.  
The examples illustrate what it takes to be of the same 
representation type and what it takes to be a token representation. 
What should have become clear is that the starting point is 
different from the communication model in which words and 
sentences of a language and their associated meanings or 
propositions are the central objects of study. Although sameness 
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of representation type lines up nicely with what some 
philosophers have taken to be sameness of proposition expressed. 
This is as it should be, as propositions, at least in part, are 
supposed to be the full meanings of sentences. Representations 
are not propositions, however, as propositions belong to a 
different explanatory project. That this way of thinking about 
representations is more useful in the present context than a 
traditional communication-based framework utilizing linguistic 
meanings and propositions will emerge during the discussion, and 
will be argued for in detail in section six of this chapter. 
In what follows, these first sketchy remarks are supplemented 
with a fuller theoretical framework that will be the basis for the 
account of modality to be developed. I will first focus on 
referential representations, before considering truth-evaluable 
representations. 
3. Representations and Reference 
The central relation that holds between a referential representation 
and what it represents is the reference relation. The reference 
relation holds between a referential representation and an object 
or a number of objects. A name token used on a particular 
occasion is an example of a singular representation, a 
representation that refers rigidly to one object, while general 
representations, for example predicates used as representations, 
typically refer to a number of objects. The singular representation 
⌜Tobi⌝, for example, refers to the single individual Tobi, while 
the general representation ⌜blue⌝ refers to each blue thing.  
That predicates, if used as representations, are said to refer to each 
object of their extension is uncommon, as they are more 
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standardly conceived of as functions from a domain to truth 
values. Their extension can then be defined as the class of objects 
for which the function returns the truth-value ‘true’. While this 
construal of predicates as functions has technical advantages, it is 
by no means mandatory for an analysis of reference and its 
relationship to truth and may even be misleading about the right 
direction of explanation. It will emerge from the discussion that it 
is quite fruitful to conceive of both singular and general 
representations as referential and to explain truth as arising from 
the appropriate relationship between the referents, as opposed to 
taking truth as a semantic primitive which in turn elucidates 
reference. 
Reference is a relation that holds between a referential 
representation and an object or objects, but it does not hold 
primitively. There is an explanation for why it holds: something 
constitutively explains the reference of representations. Thus the 
focus of the following discussion will be on reference 
determination. But before we can embark on this discussion, it is 
helpful to guard against a misunderstanding arising from two 
senses of reference determination, one epistemic, and one 
metaphysical. It is the purely metaphysical sense that is of interest 
to the present project. 
In the epistemic sense of reference determination, reference 
determination is about a thinker having the epistemic means of 
picking out the referent of some word or phrase (in a context). So 
what determines reference in the epistemic sense is what a 
speaker or hearer knows that helps him or her pick out a referent 
of a word. In the simplest case a speaker knows a condition, 
sometimes supplemented by contextual information, that, if 
satisfied, picks out a referent or referents. This condition may 
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diverge from speaker to speaker and it may be that it picks out 
objects with the help of their contingent properties.  This 90
epistemic sense of reference determination, however, is not the 
only one, and it is not the one salient for a framework making use 
of representations as opposed to words, for there is also a 
metaphysical sense of reference determination. What determines 
reference in the metaphysical sense, are the properties constitutive 
of the reference relation holding between referential 
representations and the objects in their extension. 
Whenever a reference relation holds between a representation and 
some object or objects, it holds in virtue of some properties of the 
representation, call these the reference determining properties and 
in virtue of some properties of the referent(s), call these properties 
of the referent(s) the reference realizing properties. The reference 
determining properties and the reference realizing properties 
together are constitutive of the reference relation between a 
representation and an object or objects. 
While the reference determining properties and the reference 
realizing properties work together to establish a reference relation, 
it is the reference determining properties that determine which 
properties the referent needs to have for the reference relation to 
be established. So the reference determining properties are 
explanatorily prior to the reference realizing properties in that 
they determine which realizing properties the referent must have 
for a reference relation to be established. Note, however, that the 
reference determining properties do not determine the referents to 
have the reference realizing properties. They are had by the 
objects prior to anyone referring to them. It is just the fact that 
 Burge (1979a) may be read as arguing that we should think of Fregean senses 90
along these epistemic lines.
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they are referred to by a representation which makes these 
particular properties of an object the reference realizing properties 
vis à vis a representation.  
As an analogy, consider the relation of fit as it holds between a 
lock and a key: For the relation of fit to be established between a 
lock and a key, the lock as well as the key need to have the right 
form. The properties of the lock will determine what properties 
the key must have to fit into the lock.  We may say that the 91
properties of the lock that contribute to establish the relation of fit 
are the fit-determining properties, while the properties of the key 
that contribute to the relation being established are the fit-
realizing properties. Consider the following picture: 
 Also, the form of the key determines what a lock must look like into which it 91
fits. This direction of determination, however, corresponds to a different 
explanation. Equally in the case of referent and representation.
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The picture illustrates the reference relation as it holds between a 
representation and an object. The bulge on the object side 
represents the reference realizing properties while the notch on 
the representation side represents the reference determining 
properties. Whenever the bulge fits into the notch, so to speak, the 
reference relation is established. 
It may happen that there is no object that, so to speak, fits into the 
notch of a representation. In this case no reference relation is 
established, but the representation still has reference determining 
properties that determine what properties an object would have to 
have to be the referent of the representation. 
The important feature of the reference relation that is illustrated 
by the analogy to a relation of fit is that both relations hold in 
virtue of properties of their relata, and that the properties of the 
one relatum determine the properties the other relatum must have 
for the relation to be established.  
Analogies, however, can be treacherous, as they may misrepresent 
some features of the analogon. The function of the present 
analogy is to illustrate how a relation can be established in virtue 
of properties of the relata, and how properties of the one relatum 
can determine what properties the other relatum needs to have for 
a relation to be established, it is not the claim that the reference 
relation is a relation of fit, and it is not the claim that reference is 
somehow established by relations of fit between a representation 
and its referent(s). Such suggestions, reminiscent of a picture 
theory of meaning, would be too narrow and therefore 
implausible. 
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Type-identity for referential representations 
One important question that can be tackled with the developed 
concepts, is a criterion of type-identity for token representations. 
The focus is presently on referential representations and the 
criterion of type identity will be extended to truth-evaluable 
representations in the next section.  
Intuitively we would like to say that referential representations are 
of the same representation type, if they represent the same 
object(s). However, we cannot just define sameness of type of a 
representation in terms of sameness of object(s) that it refers to, as 
there are representations that happen to have the same extension, 
but represent something different.  Also, defining sameness of 92
representation type in terms of sameness of reference determining 
properties is not helpful, because it seems that different 
representation tokens may have different reference determining 
properties and nonetheless represent the same object(s).  
We can, however, look to the reference realizing properties for a 
criterion of sameness of representation type. Since the reference 
realizing properties are those properties of an object that are 
responsible for its being the object referred to by a given 
representation, it seems reasonable to expect that representations 
whose reference determining properties determine the same 
reference realizing properties are guaranteed to refer to all and 
only the same objects. In turn, it seems to be the central 
requirement on representations of the same type that they are 
guaranteed to refer to the same things in virtue of how their 
 The classic example is Quine’s of ‘creature with a kidney’ and ‘creature with a 92
heart’ (Quine 1986). As it happens, everything that has a kidney has a heart, and 
so both have the same extension, but they obviously represent something 
different.
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reference is determined. Consequently, sameness of reference 
realizing properties is a good candidate for defining type-indentity 
of referential representations. 
Type-Identity of referential representations: Two token 
referential representations are of the same type, iff their 
reference determining properties determine the same 
reference realizing properties.  93
This criterion of type identity is a criterion for singular 
representations as well as for general representations. Before 
moving on to clarify the relationship between reference 
determining and reference realizing properties, and giving some 
examples of what these properties may be in specific cases, lets 
take stock.  
Token referential representations stand, except in cases of 
reference failure, in reference relations to the objects they 
represent. Some representations refer only to one thing, others 
refer to multiple things. In both cases the reference relation, if it 
holds at all, holds between the representation and the referent(s) 
in virtue of properties of the representation and in virtue of 
properties of the referent(s). The former are the reference 
determining properties, the latter the reference realizing 
properties. The reference determining properties are explanatorily 
prior in that they determine what the reference realizing properties 
 We may think of sameness of representation-type as sameness of meaning. But 93
we shouldn’t confuse this notion of meaning with notions of meaning as they 
figure in theories of meaning based on the communication model, or theories in 
which meaning has strong epistemic import.
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are, if a reference relation holds, or would be, if it would hold.  94
Sameness of representation-type can then be defined in terms of 
sameness of reference realizing properties. For convenience I will 
in the following talk about referential representations determining 
reference realizing properties or about reference realizing 
properties determined by the representation. Properly expanded, 
this should be understood as saying that the reference determining 
properties of the representation determine what the reference 
realizing properties would be, if a reference relation were to hold. 
4. From Reference Determining to Reference Realizing Properties 
Quite a bit has been said about the new concepts, but I have not 
been very specific about what reference determining properties, 
and even more importantly, what reference realizing properties 
are in specific cases as well as how the reference determining 
properties succeed in determining what the reference realizing 
properties of a referent are.  
Before clarifying this with some examples, I argue that some top 
down considerations already reveal quite a bit about what the 
reference realizing properties of objects may be. Following these 
general top-down considerations, I take a look at singular and 
general representations and outline a way of arriving at reference 
realizing properties for these kinds of representations. To do this, 
a bottom up approach is used, utilizing two prominent kinds of 
philosophical theories of reference, the description theory, and the 
causal theory.  Both theories are adapted to the present purpose, 95
 One way to put this is that the reference relation has a direction from the 94
representation to the object, which is mirrored in the direction of determination.
 The classic version of a description theory for names is Russell’s (1905). For a 95
refinement in terms of clusters of descriptions see Searle (1983). Outlines of the 
causal theory can be found in Kripke (1980), Putnam (1973), (1975).
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for they are more naturally situated in a communication-
framework. Both are used here for purposes of illustration only, 
and I do not wish to advance any thesis about which theory may 
be correct for a particular representation. Both theories have quite 
serious problems, and the simple sketches used in the following 
should at no point be taken to provide the whole story about 
reference determination.  In principle, the present framework can 96
stay completely neutral on which theory of reference is correct, as 
long as some reference realizing properties are determined by the 
reference determining properties. 
Determining reference realizing properties: top down 
The reference realizing and the reference determining properties 
of the representation and the referent constitutively explain the 
holding of the reference relation between the two, provided a 
reference relation holds at all. This characterization already 
allows to partially delimit what the reference realizing properties 
of an object may be:  
An object is the referent of a singular representation, if and only if 
the object represented by the singular representation exists, and an 
object is the referent of a general representation, if and only if the 
object has the feature represented by the general representation. 
Since the reference realizing properties are the properties of an 
object which are constitutive of reference, the reference realizing 
properties are had by any object, if and only if it is the referent of 
the relevant representations. And so if and only if the referent of a 
referential representation exists, does anything have the relevant 
reference realizing properties. This has some implications for 
 For a discussion of some of the problems of causal theories of reference see 96
Evans (1973),(1982). 
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what the reference realizing properties can be. Let us first 
consider singular representations. Assuming that most objects that 
are the referents of singular representations have a temporal 
extension, it follows that an object has its reference realizing 
properties during its existence.  Thus the reference realizing 97
properties of singular representations are properties the referent 
has during its existence. Once the referent looses the properties, it 
ceases to be the referent of the representation, and since if 
something is the referent of a singular representation, it is so 
during its lifetime, it ceases to exist, if it looses the reference 
realizing properties. Plausibly this finding from the temporal case 
also holds in the modal case. The reference realizing properties of 
an object are had by it across counterfactual situations. So the 
reference realizing properties are not merely among the properties 
an object has during its temporal existence, but they are among 
the properties an object has ‘during’ its modal existence, that is, it 
necessarily has the reference realizing properties, if it exists.   98
This already cuts down on the candidates for what the reference 
realizing properties for singular representations may be 
proceeding from nothing but the general characterization of 
 The temporal reading suggested here is a little tricky, as reference relations 97
arguably hold across time (unless you are a presentist): we can refer to future 
objects, and, even more uncontroversially, we can refer to past objects which no 
longer exist. So there seems to be no clear time at which the reference relation 
holds or doesn’t hold. But to get to the relevant temporal reading, we can focus 
on the referent, the object which has the reference realizing properties, and say 
of it, that it is a referent of a singular representation only during the times at 
which it has its reference realizing properties.
 Note that this need not hold for each reference realizing property singly, for it 98
may be that the set of necessary and sufficient reference realizing properties 
determined by a representation can only be characterized disjunctively. Thus, 
when I talk about the reference realizing properties of an object, this should be 
understood as talk about the necessary and sufficient properties constitutive of 
reference. 
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reference realizing properties and general assumptions about the 
reference relation. However, this account cannot and should not 
be understood as a reduction of reference realizing properties to 
necessary properties of an object, for there are a host of necessary 
properties an object has which are clearly not reference realizing. 
So being a necessary property is not a sufficient condition for 
being a reference realizing property of a singular representation, 
however, it is a necessary condition on being the reference 
realizing properties of an object that the represented object has 
them of necessity, if it exists.  
Note that the explanatory relations do not run from being 
necessary to being reference realizing. To the contrary, the 
direction of explanation runs the other way around. That a 
property is a necessary property does not determine that it is 
reference realizing, it is merely an epistemic criterion for finding 
out what the reference realizing properties may be, provided we 
know what the necessary properties are.  
These findings for singular representations can be partially 
transferred to general representations. The difference is that while 
the referent of a singular representation is the referent during its 
existence, the referent of a general representation only has the 
relevant reference realizing properties while it is a referent of the 
general representation, that is, while it has the feature represented 
by the general representation. Still, while an object is the referent 
of a general representation, the reference realizing properties are 
among those properties the object has only during that time. The 
same holds for the modal dimension: If it would be the referent of 
the representation, it would have the relevant reference realizing 
properties. 
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These general considerations somewhat delimit the candidates for 
what the reference realizing properties of an object may be and 
point to a certain similarity between essential properties and 
reference realizing properties that will be picked up again in 
chapter eight. It is not enough, however, to delimit what the 
reference realizing properties determined by a particular 
representation may be. To get closer to an answer, a more detailed 
account using a bottom-up approach is provided in what follows. 
A more detailed account: singular representations 
Singular representations essentially refer to only one object 
throughout the object’s existence. Thus the reference realizing 
properties must be properties that distinguish the object from all 
other objects, and, as we have seen above, they must be among 
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the necessary properties the object has. These requirements lead 
to two challenges.  99
The first challenge is that the purely qualitative properties of an 
object typically cannot serve to distinguish it from all other 
objects, and even if they actually can, they are usually not 
properties the object has necessarily or during its entire existence.  
To get this problem into focus, let us look at two pieces of paper 
which come from the same production line, and let the first be 
 Standard examples of singular representations are names. However, definite 99
descriptions like “the chancellor of Germany” are also used as singular 
representations. Definite descriptions are interesting, because they seem to refer 
to an object in virtue of an object satisfying a description that typically mentions 
contingent features of the object. Thus, it may seem that the reference realizing 
properties in this case are properties the object has merely contingently. This 
impression is false, however, for there are at least two readings of definite 
descriptions: a rigidified reading and a non-rigidified reading. On the rigidified 
reading, the description “the chancellor of Germany” refers to Angela Merkel. If 
it is to be the case that the chancellor of Germany is identical to Angela Merkel, 
then the two representations have to be of the same type, and thus have to 
determine the same reference realizing properties. So on the rigidified reading, 
the reference realizing properties determined by “the chancellor of Germany” do 
not include the contingent feature of being the chancellor of Germany, rather 
they are identical to the reference realizing properties determined by “Angela 
Merkel”. There is a non-rigidified reading, however, on which the reference of 
“Angela Merkel” and “the chancellor of Germany” come apart. This reading is 
exploited by Kripke (1980) in his modal and temporal counterexamples to the 
description theory of names. On this reading, the reference realizing properties 
determined by “the chancellor of Germany” really are being the chancellor of 
Germany. But since “the chancellor of Germany”, on this reading, refers to 
different people across time and modal space, “the chancellor of Germany” does 
not refer to Angela Merkel, rather whoever happens to be the chancellor of 
Germany.  
So we have to be careful which reading we take to be salient. Typically, I 
suppose, the rigidified reading is intended. But the non-rigid reading is certainly 
also possible, for it seems salient when considering some counterfactual 
situations. The trouble with the description theory of names was that it combined 
an intuitively rigid reading with a theory that yields the wrong reference 
realizing properties for this reading. In either case, we must take care to properly 
distinguish the different readings when analyzing what the reference realizing 
properties of such representations are.
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represented by the singular representation ⌜A⌝, and the second by 
⌜B⌝. Let’s assume the two pieces of paper are qualitatively 
identical, so no properties like size, weight, surface, etc. 
distinguish them. How is it that the representation ⌜A⌝ refers to 
the one piece of paper and ⌜B⌝ to the second? Initially one may 
think that there is an easy answer to this question, for did I not say 
that the first piece of paper is the referent of ⌜A⌝, and the second 
the referent of ⌜B⌝? So what distinguishes them is that A was the 
first piece to come out of the machine, and B the second. 
However, while this does indeed distinguish the two pieces, the 
property of being the first piece of paper is not a property A has 
necessarily, for it could have been that A came out second, and B 
first. So this feature of the piece of paper cannot be what is 
constitutive of reference.  100
The second challenge is to find some feature or features of the 
object which explain the holding of the reference relation during 
the object’s existence in temporal space, as well as in modal 
space. That is, they are properties the referent cannot loose, if it is 
to remain the referent of the representation, and since singular 
representations refer to objects if and only if they exist, they are 
properties the object cannot loose without ceasing to exist.  
These two challenges for finding the correct reference realizing 
properties for singular representations, distinguishing the object 
 Philosophers who are sympathetic to the essentiality of origin may take this 100
to be false and instead believe that the origin of the piece of paper is indeed what 
distinguishes the two. A thesis of the essentiality of origin, however, is not 
necessary for making the relevant distinctions, or so I will argue, and 
consequently I will not commit myself to this controversial thesis, even if it may 
offer a quick solution to some troubles.
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from every other object there is and ‘tracking’ the object’s 
temporal and modal extension, are discussed in what follows with 
the help of an example. 
Consider the name ‘Tobi’ which I will in the following take to be 
used as a singular representation for Tobi. As such the 
representation token refers to Tobi, if and only if Tobi exists. I 
will assume a simple sketch of a causal theory of reference along 
the lines suggested by Kripke on which there is a chain of uses of 
the name ‘Tobi’ as a representation of Tobi up to the use here, 
where each token representations inherits its representational 
properties from the use before. The chain goes back to an initial 
baptism at which the reference of the name was first fixed to Tobi.  
I do not take this sketch to be an accurate account of how 
reference is to be explained for all singular representations, 
however.  There are many more options, and the inheritance-of-101
representational-properties-account suggested here is almost 
certainly too simple.  But this is not our primary concern 102
presently and must be left to empirical research in each specific 
case. Considering the simplified model case will nonetheless be 
instructive. 
Representations in the chain of uses inherit their reference from 
the use before, that is, in virtue of standing in a certain causal 
connection to token representations before, they are of the same 
type. This part of the account is not particularly interesting for 
finding out what the reference realizing properties may be: They 
 One further option may be rigidified descriptions.101
 In some cases inheritance may fail, or the representational properties may 102
change during the use of a name-type across time, as the famous Madagascar 
example by Evans (1973) shows. So it may happen that during a chain of uses, 
the uses of the same name types are of a different representation type.
!106
will be the same as those of the representation used before. This is 
all the causal part of the causal theory is able to tell us.  
A more interesting part of the causal theory for finding out about 
the reference realizing properties is the initial baptism at which 
the reference is fixed to the object. Most accounts of the causal 
theory are not very explicit about the baptism, for it seems that it 
is quite easy to baptize something. Kripke, for example, observes 
that we do not have to do much to succeed in giving a name to, 
say, a person.  When asked what they want to call their child, 103
parents just have to say a name and henceforth the name is used to 
refer to the child.  
However, just because we do not have to do much to endow a 
name with a referent, does not mean that only a few things must 
be the case for a baptism to succeed, for somehow it needs to be 
determined what the representation is supposed to be a 
representation of. And since many objects are present at the 
baptism, there must be something that fixes the reference to one 
of these objects. That is, something which determines the 
reference realizing properties such that the appropriate object is 
the referent of the representation. Merely pointing to something at 
the baptism doesn’t help, for we can point as hard as we want and 
not distinguish, say, a mere time slice of a person from a 
person.  104
 Kripke (1980) p.93ff.103
 A version of this problem is by Devitt and Sterelny called the “qua-problem”. 104
For a discussion of the qua-problem see Devitt and Sterelny (1987), Stanford 
and Kitcher (2000), and most recently Thomasson (2015). For a slightly different 
approach to the topic see (Wiggins 2012). Sometimes the problem is used to 
promote some version of the description theory, or the weaker claim that there 
must be some descriptive element to the meaning of directly referential 
expressions. This is not the aim of the present discussion, since our focus is on 
representations and how their reference is fixed, not in what linguistic meaning 
words may have. 
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One option for determining the reference realizing properties may 
be to use what Kripke calls a reference fixing description. These 
descriptions are used at an initial baptism to fix the reference at 
the baptism. The problem with this, however, is twofold.  
First, and most importantly, the description used to fix the 
reference typically uses contingent features of the object the 
reference is fixed to. Consequently the features listed in the 
reference fixing description, if contingent, cannot be the reference 
realizing properties of the object.  
Second, the description doesn’t even have to apply to the object 
that is baptized to be used as a reference fixing description: 
Consider the baptism of a mountain by saying “That volcano over 
there shall be called ‘Mt. Tobi’”. As it turns out, there is no 
volcano there, it is just a peculiarly shaped regular mountain. Still 
the baptism may succeed and henceforth the words ‘Mt. Tobi’ are 
a representation that refers rigidly to the indicated object, that is, 
the mountain. So the properties used in a reference fixing 
description are typically not the reference realizing properties. 
Nonetheless there must be something in the story about how a 
representation gets its referent that determines the reference 
realizing properties. Luckily, there are a few more things that 
have to be in place for a baptism to succeed that have not been 
mentioned and which give us a better clue as to what the 
reference realizing properties may be. These facts can be 
identified by considering what the representational system is used 
for and what singular representations are supposed to represent in 
that system. This is most explicit, if we consider representational 
systems that are build for a specific purpose. Consider for 
example a meteorological model which predicts amounts of rain, 
wind, clouds, etc. In the model, there are representations for 
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clouds, rain, wind, and their respective amounts. Part of the 
reason the representations in that model do represent these things 
is that the model is build for the purpose of modeling these 
features of the weather. 
Not all representational systems are purpose-built. Language as 
well as our brains, considered as representational systems, are 
almost certainly not built by anyone for any explicit purpose, 
rather they are, we may assume, the product of evolution. This 
does not mean, however, that these systems are not used for some 
purpose which in part determines what the objects represented in 
that system are.  We use language, for example, to coordinate 105
our social interactions, and we use our brain for navigating the 
world of our experience. This gives us some clues as to what the 
referents of our singular representations may be, what the objects 
we seek to track with singular representations may be.  
Turning back to our example of names, a few uses of these 
singular representations come to mind: We use names for persons, 
we use them for animals, we use them for places, we use them for 
other kinds of objects of our life-world. In the present example 
the name ‘Tobi’ is apparently a representation of a person, and so 
this gives us a clue as to what a reference realizing property, 
necessary for reference of the singular representation ⌜Tobi⌝ may 
be: being a person. A reference relation holds between ⌜Tobi⌝ and 
Tobi, only if Tobi is a person. Once he ceases to be a person, the 
 This basic insight is part of the foundation of the broad research project of 105
naturalized semantics, and more specifically teleological semantics. I do, 
however, have no intention of endorsing this entire approach to semantics, and 
its quite reductive ambitions. Rather I stay neutral on what will in the end be the 
right way to account for the reference of our representations. For more on 
naturalized semantics see Loewer (1997), for a famous teleological theory in 
terms of evolutionary fitness see Millikan (1989).
!109
name refers no longer, and it did not refer before Tobi was a 
person. 
Note that I am not claiming that the actual names we use must 
always refer to persons. We do sometimes use names differently, 
when we, for example, use the name a person had during his or 
her life to refer to his or her body after the person has died, and 
one may be inclined to say that the referent of a name is the same 
on both uses. So the present suggestion should be taken as a 
falsifiable empirical hypothesis about what we use our singular 
representations for. Nonetheless, the hypothesis that some names, 
in particular the name ‘Tobi’ in the example, refer to a person, and 
only to a person, does not seem to be too far from the truth, and it 
will be a working assumption in what follows. 
Having identified this property of Tobi helps to solve the second 
problem of finding something that tracks Tobi’s extension in 
temporal and modal space. However, while having the reference 
realizing property of being a person is a necessary condition for 
being the referent of the singular representation ⌜Tobi⌝, it is not 
sufficient, for there are many persons, and the representation 
refers to only one of them. So what property or properties of Tobi 
make him the unique referent of ⌜Tobi⌝? This question does not 
have an easy answer, for as was pointed out above in the paper-
example, no conjunction of purely qualitative properties seems up 
to the task of individuating any object uniquely. 
Here the baptism-picture may help: Tobi is the very person which 
is actually present at the baptism, the one we give the name to, no 
other person was given the name at this very baptism. Once the 
reference is thus fixed, the singular representation refers to that 
very person.  
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So the property which succeeds in picking out the person 
uniquely is that it is the very person actually present at the 
baptism. So the reference realizing properties for being the 
referent of ⌜Tobi⌝ may be characterized as being the same person 
which was actually present at the initial baptism, or, for short, the 
person identical to Tobi.  
This characterization is rather unilluminating as long as no more 
has been said about what it takes to be identical to Tobi, or more 
generally, what it takes to be the same person or object actually 
present at the baptism. However, a few accounts from the 
literature come to mind, which may help to account for the 
identity. First, there is the thesis of the essentiality of origin, 
which says that in order to be the same object, it must have the 
same origin.  One could, so the intuition goes, not have been 106
born of different parents and still have been the same person. 
Other accounts, mainly interested in what it takes to be the same 
person or object over time, account for identity with some kind of 
continuity, either of the body, or of the mind. On those accounts, 
what it takes for a person (or object) at one time to be identical to 
itself at another time, is to have some continued bodily or mental 
integrity. How exactly this is to be spelled out, is a further 
difficult question and the matter of some debate; a debate I do not 
intend to enter into presently.  A third view may take a cue from 107
essentialist views of natural kinds, and take some feature of the 
 Since Kripke (1980) reintroduced the thesis of the essentiality of origin, it has 106
received quite a bit of discussion. For a defense see Salmon (1981). For a more 
critical view, see Mackie (2006).
 For an overview over the views and debates on personal identity, see Olson 107
(2016)
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person’s internal constitution, for example the person’s DNA, to 
be what is constitutive of being the same person. 
There is no need to take sides as to what ultimately accounts for 
the identity of objects and there may be quite diverse answers for 
different kinds of objects. In either case, however, there seems to 
be something philosophically interesting to say about what 
constitutes the identity of objects of the kind in question. So I will 
let the reader pick his or her favorite view for each particular case, 
but assume that there is something more to be said about what it is 
that makes an object the very object it is, apart from the brute 
statement of identity, which can then be utilized to characterize 
the reference realizing properties. 
Let me take stock: the reference determining properties of 
singular representations must suffice to determine the reference 
realizing properties of the referent such that the object is the 
unique referent throughout its existence. What determines 
reference for singular representations are both what is explicitly 
appealed to in theories of reference, for example, the standing in 
some appropriate relation to other representations, but also facts 
about what the representational system is used for. In the case of 
names in our language I suggested that the determined reference 
realizing properties in many cases include the property of being a 
person, and in other cases the natural kind the referent falls under. 
This property tracks the temporal and modal extension of the 
referent and is thus a good candidate for being among the 
reference realizing properties. In addition it is plausibly 
determined by the reference determining properties, if we take 
general facts about the representational system into account. To 
make sure that the representation is singular, that it refers to only 
one object, a connection to the existing object needs to be 
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established, it must be the object which is actually present at the 
baptism.  
A more detailed account: general referential representations 
General referential representations potentially refer to a number 
of objects. This makes accounting for general representations 
somewhat easier, because uniqueness does not have to be 
guaranteed. The representation ⌜red⌝ refers to each and all red 
things, the representation ⌜ball⌝ to each and every ball, and 
similarly for other general representations. The referents are the 
referents of these representation in virtue of having the 
appropriate reference realizing properties. Since objects can be 
the referents of general representations at some time during their 
existence, but not at others, the reference realizing properties are 
typically not properties the referents have necessarily. However, 
they are properties an object has while it is the referent of the 
representation and only while it is the referent of the 
representation.  
So what are the properties the referents of general representations 
must have to be the referents of the representation? Initially one 
may take the answer to be quite trivial: To be the referent of 
⌜red⌝, an object needs to be red. To be the referent of ⌜ball⌝, an 
objects needs to be a ball. And in order to be the referent of ⌜red 
ball⌝, an object needs to be red and a ball. This trivial story 
usually does work, but it is interesting to see why it works, why it 
might not be so trivial after all, and why we can often say 
something non-trivial about what is constitutive of reference. 
The reason the seemingly trivial story works, is because in our 
language the use of predicates and the use of words for properties 
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is systematically related: If some predicate used as a general 
referential representation refers to some object, we can take the 
word and turn it into the name of a property: the property unifying 
the extension of the predicate. This also works the other way 
around: a name for a property or feature of an object can be 
turned into a predicate and thereby be used to refer to the objects 
which have this feature. This relationship between the words used 
to represent properties and words used to refer generally is quite 
useful for a language to have, but it also leads to the apparent 
triviality of the characterization of the reference realizing 
properties. For to characterize the reference realizing properties, 
we have to use language once more.  
The resulting triviality of the characterization, however, is not 
indicative of there not being an explanatory relation between the 
property of being red and being a referent of the general 
representation ⌜red⌝, it is merely indicative of a special feature of 
the language we use to characterize this explanatory relation. 
Still, there are many cases in which we can do better than to give 
a trivial story, for we can give a fuller account of what it takes to 
be the referent of a general representation. Lets look at two 
examples where non-trivial reference realizing properties for 
general representations can be found. The first utilizes a 
description theory of reference, the second uses the sketch of a 
causal theory of reference.  
Lets first take a look at an example to which a description theory 
may apply: the representation expressed by the word ‘vixen’. On 
the description theory, the word used as the representation 
⌜vixen⌝ has its representational properties in virtue of being 
appropriately associated with certain mental representations. In 
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the present case, let us assume, it inherits its representational 
properties by being associated with the mental representations 
⌜female⌝ and ⌜fox⌝ such that it refers to the objects to which 
both ⌜female⌝ and ⌜fox⌝ refer.  
The description theory gives an account of how one 
representation inherits its representational properties from others: 
By being appropriately associated with other representations, it 
inherits their representational properties such that the reference 
realizing properties of the representation are the conjunction of 
the reference realizing properties of the associated 
representations. While this theory does not tell us directly what 
the reference realizing properties of the referents are, it moves us 
one step closer to an answer. For if the referents of ⌜vixen⌝ are 
supposed to be referents of both ⌜female⌝ and ⌜fox⌝, it must be 
the case, that the referents of vixen have both the reference 
realizing properties of ⌜female⌝ and ⌜fox⌝. Consequently, we 
arrive at some non-trivial reference realizing properties: the 
referents of ⌜vixen⌝ have the reference realizing properties being 
female and being foxes. 
Another theory of reference that can also be utilized for general 
representations is a causal theory of reference. It proceeds along 
similar lines as the causal theory for singular representations. 
Again the representational properties of one representation are 
inherited from the representations used before to which the 
representation is connected by some chain of uses. The chain of 
uses terminates at an initial baptism where a sample or example is 
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first indicated as a referent of the general representation.  The 108
stock example for this kind of theory is the general representation 
⌜water⌝, and so I will use it here.   109
In the literature, it is not always clear whether the general 
representation ⌜water⌝, which has as referent everything that is 
water, or whether the singular representation ⌜Water⌝ referring to 
the kind water, or the property of being water is at issue. 
Presently, as in Putnam’s original discussion, I take it that the 
theory provides us with an account of how the reference of the 
general representation is established. 
So here is the simplified story of how the general representation 
⌜water⌝ gets its representational properties: The representation 
stands in a chain of uses of other token representations of water, 
going back to an initial baptism at which a sample of water was 
baptized thus: “Samples of the same natural kind as this are called 
‘water’!”. After that baptism, uses of the term ‘water’ are general 
representations of the objects which are of the same natural kind 
as the indicated sample. So what it takes to be the referent of the 
representation ⌜water⌝ is to be an object of the same natural kind 
as the one actually indicated at the baptism. But we can be even 
more specific. For what it takes to be of the same natural kind as 
the water indicated at the baptism, is to have the same molecular 
 Once more the simple theory is most likely false for most representations we 108
actually use. It is nonetheless instructive.
 That ‘water’, as a natural kind term, should be treated in this way was 109
famously argued for by Putnam (1975).
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structure, or so common orthodoxy goes.  Thus, what it takes to 110
be water is to have the molecular structure H2O. So the reference 
realizing property of objects to which the general representation 
⌜water⌝ refers is having the molecular structure H2O. 
In the example it is assumed that the representation ⌜water⌝ has 
as referent the members of a natural kind which are of a natural 
kind in virtue of having the same molecular structure. This may 
be true for ⌜water⌝, but this may not be the case for every 
representation whose reference is determined in a similar way. 
Which underlying properties turn out to be the reference realizing 
properties of these representations, will depend, as in the case of 
singular representations, on a number of facts about the 
representational system in which they appear as representations. 
This concludes the present discussion of referential 
representations and the relationship between reference realizing 
and reference determining properties. Some more suggestions 
about what reference realizing properties in specific cases may be 
will be made along the way, especially when discussing examples 
of necessary truths in chapter six and in the discussion on 
essentialism in chapter eight. 
5. Representations and Truth 
There are referential representations, and there are truth-evaluable 
representations. Token referential representations come together 
to form token truth-evaluable representations. The truth of these 
 Even if it may be true for the present example that kind-membership is due to 110
molecular, or otherwise internal structure, it may be that kind-membership is not 
generally so determined. I do not take a stand on the issue here. In principle the 
causal theory seems compatible with many different ways for individuating 
kinds. For a more complex approach see Stanford and Kitcher (2000).
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truth-evaluable representations depends on whether the 
relationship between the referents of the constituent 
representations is as the representation represents it as being. 
Suppose, for example, that a truth-evaluable representation is 
constituted of the referential representations ⌜raven⌝ and ⌜black⌝ 
in such a way that it is required for the truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation that the referents of ⌜raven⌝ are also referents of 
⌜black⌝. This truth-evaluable representation is true in virtue of 
the appropriate relationship between the referents of the 
referential representations. In particular, the truth-evaluable 
representation is true, just in case all the referents of ⌜raven⌝ are 
referents of ⌜black⌝, that is, if all ravens really are black. These 
requirements on the referents of the constituent referential 
representations are the requirements for truth of a truth-evaluable 
representation. 
Referential representations can constitute truth-evaluable 
representation in different ways, thereby giving rise to different 
requirements for truth. The two referential representations 
⌜raven⌝ and ⌜black⌝ may, apart from the first possibility above, 
also constitute a truth-evaluable representation such that it is 
required for its truth that the referents of ⌜black⌝ are all referents 
of ⌜raven⌝ which would be true, if everything black was a raven. 
Different ways of combining the two referential representations 
from the example into truth-evaluable representations may give 
rise to still other relationships between the referents of the 
representations required for the truth. So it may be that an 
appropriately constituted representation requires for its truth that 
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most referents of ⌜raven⌝ are referents of ⌜black⌝. Many more 
ways of constituting a truth-evaluable representation from 
referential representations come to mind when considering these 
examples. What unites these ways is that they all require some 
appropriate relationship between the referents of the constituent 
referential representations for their truth. 
How truth-evaluable representations are constituted from 
referential representations and how this constitution gives rise to 
different requirements for truth, depends on the kind of 
representation at issue. In the case of representations in language, 
the requirements for truth are indicated, for example, by the 
copula ‘is’, by the order in which the referential representations 
appear, by logical vocabulary, and by quantifiers.  
The assumption that quantifiers together with structural properties 
of sentences and logical vocabulary can be, and are used to 
indicate the relationship between the referents required for the 
truth of a representation is consistent with the treatment of 
quantifiers by linguists and philosophers alike: Quantifiers in 
subject-position are to be understood as denoting relations 
between those sets which are the extension of the words of a 
sentence: the universal quantifier denotes the subset relation, the 
existential quantifier the relation of non-disjointness.  Other 111
relations between sets are denoted by other quantifiers. For 
example the sentence, “Every raven is black”, is true, iff the 
extension of ‘raven’ is a subset of the extension of ‘black’. And 
 See Heim and Kratzer (1998), p. 147ff. They attribute this relational view of 111
quantifiers to Aristotle, and trace it through Leibniz and Frege. Heim and Kratzer 
also argue at length that quantifiers cannot be understood as denoting either 
individuals or sets (p. 131ff.).
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“There is a beer in the fridge.” is true, iff the set of beers is non-
disjoint from the set of things in the fridge.  
So in the case of sentences that are used as representations, it 
seems to be well established that quantifiers are used to indicate 
the relation the referents of the referential representations need to 
stand in, in order to be true. How this is done in the case of other 
kinds of truth-evaluable representations, for example thoughts, is 
a further question, which will need to be answered by looking at 
other kinds of representations.  
The important point presently is that referential representations 
come together in various ways to form truth-evaluable 
representations. Depending on how they come together, different 
relationships between their referents are required for the truth of 
the representations. In each case, the truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation will depend on the referents of the referential 
representation constituting it. The relationship between the 
referents of the constituents required for the truth of the 
representation are the requirements for truth of the representation. 
With this concept of requirements for truth in hand, we can go on 
to define sameness of type for truth-evaluable representations just 
as we did for referential representations: 
Type-Identity of truth-evaluable representations: Truth-
evaluable representations are of the same type, iff they are 
constituted by referential representations of the same type, 
and the same relationship between the referents of these 
representations is required for their truth.  
This definition is the natural extension of the definition of 
sameness of type for referential representations. 
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The present discussion provides the basic concepts for an 
explanation of necessary truth. Before moving on, some remarks 
on complex truth-evaluable representations and how they may be 
broken down into their constituents are made. To conclude the 
introduction of the new concepts, I assess the utility of the 
developed concepts. 
Complex truth-evaluable representations 
The examples discussed above all had a very simple structure, but 
truth-evaluable representations may be quite complex. Examples 
illustrating this are representations that are expressed by sentences 
involving logical connectives. Let us start with a comparatively 
simple example of a representation that illustrates this complexity, 
the representation expressed by the sentence “If Peter is grey-
haired, then Peter is old”. This truth-evaluable representation 
apparently consist of the singular representation ⌜Peter⌝, another 
singular representation of Peter of the same type, the general 
representations ⌜grey-haired⌝ and ⌜old⌝. In addition there is the 
logical connective if…then, whose role in the sentence used to 
express the representation needs to be clarified.  
What makes the example initially puzzling, is that the 
representations ⌜Peter⌝ and ⌜old⌝, as well as ⌜Peter⌝ and ⌜grey-
haired⌝ apparently already form two truth-evaluable 
representations, which are in turn connected by the logical 
connective to constitute another truth-evaluable representation. 
Thus it may seem that truth-evaluable representations are not 
always constituted by referential representations, but may also be 
constituted by other truth-evaluable representations. This, 
however, is only partially right: all truth-evaluable representations 
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should be thought of as primarily constituted by referential 
representations, even though a proper subset of the 
representations which partly constitute a truth-evaluable 
representation could sometimes constitute truth-evaluable 
representations themselves.  
The reason we should always conceive of complex truth-
evaluable representation primarily as constituted of referential 
representations is that the truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation ultimately depends on the relationship between the 
referents of the constituent referential representations. 
Consequently, the logical connective should be read as telling us 
something about the requirements for truth of the complex 
representation, which are given in terms of the referential 
constituents. 
If this is right, the requirements for truth in terms of the referents 
of the referential representations are the following: ⌜If Peter is 
grey-haired, then Peter is old⌝ is true, iff the referent of ⌜Peter⌝ is 
a referent of ⌜grey-haired⌝ and the referent of ⌜Peter⌝ is a 
referent of ⌜old⌝, or the referent of ⌜Peter⌝ is not a referent of 
⌜grey-haired⌝.  
The example demonstrates that the complexity of a referential 
representation gives rise to complex requirements for truth. One 
may, however, be inclined to believe that the sentence above 
should be understood to express a different representation; a 
representation which represents the logical relation ‘if…then’ as 
holding between the two truth-evaluable representations ⌜Peter is 
grey-haired⌝ and ⌜Peter is old⌝. For this account of the 
representation to work, we would have to think of the connective 
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‘if…then’, as being a referential representation which represents 
the conditional as a relation between two representations. We can 
then think of the referents of this relation as ordered pairs of 
representations, which are referents of ⌜if…then⌝ just in case the 
first representation of the set is false, or both representations are 
true. If this is the right reading of the connective ‘if…then’ in the 
sentence above, we have to take the two sentences “Peter is grey-
haired”, and “Peter is old” to themselves express referential 
representations which refer to truth-evaluable representations; 
those truth-evaluable representations that would be expressed by 
the sentences if used by themselves.  
This reading, however, has the drawback that while we may use a 
sentence as a name for the representation it would express if used 
by itself, it is not what we commonly seem to do with a sentence. 
We do not usually use sentences as referential representations. So 
the standard reading of the above sentence - that the logical 
vocabulary is used to indicate the relationship which needs to 
hold between the referents of the constituent referential 
representations for the representation to be true - is preferable to 
the reading on which the sentences act as names for the 
representations expressed. 
There is an interesting connection between the two proposals for 
reading the sentence, however. The representation consisting of 
the relation ⌜if…then⌝ and the names for the truth-evaluable 
representations, and the complex representation consisting of 
⌜Peter⌝,⌜old⌝, ⌜Peter⌝ and ⌜grey-haired⌝ are bound to have the 
same truth value. This is because the reference realizing 
properties for the referential representations referring to the truth-
evaluable representations (⌜Peter is grey-haired⌝ and ⌜Peter is 
!123
old⌝) are, we may suppose, that the referents have the 
requirements for truth the representation would have if the 
sentence was used to express a truth-evaluable representation, and 
that the reference realizing properties of the constituents are the 
same as the ones the constituents would have, if the sentence was 
used as a truth-evaluable representation. So the representation 
⌜if…then⌝ would refer to the ordered set of representations 
named by the two sentences, just in case the requirements for 
truth of the representations expressed on the first reading are 
satisfied.  
All this, of course, only applies under the assumption that we use 
the sentences as names for truth-evaluable representations such 
that they refer to the truth-evaluable representation they would 
express, if used independently. 
Be that as it may, however, I take the proper reading of the 
example sentence to be that it expresses a truth-evaluable 
representation consisting of the referential representations 
⌜Peter⌝,⌜old⌝, ⌜Peter⌝ and ⌜grey-haired⌝, and as having the 
suggested complex requirements for truth outlined above. 
The discussion illustrates how a complex constitution of truth-
evaluable representations, for example through the use of logical 
vocabulary, gives rise to complex requirements for truth. So the 
complexity of representations can be captured with the concepts 
developed and is not an obstacle in the use of the present 
framework in an explanation of necessary truth. 
6. The Case for Representations 
The semantic framework with representations as the primary 
objects of study has some advantages over the classical study of 
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language as based on the communication model when 
investigating truth, reference, and the modes of truth.  
The first and salient advantage is that the focus on representations 
generally allows for a general account of necessary truth. For 
truth is a property that applies not only to sentences, if used as 
representations, but also to other kinds of representations, for 
example mental states. Consequently, the modes of truth, 
necessity and possibility, also apply to all these different kinds of 
representations. So if there is any explanation to be had for the 
modes of truth which proceeds from properties of the 
representations, then these should better not be the properties only 
one kind of representation, for example sentences, have. Rather, 
the focus has to be on the representational properties the different 
kinds of representations share. Only by considering properties all 
kinds of representations have, can there be a general explanation 
of necessary truth in terms of the features of the representation. 
This is the first reason to focus not on sentences of a language 
independently from their use as representations, but to look at the 
objects which have their representational properties essentially. 
Second, even if we can identify some mechanisms by which a 
sentence cannot fail to express something true, this will not 
suffice for the necessary truth of the representation expressed. For 
a necessary truth is not necessary, because the sentence 
expressing it cannot but express a true proposition, but because 
what it says, its content, cannot fail to be the case. Thus only 
objects which represent what they do essentially, that is, 
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representations in the sense introduced above, can be properly 
said to be true necessarily.   112
Words and sentences are contingently associated with concepts 
and propositions.  Thus the association between words and 113
concepts, and sentences and propositions can and does change, 
consequently what these words or sentences mean can change.  114
The word ‘bachelor’, for example, may presently be associated 
with the complex concept ‘unmarried and male’, but this may 
change, for example, if it starts to include more people on the 
gender spectrum, and not only men. Thus, while it may today still 
be true to say “all bachelors are men”, in the future the same 
words may be used to state a falsehood. Thus, sentences, even if 
they are not context-sensitive, only have fixed truth-conditions at 
or during a time, and can thus not be said to be true or false 
simpliciter. To deal with this problem we could talk about truth at 
a time, and necessary truth at a time, but the time index would not 
be explanatory of why the truth-values of the sentences change. 
What accounts for the change in truth value of a sentence is a 
 Another candidate for being the bearers of necessary truth are propositions in 112
the traditional sense. However, traditional propositions preclude an explanation 
of their necessary truth, because they lack the relevant features that can be 
exploited for an explanation of the necessary truth of truth-evaluable 
representations.
 As above, I leave open what propositions and concepts are. On an intuitive 113
communication model, they are just mental representations, but on virtually all 
accounts prominent today, they are abstract entities of some kind: Sets of worlds, 
sets of properties and individuals, etc.
 It is quite controversial how words and sentences, as the objects of study in 114
linguistics, should be individuated, and how independent their individuation is of 
their meaning. For discussion see Kaplan (1990), Hawthorne and Lepore (2011), 
and most recently Bromberger (2011). What is uncontroversial, however, is that 
words and sentences are only contingently associated with their full meaning, 
and that their meaning may change over time. 
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change in the representational properties of that sentence at 
different points in time.  
So talking about the objects which have the relevant 
representational properties essentially instead of those that have 
them only accidentally, is the best and surest way to secure that 
the object is the proper bearer of truth and necessary truth 
simpliciter.  
I conclude that representations are the proper and reasonable 
objects of study for an account of necessary truth which seeks to 
explain this necessary truth by the representational properties of 
the representation. Before finally moving on to the envisaged 
explanation of necessary truth, I want to clarify the relationship 
between the present approach to representations and linguistic 
research. 
The communication model, l inguistic evidence, and 
representations 
The discussion above emphasized the difference between the 
communication-model and the representation-framework. There 
are, however, connections between the two approaches, and at no 
point should the present suggestion be understood as an attack on 
the valuable work of linguists working within the communication 
paradigm. In this last section of the chapter, an important 
contribution linguistic evidence can make to the investigation of 
representations is highlighted, but first some important 
differences are pointed out. 
Linguists focus on one representational system in particular: 
language as we use it in communication. The interests in this 
phenomenon are quite diverse, but one central branch of 
linguistics is concerned with analyzing how words and phrases of 
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a language and the way they are put together, contribute 
systematically to the truth-conditions of sentences.  The 115
constituent words or phrases are assigned an interpretation (often 
just its extension, but depending on the level of analysis also its 
intension) and it is then shown how the words with their 
interpretation contribute to the truth values of sentences. Taking 
an example from an introductory textbook, the sentence “Ann 
smokes”, can be analyzed into the noun-phrase ‘Ann’, and the 
verb-phrase ‘smokes’, which are exemplified by the noun ‘Ann’, 
and the verb ‘smokes’. The noun is assigned a denotation: Ann. 
And the verb is assigned a denotation: the function which returns 
the truth value ‘true’ for each elements x of the domain, iff, x 
smokes. The denotation of the entire sentence is a truth-value, and 
since the structure is as it is, it is the truth value which the 
denotation of the verb-phrase returns, if the denotation of the 
noun-phrase is taken as input. That is, it returns the truth value 
‘true’, iff Ann smokes.  This rather simple example gives a taste 116
of how a certain branch of linguistic analysis proceeds, and it 
highlights how linguistic research is helpful for the present 
project, but also where the differences lie. 
First, the differences. Linguistics is interested in the workings of 
language or languages as systems of communication that transmit 
information and are used by human beings. As such linguistics 
focuses on words and sentences, and how the same word or 
sentence type is regularly used to convey the same informational 
content. Since the meaning of words plays a systematic role in 
 Truth-conditions are important to the linguist, because sameness of truth 115
conditions is a good indicator for sameness of meaning, even if truth-conditions 
cannot be identified with meaning.
 The example is taken from Heim and Kratzer (1998) p. 13ff.116
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constituting what the informational content of a sentence is, the 
contribution of the meanings of words to the meanings of 
sentences are also studied. Thus linguists are interested in words 
of a language, and how they are used in communication to 
represent something, not so much in representations themselves. 
The most important difference between the study of language in 
communication, and the study of representations lies in the role 
reference and truth play in the investigation. Consider again the 
toy example above. Here the verb-phrase is construed as a 
function from objects to truth-values, and its extension, its 
reference, is conceived of as the objects for which the function 
yield the value ‘true’. Thus reference is secondary to truth in the 
order of inquiry. This is useful for a linguistic analysis for two 
reasons: First, it makes intelligible how the verb-phrase 
contributes to the truth-value of the whole sentence, namely by 
taking as input the denotation of the noun-phrase to yield a truth-
value. Second, investigating truth-value changes in response to 
variations in input is a good method for distinguishing different 
functions, and thus 
for investigating the meaning of these words, if this meaning is 
conceived of as the contribution of a word to truth-conditions.   117
Useful and adequate as this outlook is for linguistic research, 
conceiving of phrases in predicate-position as functions 
contributing to truth-conditions is putting the cart before the horse 
from the point of view of the representation framework, which 
 As is well known, this method works quite well for most cases, but fails for 117
(necessarily) coextensive predicates with different meanings. Thus, meanings 
cannot be identified either with extensions or with intensions, and consequently 
predicates are not purely functions from domains to truth values. For most 
purposes, however, truth-conditions are a very good guide to meaning, and so 
formal modeling often works within the truth-functional paradigm. 
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seeks to explain how reference and truth, constitutively, come 
about. For it is not in virtue of it being true of everybody who 
smokes that they are referents of the representation ⌜smokes⌝ , 
rather it is in virtue of them being referents of ⌜smokes⌝ that it is 
true to represent them as smoking. In a nutshell, linguistic 
research takes truth and reference for granted, and uses these 
concepts to find out about the systematic use of words and 
sentences in communication. The representation-framework, on 
the other hand, is interested in different objects, representations, 
and in what constitutes their reference.  
Even though the basic outlook is quite different, linguistics, as 
special science of one kind of representation, can be useful for the 
study of representations. For by investigating the semantic 
assignments, it contributes to finding out what a particular 
sentence is used to represent in some context. That is, it helps us 
find out which parts of a representation are referential, to what 
they refer, and how the other vocabulary indicates what the 
requirements for truth are. So once we consider sentences and 
words as concrete examples of representations, linguistic insights 
can help deliver part of the evidence needed for a correct account 
of the representational properties of particular representations. 
Summing up 
In the present chapter the framework and the basic concepts for 
the explanation of necessary truth were developed. I argued that if 
there is to be any chance for giving an explanation of necessary 
truth in terms of the representational properties of the constituents 
of representations, we cannot focus on words and sentences, for 
they are the wrong kind of object to be true or false simpliciter. 
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Rather we have to look to representations and the central 
representational relations reference and truth. 
Representations have certain representational properties 
essentially. We can distinguish between referential representations 
and truth-evaluable representations. Referential representations 
can be divided into singular and general. The former refer to one 
and only one object, while the latter, at least potentially, refer to a 
number of objects. A reference relation between a referential 
representation and a referent is established in virtue of properties 
of the representation and properties of the referent. The former are 
the reference determining properties, while the latter are the 
reference realizing properties. Which properties of the referent the 
reference realizing properties are, is determined by the reference 
determining properties of the representation. The reference 
realizing properties play a special role in the individuation of 
referential representations: Token representations are of a kind, if 
and only if they determine the same reference realizing properties. 
Truth-evaluable representations are constituted by referential 
representations and their truth depends on the relationship 
between the referents of the constituent referential 
representations. The relationship required for the truth of a truth-
evaluable representation are the requirements for truth of the 
representation. Which relationship is required for the truth 
depends on how the truth-evaluable representation is constituted 
by the referential representations. Truth-evaluable representations 
can be individuated with respect to their constituents and their 
requirements for truth: Truth-evaluable representations are of a 
kind, if and only if they have, as constituents, referential 
representations of the same type, and have the same requirements 
for truth. 
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Within this framework, I will argue, necessary truth can be 
explained. It is the task of the next chapter to show how this may 
be done. 
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Chapter 5: An Explanation of Necessity 
The Kant-inspired explanation of analyticity is an explanation of 
how some judgements cannot fail to be true in virtue of their 
constituents standing in the appropriate containment relations.  118
The main fault with this explanation, if we take it to explain 
necessity generally, is that it is not nearly general enough to 
explain the interesting cases of necessary truths: Only few 
concepts seem to exhibit a containment structure and so an 
explanation of necessity that relies on this structure cannot work 
for the many judgments whose constituent concepts do not have 
it. But the way in which Kant explains how analytic judgments 
cannot fail to be true, can serve as a blueprint for an explanation 
of necessity, because giving an explanation for the fact that a 
judgement cannot fail to be true amounts to giving an explanation 
of the judgment’s necessity. The general account of 
representations and their semantic relations developed in the last 
section can be utilized to give a general explanation of some 
representation’s necessary truth by explaining how they cannot 
fail to be true in virtue of how the reference of their constituents is 
determined. Situating the explanation in the more general 
framework will show that the containment structure for concepts 
is merely a superficial feature of the explanation of why analytic 
 It should be noted again that it was not Kant’s goal to explain necessity. His 118
main concern was to explain how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, while 
analytic judgments, supposedly a priori and necessary, are just the boring cousin 
of these more interesting truths. Consequently, the criticism should not be read 
as directed at him. Kant knew about this feature of his definition of analyticity 
and endorsed it. I am not concerned with criticizing or supporting the Kantian 
project, I merely take Kant’s definition as a starting point for what I take to be a 
good explanation for necessary truth.
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judgments cannot be false, and that the necessity of a number of 
philosophically interesting truths can be explained in this way.  
First, the Kant-inspired explanation will be rehearsed once more 
to clarify what is doing the explanatory work. Second, the 
explanatory strategy will be used to show how the necessary truth 
of representations can be explained more generally with the help 
of the semantic framework developed. In the next chapter, I will 
argue that this explanation of necessity covers a range of 
philosophically interesting examples of necessary truths.  
1. Kant’s Definition of Analyticity and the Explanation of 
Necessity 
Consider again the Kantian definition of analyticity:  
“In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the 
predicate is thought […] this relation is possible in two 
different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject 
A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept 
A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be 
sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call 
the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic.”   119
The definition of analyticity itself does not tell us much about 
why concept-containment gives rise to necessity, it merely tells us 
that judgments with subject-predicate structure are analytic: if the 
predicate-concept is contained in the subject concept. 
Explanation, however, is not far to seek. The first thing to note is 
that concepts should quite literally be thought of as having other 
 Kant KrV A 6-7.Translation from Kant (1998).119
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concepts as parts: Concepts build up other concepts.  The 120
reference a built-up concept has is determined by its constituent 
concepts. So for example, if a concept is built up from the two 
concepts ‘red’ and ‘ball’, then its referents are all things that are 
the referents of both concepts ‘red’ and ‘ball’.  The second thing 121
to note is the required subject-predicate structure of the analytic 
judgment. This structure leads to the following relationship 
between reference and truth: For a judgment with subject-
predicate structure to be true, the referents of the subject concept 
must also be referents of the predicate concept.  
The containment of the predicate concept in the subject concept 
as a part determines the reference of the subject concept to be 
such that its referents are also referents of the predicate concept. 
This in turn guarantees that the judgment is true, since the truth of 
a subject-predicate judgement requires the referents of the subject 
to also be referents of the predicate. So the concept structure, the 
judgment structure, and the resulting constraints on reference and 
truth work together to explain why an analytic judgment cannot 
fail to be true: It cannot fail to be true, because the reference of 
the subject and the predicate concept is determined in such a way 
that its requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied.  
While Kant’s definition of analyticity heavily relies on 
containment and the subject-predicate structure of analytic 
judgments, the explanation of why these judgments cannot fail to 
be true does not essentially rely on these two elements. What 
explains that such a judgment cannot fail to be true, is the 
 Hence the name ‘analytic’. For a historically informed discussion of parthood 120
and concepts in Kant, see Leech (forthcoming 2016)
 In principle, there may be other ways in which concepts are built up which 121
may give rise to different conditions on the referents, but apparently the Kantian 
containment-picture only takes account of the kind of constitution outlined here.
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working together of how the reference of the constituents of the 
judgment is determined and what is required of the referents for 
the truth of the judgment. Containment of one concept in another, 
given the background theory of concepts, is a sufficient condition 
for the necessary truth of a subject predicate judgment. However, 
it is likely to not be a necessary condition, as there are possibly 
other ways in which reference determination of constituent 
representations guarantees the truth of truth-evaluable 
representations. We may call the Kantian analytic truths narrowly 
analytic to mark the distinction between those truths classically 
conceived of as analytic, and the wide analytic truths, which are 
necessary in virtue of how reference is determined generally. In 
what follows, the explanation of necessary truth will be expanded 
to cover not only the narrow analytic truths, but also the wide 
analytic truths. 
2. Explaining Necessary truth 
An explanation of why a truth cannot fail to be true amounts to an 
explanation of its necessity. The explanation suggested by the 
Kantian account of analyticity goes like this: An analytic truth 
cannot fail to be true, because the relationship of the referents of 
its constituents required for its truth is guaranteed by how the 
reference of the constituents is determined. This explanation 
cannot only be applied to narrowly analytic truths whose 
constituents stand in containment relations to each other, but to 
other representations as well, provided that something about how 
the reference of the constituents is determined guarantees that the 
relationship between the referents required for the truth of the 
representation obtains. 
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The account of representations outlined in the last section 
provides all the tools needed for a general account of necessary 
truth. The starting point for an account of necessary truths are 
token representations. Token truth-evaluable representations are 
constituted by token referential representations. The truth of truth-
evaluable representations depends on the relationship between the 
referents of the referential representation. The relationship the 
referents need to have for a truth-evaluable representation to be 
true are the referential requirements for truth, which can be stated 
in the following form:  
Requirements for truth: The truth-evaluable representation 
R is true, iff the referents of the constituent referential 
representations C1,…,Cn stand in relation I.  
The constituent token representations refer to something in virtue 
of their reference determining properties, and in virtue of the 
reference realizing properties of the referents. The reference 
determining properties determine what the reference realizing 
properties, the properties the referent(s) of the token 
representation must have for a reference relation to hold between 
the representation and its referent, are. The reference realizing 
properties can be stated as conditions. They take the following 
form:  
Reference conditions: The referential representation C 
refers to o, iff o has P1,…,Pn.   122
 P1,…,Pn are the reference realizing properties. 122
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These conditions are the reference conditions of representation C. 
The reference conditions typically state necessary and sufficient 
conditions for reference to occur. However, I will also use the 
term reference conditions to refer to the merely necessary 
conditions.  123
For a truth-evaluable representation to be necessarily true, the 
reference realizing properties of the constituent representation 
must be appropriately related such as to guarantee the satisfaction 
of the referential requirements for truth. One way in which this 
may happen is if the requirements for truth require the referents of 
one constituent representation (C1) to be a subset of the referents 
of the other (C2), and if the reference realizing properties of C2 
are a subset of the reference realizing properties of C1. One 
example of such a case is the example of the unmarried bachelors 
above. ⌜All bachelors are unmarried⌝ cannot fail to be true, 
because the requirements for truth require the referents of 
⌜bachelor⌝ to be a subset of the referents of ⌜unmarried⌝, and the 
reference realizing properties of ⌜unmarried⌝ are a subset of the 
reference realizing properties of ⌜bachelor⌝, since we can 
assume, along with standard treatment of the conditions the 
referents of ⌜bachelor⌝ have to satisfy, that these referents are 
unmarried. 
 These reference conditions may be disjunctive. There is no requirement that 123
the conditions need to be stateable as singly necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions, although this is desirable. There may be limits to the properties 
expressible in a language, so it should not be expected that it is always possible 
to spell out the reference conditions for every representation as sufficiently 
specific necessary and sufficient conditions.
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The relationship between the reference determining, and the 
reference realizing properties can again be illustrated with the 
model of fit introduced in the last section. 
 
The picture illustrates that the reference determining properties 
determine the reference realizing properties of ⌜bachelor⌝ and 
⌜unmarried⌝ such that the reference realizing properties of 
⌜unmarried⌝ are a subset of the reference realizing properties of 
⌜bachelor⌝. 
This is the simplest case of how the reference realizing properties 
can be related to the requirements for truth. More complex 
representations have more complex requirements for truth and 
accordingly more complex relations between the reference 
realizing properties that need to be in place for their satisfaction to 
be guaranteed.  
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To capture all these cases, I propose the following definition: 
Necessary truth (tokens): A token truth-evaluable 
representation is necessarily true, iff the satisfaction of its 
requirements for truth is implied by the reference 
conditions of its constituent referential representations. 
The definition can be applied to our example in the following 
way: The requirements for truth of ⌜all bachelors are unmarried⌝ 
are: ⌜all bachelors are unmarried⌝ is true, iff the referents of 
⌜bachelor⌝ are referents of ⌜unmarried⌝. 
The reference conditions of ⌜bachelor⌝ are, we may assume: 
⌜bachelor⌝ refers to o, iff o is unmarried and male. 
And the reference conditions for ⌜unmarried⌝ are, we may 
assume for simplicity: ⌜unmarried⌝ refers to o, iff o is 
unmarried.  124
It follows from these reference conditions that the referents of 
⌜bachelor⌝ are referents of ⌜unmarried⌝ and consequently the 
requirements for truth of ⌜all bachelors are unmarried⌝ are 
satisfied.  
The definition of necessary truths in terms of reference conditions 
and what they imply is adequate in light of what reference 
conditions and requirements for truth are. However, the present 
definition is neither intended to be a reduction, for it appeals to 
the modal notion of entailment, nor does the definition give the 
 These reference conditions are trivial, but this triviality is not harmful to the 124
example, as was explained in the last chapter.
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desired explanation of necessary truth, even though it points to an 
explanation. 
The intended explanation of necessary truth involves the 
reference determining properties, the corresponding reference 
realizing properties, as well as the requirements for truth of the 
truth-evaluable representation. Let us look at each ingredient to 
the explanation in turn. The fact that a representation’s reference 
determining properties determine reference realizing properties is 
gained from considering the nature of reference. Since reference 
is a relation between a representation and an object or a number 
of objects, which holds in virtue of properties of the 
representation and properties of the referent, the referent(s) are 
bound to have some reference realizing properties determined by 
the reference determining properties. The fact that truth-evaluable 
representations are true in virtue of the referents of its constituents 
standing in some specified relation to each other is equally an 
uncontroversial fact about truth-evaluable representations. Now it 
may be the case that the relationship between the referents of the 
constituent representations that needs to hold for the truth-
evaluable representation to be true, is guaranteed to hold in virtue 
of how the reference realizing properties relate to each other. If 
this is the case, the truth-evaluable representation cannot be false, 
and so it is necessarily true. In a sentence: 
Explanation of Necessity: A necessarily true truth-evaluable 
representation is necessary, because the reference 
determining properties of the constituent referential 
representations determine the reference realizing properties 
such that the requirements for truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation are guaranteed to be satisfied. 
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What it takes for a representation to be necessarily true, is that its 
requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied. That the 
conditions for this guarantee are in place can be gained from the 
relationship between the reference realizing properties of the 
constituent representations and the requirements for truth of the 
truth-evaluable representation.  
This explanation may at first glance seem circular, because it 
involves a “guarantee” that the requirements are satisfied, which 
may seem like nothing more than a restatement of the necessary 
truth of the representation. But the present account is not intended 
as a conceptual reduction, but as an explanation, and it explains 
how the guarantee is effected. For each (kind of) case, we can say 
without recourse to the modal notion of guarantee, what it takes 
for the requirements for truth to be guaranteed by the reference 
realizing properties. 
Consider again the example of the unmarried bachelors. The 
representation ⌜all bachelors are unmarried⌝ is true, iff the 
referents of ⌜bachelor⌝ are a subset of the referents of 
⌜unmarried⌝. And thus it is necessary, according to the present 
account, just in case the reference realizing properties determined 
by ⌜bachelor⌝ include among them the reference realizing 
properties determined by ⌜unmarried⌝.  This way of saying 125
what it takes for the particular representation to be necessarily 
true, makes no reference at all to any modal notions, and thus the 
characterization is not explanatorily circular.  
 Note that the inclusion relation between these sets of properties is not the 125
same as the relation of concept containment in the Kantian account. For concept 
containment, if it exists, is only one possible way that gives rise to this 
relationship between the reference realizing properties. 
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The apparent circularity comes in when we try to say more 
generally what it takes for a representation to be necessary, for 
there are different ways, depending on the requirements for truth, 
in which the relationship between the reference realizing 
properties can guarantee the satisfaction of the requirements for 
truth.  So one has to revert to a description in modal terms: what 126
it is to be necessary is to be guaranteed to be true. This, however, 
is unobjectionable, for the intention is not a conceptual reduction, 
a different way of saying the same thing, but constitutive 
explanation. So as long as we can explain what gives rise to such 
a guarantee in each particular case without circularity, the 
explanation is not objectionably circular. We can do this in each 
case by giving the relation between the reference realizing 
properties with respect to the relation between the referents 
required for the truth of the representation which explains the 
necessary truth.  
Here are three more examples of how the guarantee may be 
effected in some cases. Lets assume for simplicity the following 
format for the examples: the truth-evaluable representation R 
consist of two constituent referential representations C1 and C2, 
which determine certain reference realizing properties. The 
requirements for truth for R are given as a relation between the 
referents of C1 and C2. 
 One may attempt a list of different kinds of truth-evaluable representations, 126
which classifies them according to the relationship the referents of their 
constituents need to stand in. Then one could, for each such kind, say more 
generally, without recourse to modality, what the required relationship between 
the reference realizing properties needs to be. There is no need for this here, 
however, as the modal vocabulary will do just fine to get the intended 
explanation across. 
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The first example is a representation which requires for its truth 
that the referents of C1 are a subset of the referents of C2. A 
representation with this form of requirements for truth is 
necessarily true, just in case the reference realizing properties 
determined by C2 are a subset of the reference realizing 
properties determined by C1. 
The second example is a representations which requires for its 
truth that the referents of C1 are identical to the referents of C2. A 
representation with this form of requirements for truth is 
necessarily true, just in case the reference realizing properties 
determined by C1 are the same as the reference realizing 
properties determined by C2. That is, it requires that both 
representations are of the same type. 
The third example is a representation which requires for its truth 
that the referents of C1 and C2 are disjoint. A representation with 
this form of requirements for truth is necessarily true, just in case 
either the reference realizing properties of C1 include the negation 
of the reference realizing properties of C2, or vice versa.  
What explains necessity in all three cases is the appropriate 
relationship between the requirements for truth and the reference 
realizing properties, a relationship that guarantees the satisfaction 
of the requirements for truth.  
The proposed explanation of necessary truth shows how 
representations can be guaranteed to be true in virtue of having an 
appropriate relationship between the relevant reference realizing 
properties and the requirements for truth. But one may wonder 
what the scope of the account is, whether it captures all 
philosophically interesting cases of necessary truths, or whether it 
is just a more abstract way of accounting for mere conceptual 
truths. This is the challenge that will be confronted in the next 
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chapters by giving a range of examples and by arguing that the 
kind of necessity explained is indeed metaphysical necessity. 
The purpose of this section was to show that an explanation of 
why some representations cannot fail to be true naturally drops 
out of a general account of representations, given that reference is 
not primitive, and given that the truth of truth-evaluable 
representations depends on the reference of its constituents. I take 
these two assumptions to be uncontroversial and thus that it has 
been established that at least some kind of necessary truth can be 
properly explained in the way advocated. 
3. Necessary Truth for Types of Representations 
The explanation of necessity was given in terms of token 
representations, since they are naturally taken to be the primary 
bearers of truth and necessary truth in the present framework. The 
explanation, however, can be extended to types of token 
representations. For simplicity I will sometimes call types of 
truth-evaluable representations ‘propositions’. And I will 
sometimes call types of referential representations ‘concepts’. 
However, it should be kept in mind that this is a non-standard and 
stipulative use of both terms, and should not be taken to be the 
standard usage of the term proposition or concept as it is used in 
most philosophical debates.   127
 There is not the standard use of these terms, but the debate around 127
propositions fits better with the communication model discussed above, where 
propositions and concepts have a very specific theoretical role, that the concepts 
and propositions as they are used here need not satisfy. Still, conceiving of 
propositions as some type of a token representations is suggested by some 
philosophers. Scott Soames in King, Soames, Speaks, (2014), for example, 
argues that one should conceive of propositions as a type of act of predication.
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Truth-evaluable representation tokens are of a type in virtue of 
having constituent representations of the same type, and in virtue 
of having the same requirements for truth, so we may say that 
propositions have derivative requirements for truth. Types of 
referential representations (concepts), accordingly have derivative 
reference realizing properties and thus derivative reference 
conditions, for the token referential representations are of a type 
in virtue of having the same reference realizing properties. The 
definition for the necessity of propositions is thus parallel to the 
definition of necessary truth for token representations: 
Necessary truth (types): A proposition is necessarily true, 
iff the satisfaction of its (derivative) referential 
requirements for truth is implied by the (derivative) 
reference conditions of its constituent concepts. 
As before, the definition is not a reduction and should not be 
confused with the explanation of necessity. The explanation of 
necessary truth runs via the interplay between the reference 
determining properties of the token constituent representations 
and the token truth-evaluable representation’s requirements for 
truth. 
We can take the definition of necessity for propositions to tell us 
what the reference determining properties of the tokens of the 
constituent concepts and the requirements for truth of the token 
truth-evaluable representation would have to be like for them to 
necessarily represent truly. 
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4. Adequacy of the explanation 
The explanation of necessity, I want to argue here, has good 
prospects for satisfying the criteria of adequacy for a 
philosophical explanation outlined in part one: non-circularity, 
generality, and intelligibility. I hope to convince you throughout 
the thesis that it does so better than its competitors. In the 
following, I consider the criteria of adequacy in turn, and indicate 
where further argument is needed for an adequate assessment of 
the merits of the theory. 
The non-circularity of the explanation was discussed above 
already. Although some apparently modal notions appear in both, 
the definition, as well as the general formulation of the 
explanation, this doesn’t threaten the non-circularity of the 
explanation. To see why the explanation is non-circular, it helps to 
look back at the discussion in the first part on what a 
philosophical explanation is supposed to do: It is supposed to tell 
us what it takes, constitutively, for something to be the case. An 
explanation of knowledge, for example, is supposed to tell us 
what it takes to be knowledge, and an explanation of necessary 
truth is supposed to tell us what it takes to be necessarily true. 
This question can be approached in different ways. One way is to 
give a conceptual analysis of a philosophical concept, that is, 
essentially, to find a different way of representing the intended 
philosophical concept, and to hope that this reformulation 
elucidates what it takes for the philosophical phenomenon to 
obtain. As is well known, however, such analyses are not always 
possible, and even if some extensionally adequate reformulation 
is possible, it is not always clear that it moves us any closer to 
knowing what it takes for the phenomenon to obtain. In particular 
in the modal case, when we want an explanation of why some 
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representation is necessarily true, it seems that we cannot expect a 
(sensible) reformulation that is not itself in need of further 
explanation.  Consequently, the present theory did not attempt 128
any such conceptual analysis. Rather, a reformulation was chosen 
that is in further need of explanation, but which moves us closer 
to understanding what it takes for a representation to be 
necessarily true: necessary truth is a guarantee of truth. 
Subsequently, the need for explanation was discharged by 
showing what it takes for a representation to be guaranteed to be 
true. Something must make it the case that the representation 
cannot fail to represent truly. The way the guarantee is effected, I 
argued, is via the appropriate relationship between what is 
required for the truth of the truth-evaluable representation and the 
reference realizing properties determined by its constituent 
representations. What this relationship is, is different for different 
kinds of truth-evaluable representations, and so there is no way of 
saying what the relationship for any truth-evaluable representation 
is without resorting to the modal notion of a guarantee. However, 
even though the notion of guarantee appears in the official 
explanation of necessity, the explanation is not that a 
representation is necessarily true, because it is guaranteed to be 
true. This would rightly count as a circular explanation. Rather, 
the explanation is that what it is (not takes) for a representation to 
be necessarily true, is to be guaranteed to be true, and what it 
takes for this guarantee to be effected is an appropriate 
 Lewis’ genuine modal realism would be an account that succeeds in a 128
reformulation that does not seem to be in immediate need for further 
philosophical explanation (Lewis 1986). However, to even be extensionally 
adequate, it requires the existence of a plurality of concrete possible worlds, and 
even if all these worlds existed, it seems like quite a stretch to claim that truth in 
all these worlds is really what it takes for a representation to be necessarily true.
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relationship between the requirements for truth and the reference 
realizing properties. What the appropriate relationship for some 
specific kinds of truth-evaluable representations is, was outlined 
in the examples. So while I agree that there is no way to give an 
illuminating conceptual reduction of necessity, I do hold that an 
illuminating and non-circular explanation of why each necessary 
truth is necessary can be given.  
Whether the second requirement, generality, is satisfied remains 
to be shown in the following sections, but presently it is useful to 
see what would have to be the case for the requirement to be 
satisfied. The generality requirement states that a philosophical 
explanation should be able to not only give a partial account of 
some phenomenon, but a general and unified account of an 
apparently unified phenomenon: necessary truth. To argue that the 
requirement is satisfied, I will first have to show that the account 
is extensionally adequate, that is, that it is able to explain 
uncontroversial examples of metaphysically necessary truths.  
I will argue for the extensional adequacy of the theory in two 
ways. In the next chapter I will give examples of standard 
necessary truths and argue that they can be explained in the way 
envisaged. In the following chapters I will provide additional 
considerations that are designed to strengthen the claim to 
extensional adequacy. The examples will suggest that the 
necessity primarily explained by the account is what has 
commonly been called metaphysical necessity. However, since 
some possibly controversial assumptions about the reference 
realizing properties must be made for the examples to go through, 
there is room for some doubts about extensional adequacy. Some 
of these doubts will be alleviated by comparing the present theory 
to essentialism, a theory which is commonly taken to be 
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extensionally adequate, if it explains necessity at all. I will 
suggest that we should identify essential properties with those 
reference realizing properties of an object which are determined 
by the singular representation referring to it. If this identification 
is plausible, then it speaks strongly in favor of the theory giving a 
general explanation of metaphysical necessity. 
Since metaphysical necessity is not the only kind of necessity the 
theory may be expected to explain, but also other, weaker kinds of 
(alethic) necessity, such as nomic or practical necessity, chapter 
seven is devoted to arguing that the account can be appropriately 
expanded to account for these kinds of necessity as well. Given 
that these considerations turn out to be convincing, the proposed 
explanation has a strong claim to being a sufficiently general 
theory of necessary truth. 
I also take the proposed explanation to score high on the last 
desideratum: intelligibility of the explanans. For the explanans 
makes use of uncontroversial resources and does not require us to 
believe in anything we would usually reject. The resources merely 
rely on very general considerations about the nature of 
representation and reference: (i) that truth-evaluable 
representations have as their constituents referential 
representations, (ii) that they are true, if the relationship between 
the referents of these constituent representations is as required, 
and (iii) that reference is a relation that holds in virtue of 
properties of the referent and the representation. Unless one is a 
skeptic about reference and truth, these assumptions should not be 
controversial, for no matter what philosophical view one is 
inclined to have on how reference is determined, it is quite 
uncontroversial that for the reference relation to hold, both the 
representation as well as the referent must have certain properties. 
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Equally, if one accepts that there is reference, the proposed 
relationship between reference and truth can hardly be doubted. 
So necessary truth is bound to arise from quite basic assumptions 
about how representations work.  
These considerations provide reason for optimism that the present 
explanation is a non-circular, general, and genuinely intelligible 
theory of necessity. It will have to be shown in the following 
chapters that this optimism is justified. 
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Chapter 6: Applying the Theory 
The last chapter outlined how an explanation for the necessary 
truth of representations may go. In this chapter the explanatory 
strategy will be applied to examples. This application is supposed 
to clarify the explanation itself, but it is also supposed to show 
that it explains what has commonly been called metaphysical 
necessity. To do so, I will apply the theory to standard examples 
of metaphysically necessary truths, and argue that their necessity 
is indeed explainable in the way suggested.  
Using examples, however, can only go part of the way of showing 
that the theory is (extensionally) adequate. This is for two 
reasons. The first is the not terribly interesting reason that 
examples are just that, examples, and the small number given here 
can only raise our confidence in the theory so much. However, 
since there is reasonable hope that the account covers more 
examples, I will for now pay no further attention to this problem. 
The second reason for doubting the effectiveness of the examples 
for showing that the theory has a claim to extensional adequacy, 
however, is more worrying: I will have to make assumptions 
about what the sentences, commonly taken to be used to express 
necessary truths, are used to represent. That is, I will have to 
make assumptions about the requirements for truth of the 
representations, and I will have to make assumptions about the 
reference realizing properties of the constituent representations. 
These assumptions will not just be made up, but they will also not 
be beyond doubt. I will take care to give plausible reference 
realizing properties and requirements for truth in light of my 
understanding of the english sentences said to express a necessary 
truth, and in light of what we know about the reference realizing 
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properties of the constituent referential representations. While this 
will provide some reason to endorse the explanation as 
extensionally adequate, this is conditional on the plausibility of 
the assumptions. Thus I will not merely rely on the examples to 
argue for the extensional adequacy of the theory, but in the 
following chapters give some more reasons to take the present 
explanation to explain metaphysical necessity. 
In the application of the theory, I will proceed as follows. First, I 
give examples of representations whose necessity is due to the 
reference realizing properties of general representation.  These 129
examples are probably the most uncontroversial examples, as 
some of them are even today taken to be conceptual, or analytic 
truths in some sense. The examples that follow will show that the 
difference between these apparently simpler examples to 
necessary truths, whose necessity can be traced to the reference 
realizing properties of the singular representation, does not run 
deep. Necessarily true representations, where the necessity can be 
traced to the singular representations, do have a certain 
peculiarity, however. This is due to the apparently existence-
entailing character of sentences involving a singular 
representation in subject-position. For if such sentences are 
 I talk here of necessary truths whose necessity is due either to a general or a 129
singular representation. Of course the full explanation of necessary truth 
involves the reference realizing properties of all referential representations in the 
truth-evaluable representation and their relation to the requirements for truth. 
Still there sometimes is a sense in which the necessity is due to one of the 
referential representations. This is vivid for cases where the reference realizing 
properties of one representation are a subset of the other. Here the representation 
with the larger set of reference realizing properties can be conceived of as the 
one ‘responsible’ for the necessary truth. As an example take once more ⌜all 
bachelors are unmarried⌝, where the necessity may be said to be due to the 
representation ⌜bachelor⌝. 
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indeed used as truth-evaluable representations which require for 
their truth the existence of a referent, then it seems that the 
present theory cannot account for their necessity, because there is 
no way to guarantee that anything in fact has the reference 
realizing properties determined by the reference determining 
properties of the representation. Luckily, however, there is good 
reason not to take these sentences to be used as representations 
which require the existence of the referent of the singular 
representation for their truth. 
To argue for all this, I start with necessarily true representations 
involving general representations. This is followed by an interlude 
discussing the problem of existence, necessary truth, and singular 
representations generally. The insights gained there are then be 
applied to examples of necessarily true representations involving 
singular representations.  
1. Necessarily True Representations Involving General 
Representations 
Conceptual truths 
The first example is one we have already encountered above and 
an example of what is sometimes called a conceptual truth.  The 130
example is the representation expressed by the sentence “Vixens 
are female”. 
The first step in explaining the representation’s necessity, is to 
identify the referential representations and the requirements for 
 From the discussion of analyticity in the last part it should have become clear 130
that I do not take conceptual or analytic truths to be made true in any special 
way. The phrase “conceptual truth” is here merely used to classify the class of 
truths commonly called “conceptual truths” by philosophers. Similar remarks 
apply to the labels “logical truth” and “mathematical truth”.
!154
truth of the truth-evaluable representation: The representation 
⌜vixens are female⌝ should be taken to consist of the two 
referential representations ⌜vixen⌝ and ⌜female⌝. The subject 
predicate structure of the sentence also gives us a clue as to which 
relationship is required for the truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation: The referents of ⌜vixen⌝ must be referents of 
⌜female⌝.  
The next step in the explanation of necessary truth is identifying 
the appropriate relationship between the reference realizing 
properties determined by the referential representation which 
explains that the requirements for truth are guaranteed to be 
satisfied. As I pointed out in the last chapter, the relationship 
between the reference realizing properties explaining the 
necessary truth is the following: The reference realizing properties 
determined by ⌜female⌝ must be among the reference realizing 
properties determined by ⌜vixen⌝, for if this is the case, the 
representation ⌜female⌝ will refer to anything the representation 
⌜vixen⌝ refers to, thus making sure that the requirements for truth 
are satisfied. 
The final step in establishing the necessary truth of the 
representation is to find out whether the reference realizing 
properties determined by the representations are related in the 
way required for the representation to be necessarily true. To 
establish this, I will assume that the simple description theory of 
reference outlined in the semantic preliminaries is true for the 
representation ⌜vixen⌝. On this theory, the reference of ⌜vixen⌝ 
is determined by the appropriate association with other (token) 
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representations in the speaker’s head. In the present case these are 
the token representations ⌜female⌝ and ⌜fox⌝. By being so 
associated, the reference realizing properties of ⌜vixen⌝ are 
determined to be the conjunction of the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜female⌝ and ⌜fox⌝. This is already almost enough 
to establish the necessary truth of the representation ⌜vixens are 
female⌝, all that has to be assumed in addition is that the 
referential representation ⌜female⌝ as it appears in the token 
truth-evaluable representation above is of the same type as the 
referential representation ⌜female⌝, which is associated with 
⌜vixen⌝. If this assumption is true, then, since two token 
referential representations are of the same type in virtue of 
determining the same reference realizing properties, it is the case 
that the reference realizing properties of ⌜female⌝ are among the 
reference realizing properties of ⌜vixen⌝. And since this is just 
what is required for the representation to be necessarily true, it is 
necessarily true.  
Note that the example did not even have to establish what the 
reference realizing properties are. It was sufficient to point out 
that they are appropriately related vis à vis the requirements for 
truth. That this is the case could be shown assuming a description 
theory of reference. It may be the case that the description theory 
presupposed here is not ultimately the best theory for explaining 
the reference of the representations. However, in the case of 
simple conceptual truths, it is at least plausible to assume the that 
reference of ⌜vixen⌝ suitably depends on the reference of 
⌜female⌝. 
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The necessity of conceptual truths is thus explained by the theory. 
This, however, was to be expected since the blueprint for the 
explanation was the Kantian containment-account of analyticity, 
which could already explain these simple cases. So next it needs 
to be shown that the account covers more than these simple 
examples. 
Logical truths 
Logical truths are some of the prime examples of necessary truths 
and they should be accounted for by any theory of necessity. 
Standard examples are usually given in propositional logic: “p or 
not p”, “If p then p”, etc., I will first focus on these simple 
examples from propositional logic. Afterwards I will discuss 
examples from (first-order) quantified logic, as these need a 
slightly different treatment, due to the more complex character of 
the truth-evaluable representations. 
Take first the simple example of “p or not p”. As it stands, it can 
hardly be taken to be a representation, more as representing the 
form of a representation, but by adding some detail and filling in 
assumptions, there is a reading of “p or not p” that may count as 
genuine representation. The propositional constants (p, q, r, …) 
can be taken to be referential representations that refer to 
propositions understood as truth-evaluable representations. The 
same letter is used as a representation of the same type on every 
occasion of use and it is used to refer to truth-evaluable 
representations of the same type. So each appearance of the letter 
‘p’, for example, is to be taken to be a representation of the same 
type and to refer to truth-evaluable representations of type p. 
Multiple occurrences of propositional constants can be taken to 
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refer to ordered sets of propositions, depending on the order of 
their appearance. 
The logical vocabulary (if…then, or, and, not) can then be taken 
to represent a relation between the representations which holds in 
virtue of their truth value. The referents of this relational 
representation are ordered sets of objects, in the present case, 
ordered sets of truth-evaluable representations. 
The first step in establishing the necessary truth of the 
representation expressed by “p or not p”, is to find out what its 
requirements for truth are. Given what has been said above, they 
are the following: 
⌜p or not p⌝ is true, iff the referent of ⌜p…p⌝ is a referent of ⌜or 
not⌝.  
The next step is to see whether the reference realizing properties 
of the representation are such that they guarantee the satisfaction 
of these requirements. Let us start with the general representation 
⌜or not⌝. To be the referent of this representation an ordered pair 
of propositions must be such that either the first member of the 
pair is true and the second is true, or the first member of the pair 
is true and the second member false, or both members of the pair 
are false. The interesting part of these reference realizing 
properties is that it is sufficient for being the referent of the 
relation ⌜or not⌝ that both the first and the second element of the 
pair are either both true or both false. This will, for example, be 
the case whenever the requirements for truth of both 
representations of the pair are the same. 
Next we need the reference realizing properties of the 
representation ⌜p…p⌝. Since this representation refers to an 
ordered set of truth-evaluable representations, the reference 
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realizing properties are that the referent is an ordered pair 
consisting of the referents of the representations ⌜p⌝ and ⌜p⌝. On 
the assumption that both ⌜p⌝ and ⌜p⌝, are representations of the 
same kind which refer to truth-evaluable representations of the 
same kind, the representation ⌜p…p⌝ refers to ordered pairs of 
truth-evaluable representations consisting of representations of 
the same type. Since representations are of the same type in virtue 
of having the same requirements for truth, it is a necessary 
condition for being the referent of ⌜p…p⌝ that the elements of the 
pair have the same requirements for truth.  
This last finding is what we need to establish that the 
requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied, for that both 
elements of the pair <p,p> have the same requirements for truth is 
sufficient for being the referent of ⌜or not⌝, and so the 
requirements for truth, that the referent of ⌜p…p⌝ is a referent of 
⌜or not⌝ are bound to be satisfied.  
The example shows how the necessary truth of logical truths of 
propositional logic can in principle be explained in the present 
framework, if the propositional constants are conceived of as 
representations of propositions. As it turns out, the explanation for 
their necessary truth is not very different from the explanation in 
the simple containment-cases.  
Propositional logic contains only referential representations 
representing proposition, and relations that hold between them in 
virtue of their truth value. As such the referential representations 
only refer to other representations or sets of representations. 
Quantified logic expands this narrow focus, and adds more 
structure to the representations. By giving the representations 
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more structure, however, the function of the logical connective 
changes. They can no longer be viewed as representations of 
logical relations holding between propositions, as there are no 
longer representations of those propositions, rather, the logical 
connectives indicate the sometimes complex relationship between 
the referents of the referential representations required for the 
truth of the truth-evaluable representation.  
Again an example involving quantification is helpful. Take as 
example the representation expressed by the sentence “For all x, if 
x is grey, then x is grey.” The first step in finding out whether this 
representation is necessarily true is again to give the requirements 
for truth: 
⌜For all x, if x is grey, then x is grey⌝ is true, iff the referents of 
⌜grey1⌝ are referents of ⌜grey2⌝.  
To distinguish the two token representations exemplified by the 
word ‘grey’, I have labeled them ⌜grey1⌝ and ⌜grey2⌝ 
respectively. The requirements for truth should in light of the 
standard reading of ‘if…then’ not be very surprising.  
The next step is, as before, to see what the reference realizing 
properties determined by ⌜grey1⌝ and ⌜grey2⌝ are and whether 
they guarantee the satisfaction of the requirements for truth. We 
can assume that the representations ⌜grey1⌝ and ⌜grey2⌝ are of 
the same type, that is they determine the same reference realizing 
properties. In the context of some formal language this is obvious, 
as it is usually stipulated that if two predicates are symbolized by 
the same letter or word, then they are representations of the same 
type.  
The argument that the reference conditions imply the satisfaction 
of the requirements for truth is now easily made: Since the 
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reference realizing properties determined by ⌜grey1⌝ and those 
determined by ⌜grey2⌝ are the same, a referent of ⌜grey1⌝ is a 
referent of ⌜grey2⌝. Since this just is the requirement for the truth 
of the truth-evaluable representation, the logical truth expressed 
by the sentence “For all x, if x is grey, then x is grey” is 
necessarily true. 
Interestingly, logical truths do not look very different from other 
necessary truths in the present framework. What seems to be 
doing quite a bit of work to make some truths truths of logic is 
that some of the referential representations determine, by 
stipulation, the same reference realizing properties. This makes it 
easy to deduce the necessary truth of some truth-evaluable 
representations in which they occur, as no special attention has to 
be paid to what the exact reference realizing properties are. 
Relations 
Above a first special case of relations was discussed: logical 
relations holding between propositions. But other relations are 
ubiquitous and are also involved in necessary truths. So in the 
following I will give a non-logical example of a truth involving 
relations.  
The special feature of relations is that they can hold between 
multiple objects and so the referents of relations cannot just be 
single objects, but can instead be conceived of as ordered tuples 
of objects. On this view, a two-place relation has as referent an 
ordered pair of objects, a three-place relation has an ordered triple 
of objects as referents, and so on. 
The standard examples of necessary truths involving relations are, 
it turns out, quite complex, as they exploit the formal properties of 
!161
relations to form a necessary truth. Here is an example of a 
necessary truth involving relations; the representation expressed 
by the sentence “If Tobi is taller than Conny, and Conny is taller 
than Laila, then Tobi is taller than Laila.” 
The structure of this truth-evaluable representation can be broken 
down in the following way: There are three general referential 
representations, each a representation of the dyadic relation taller-
than. Second, there are three singular representations ⌜Tobi, 
Conny⌝, ⌜Conny, Laila⌝, and ⌜Tobi, Laila⌝ referring to the 
ordered pairs <Tobi,Conny>, <Conny, Laila>, and <Tobi, Laila>. 
Third, there are logical connectives, which indicate the 
requirements for truth. 
The first step, as before, is finding out what the requirements for 
truth of the truth-evaluable representation are. These are complex, 
as the overall structure involves multiple referential 
representations whose referents have to stand in certain relations 
to each other for the representation to be true. 
The overall structure is that of a conditional with a conjunction in 
the antecedent. So the representation will be true, if either 
<Tobi,Conny> is not a referent of ⌜taller than⌝ , or if <Conny, 
Laila> is not a referent of ⌜taller than⌝, or if all three pairs, 
<Tobi, Conny>, <Conny, Laila>, and <Tobi, Laila> are referents 
of their respective token representations of ⌜taller than⌝.   131
 As before one would, to be quite precise, have to distinguish between each 131
token representation exemplified by the words “taller than”. However, since it 
was (reasonably) assumed that they are of the same type, there is no harm done 
in considering them together and thinking of all the pairs as being referents of 
the same type.
!162
So there is a number of different relations between the referents of 
the representations that suffice for the truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation.  
To find out whether one of these relations between the referents 
are guaranteed to hold in virtue of how the reference of the 
constituent representations is determined, the reference realizing 
properties determined by the referential representations must be 
clarified.  
The reference realizing properties of the pair’s singular referential 
representations, ⌜Tobi, Conny⌝, ⌜Conny, Laila⌝, and ⌜Tobi, 
Laila⌝, need not be given in detail here. It will be enough to note 
two uncontroversial features. First, the two uses of each name are 
token representations of the same type and they therefore 
determine the same reference realizing properties. Second, the 
reference realizing properties of the pairs suitably depend on 
those of the singular referential representations referring to the 
elements of the pairs. 
The more interesting reference realizing properties for present 
purposes are those of the three uses of ⌜taller than⌝. It can be 
assumed that they are all representations of the same type and that 
they thus determine the same reference realizing properties. A 
theory of reference for the relation, however, is not so easy to 
find: A simple description theory is at least not obviously 
forthcoming, and it is also slightly unclear how a causal theory 
may work in the present case. So I will have to abstain from 
speculating about the theory of reference. In either case, however, 
we arguably do know at least some things about the reference 
realizing properties determined by ⌜taller than⌝, and so I will 
suggest some plausible reference conditions, which are roughly in 
!163
line with linguistic analyses of comparatives.  Whether the 132
resulting reference realizing properties really are the correct ones, 
however, will remain conditional on a true theory of reference 
actually yielding reference conditions along these lines. 
Nonetheless, the exercise will be instructive. Here is the 
suggestion for the reference conditions of ⌜taller than⌝: 
An ordered pair of objects is the referent of ⌜taller than⌝, iff the 
first member of the pair has a size greater than the second 
member of the pair.  
These reference conditions invoke the property of size as well as 
assuming that these sizes are comparable as smaller and greater. 
These assumptions should not be objectionable, as there is no 
intention to give a reductive account of the relation eliminating 
the comparative relations. These reference conditions, together 
with the assumptions about the singular representations, imply the 
necessary truth of our target representation in the following way:  
Let’s assume that ⌜taller than⌝ does refer to the pair <Tobi, 
Conny> and to the pair <Conny, Laila>. If this is the case, we 
know from the reference realizing properties of ⌜taller than⌝ that 
Tobi has a size greater than Conny, and that Conny has a size 
greater than Laila. Next we ask what would have to be the case 
for ⌜taller than⌝ to have the pair <Tobi, Laila> as referent. This 
pair is a referent of ⌜taller than⌝, if and only if Tobi has a size 
greater than Laila.  
 In linguistics it is common to understand the relation ‘taller than’ as a relation 132
between sets of degrees of size. See for example Kennedy (2014) for an 
overview over the semantics of comparatives, as well as Klein (1980).
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Now if the pair <Tobi, Laila> is bound to have these reference 
realizing properties given that the pairs <Tobi, Conny> and 
<Conny, Laila> are referents of ⌜taller than⌝, then the 
requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied, because they 
are satisfied if all three pairs are referents of the ⌜taller than⌝ 
relation. That Tobi indeed has a size greater than Laila, and that 
therefore the pair <Tobi, Laila> is a referent of ⌜taller than⌝, if 
<Tobi, Conny> and <Conny, Laila> are, follows from the facts, 
derived from the reference realizing properties that Tobi has a size 
greater than Conny and that Conny has a size greater than Laila. 
So it is the case that the pair <Tobi, Laila> is a referent of ⌜taller 
than⌝, if the pairs <Tobi, Conny>, and <Conny, Laila> are.  
This is just what needs to be established to explain the necessary 
truth of the truth-evaluable representation. For the requirements 
for truth are bound to be satisfied in virtue of the relationship 
between the reference realizing properties of the referential 
representations. 
The examples discussed here, ranging from simple conceptual and 
logical truths to more complicated relations, demonstrate that the 
present account, at least in principle, has the resources to account 
for the necessary truth of these kinds of representations.  
This, however, is still not very surprising, as it would have been 
expected of an account developed from an account of analyticity. 
In the next sections, I suggest how the theory may explain the 
necessary truth of representations involving singular referential 
representations. These broadly essentialist truths have a special 
feature which has been noted and discussed in the literature: They 
seem to require for their truth that the object represented by the 
singular referential representation exists. So if such 
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representations are necessarily true, they seem to imply the 
necessary existence of the object represented by the singular 
representation. This is a puzzle that needs to be solved, if one is 
unwilling to accept that everything exists necessarily. Connected 
to this puzzle about necessary existence are questions about 
merely possible objects, objects that do not actually exist, but may 
exist, as well as impossible objects, objects that just cannot exist. 
It is the topic of the following sections to clarify how these 
puzzles may be dealt with in the present framework. 
Interlude: Necessary Existence and Mere Possibilia 
In this section I will argue that puzzles surrounding necessary 
existence, mere possibilia, and necessarily non-existent objects 
can be dealt with in the present framework, by distinguishing 
between different readings of sentences involving names.  
Puzzles arise once a theory of necessity allows for (broadly) 
essentialist truths, truths that attribute an essential property to an 
object. A prominent example is the representation expressed by 
the sentence “Socrates is human” which will in the following be 
assumed to be necessarily true.  The puzzle arises, because it 133
seems that if it is necessarily true that Socrates is human, then 
Socrates exists necessarily, for how can it be true at all that 
Socrates is human without Socrates existing?  
The solution, I argue, is to distinguish between two readings of 
essence attributions. On one reading of such sentences, it is 
required for the truth of the representation expressed that the 
singular representation expressed by the name has a referent. On 
 I do not presently take a stand on which specific essence attributions are true. 133
But some will be true, and so the skeptic can substitute her favorite example in 
place of the one used here.
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this reading, no such representation turns out to be necessarily 
true according to the present theory. On another reading, however, 
it is not required for the truth of the representation that the 
singular representation has a referent. On this reading the 
representation may turn out to be necessarily true according to the 
theory, but it no longer implies the necessary existence of a 
referent of the singular representation. This diagnosis is consistent 
with standard solutions to the puzzle of necessary existence. 
First I will discuss the puzzle of necessary existence and argue for 
the suggested solution. These findings are then shown to impact 
discussions about merely possible and impossible objects. 
Necessary existence 
Some truths involving singular representations seem to require for 
their truth that the object to which the singular representation 
refers, exists. If these representations can be necessarily true, a 
puzzle arises, for it seems that we can straightforwardly deduce 
the necessary existence of the objects referred to by the singular 
representation. Here is how Bob Hale puts the argument: “It is in 
the nature of Aristotle to be a man—being a man is part of what it 
is to be Aristotle. […] So it is necessary that Aristotle is a man. 
But nothing can be true of Aristotle unless he exists. So it cannot 
be true that Aristotle is a man unless he exists. So Aristotle 
necessarily exists!”  This is problematic, since ordinarily we 134
would think that people and ordinary objects could have failed to 
exist: If Aristotle’s parents would not have met, he would never 
have been born, and so would not have existed. Similar stories 
can be told for all ordinary objects. It even seems true that nothing 
 Hale (2013) p. 211.134
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could have existed. So unless we are prepared, like some 
philosophers, to believe that everything exists necessarily, we 
have to reject some part of the argument for necessary 
existence.   135
First, I will discuss a standard solution to the puzzle, then move 
on to Kit Fine’s criticism of the standard solution and his own 
proposal, and finally look at Bob Hale’s recent take on the issue. 
Finally I argue for my own solution, which flows from the 
representation-framework, and show how it unifies these other 
proposals. 
The argument for necessary existence and the standard solution 
The argument for the necessary existence of an ordinary object 
can be spelled out in argument form as follows. I use Kit Fine’s 
formulation here, as it brings out nicely the paradoxical character 
of the puzzle: 
“(1) It is necessary that Socrates is a man; 
(2) It is possible that Socrates does not exist; 
(3) Therefore it is possible that Socrates is a man and does not 
exist”  136
Premiss (2) is clearly true, premiss (1) may be controversial, but 
can be substituted by any other property Socrates necessarily has, 
for example his self-identity, for the argument to go trough. The 
conclusion (3) however, seems unacceptable, “for how can 
Socrates be a man without existing?”  And so we might be led 137
to conclude that (2) is false after all, and that it is not possible that 
Socrates does not exist. 
 Williamson (2013) claims that everything exists necessarily. 135
 Fine (2005) p. 328136
 Fine (2005) p. 329137
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There is a more or less standard solution to the problem, as Fine 
points out, which distinguishes between a qualified and an 
unqualified reading of the modality in question. “Under the 
‘unqualified’ reading, a proposition concerning certain objects 
will be necessary if it is true in every world,[…]. Under the 
‘qualified’ reading a proposition concerning certain objects will 
be necessary if it is true in any world in which those objects exist, 
[…]”  So according to the standard solution, the mistake is a 138
fallacy of equivocation: drawing an unqualified conclusion from 
the qualified premiss (1).  
This comes out more clearly in possible-world talk. Premiss (1), 
rephrased in terms of possible worlds says, on the standard 
solution, that in all possible worlds, if Socrates exists, then he is a 
man. Premiss (2) says that there is a possible world in which 
Socrates does not exist. All that follows from this is that there is a 
possible world in which Socrates does not exist and in that 
possible world, if Socrates exists, then he is human. But it does 
not follow that there is a possible world in which Socrates does 
not exist and in which he is human. 
Fine, however, has some quarrel with this standard solution. His 
main objection is that there is no clear linguistic motivation for 
diagnosing an equivocation between the qualified and unqualified 
sense of ‘necessarily’, for we do not seem to have any evidence 
that there are different senses at issue. So, conditional on the 
quality of Fine’s arguments, it seems that, absent a good 
independent reason to treat the two readings of ‘necessarily’ as 
distinct, it is at least doubtful that the diagnosis offered by 
proponents of the standard solution is correct. 
 Fine (2005) p. 330138
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Fine’s solution: worldly and unworldly predicates 
To solve the puzzle, Fine draws a distinction between ‘worldly’ 
and ‘unworldly’ predicates and the resulting sentences. The idea is 
that if a true sentence is formed with a worldly predicate, then it is 
existence-entailing. If it is formed with an unworldly predicate, 
then it is not existence entailing. The distinction between worldly 
and unworldly predicates is motivated by an analogy to a 
distinction within the temporal domain. Here a distinction can be 
drawn between tensed and tenseless expressions. A tensed 
expression is, to use Fine’s example, ‘exists’, for “Socrates exists” 
is true at a time where Socrates exists, and false at times where 
Socrates is no more or was not yet. Opposed to that are tenseless 
expressions, such as ‘is a man’. For “Socrates is a man” is true, 
and “cannot properly be said to be true or false at a time”.  139
Corresponding to this distinction, a distinction can be made 
between sempiternal truths and eternal truths, where sempiternal 
truths are tensed sentences that are always true and eternal truths 
are tenseless sentences that are true simpliciter. Fine notes that the 
distinction between eternal and sempiternal truths can be 
obscured, if we admit an extended sense of truth-at-a-time, for in 
that extended sense, eternal truths can be said to always be true. 
So sempiternal as well as eternal truths will just be true at any 
given time. But he insists that even so, a distinction can be drawn, 
for “a tensed sentence will be true at a time because of how things 
are at that time, while […] a tenseless sentence will be true at a 
time regardless of how things are at that time.”   140
 Fine (2005) p. 322139
 Fine (2005) p.323. Emphasis mine140
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If we accept this distinction, Fine argues, we should accept an 
analogous distinction in the modal sphere. Here “one can draw a 
distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences according to 
whether they can be properly said to be true or false in a 
world.”  Corresponding to this distinction is a distinction 141
between transcendental and necessary truths, where the 
transcendental truths will be true regardless of the circumstance, 
and the necessary truths are true whatever the circumstance.  
This distinction solves the puzzle under the assumption that ‘man’ 
is unworldly, while ‘exists’ is worldly, because if we accept that 
‘man’ is an unworldly predicate, then it doesn’t follow that the 
truth of “Socrates is a man” requires the existence of Socrates. 
And so the conclusion can be accepted.  142
Fine’s solution seems to have an advantage over the standard 
solution in terms of different senses of the word ‘necessarily’, 
because no equivocation and thus no mistake on the side of the 
reader of the argument must be diagnosed. Rather, an 
independently plausible distinction between truths that require the 
existence of the object they are about and those that don’t is 
invoked to explain the acceptability of the conclusion.  
One must be slightly careful in evaluating the dialectic advantage 
of this position, however. For even though Fine can give both 
premises an unqualified reading, and thus pay tribute to our 
intuitions when reading the argument, he has to attribute to the 
reader of the argument, who is puzzled by it, a different mistake, 
 Fine (2005) p 324141
 Fine (2005) also distinguishes between three different senses of ‘necessarily’ 142
depending on whether a proposition is transcendental, necessary, or a mixture of 
both. This is important for the readings of the modal idiom in the argument 
leading to the puzzling conclusion. For the current exposition of the argument, 
however, no detailed discussion of this is necessary.
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for the reader has a mistaken reading of the conclusion: he fails to 
notice that the predicate ‘human’ is unworldly, and thus a 
sentence formed with it and a singular term may be true even 
though the object the singular term purports to refer to, does not 
exist.  
The delicate linguistic dialectic, however, need not concern us too 
much. For Fine’s solution, on second thought, is not so different 
from the standard solution after all. For notice that it is not just 
the case that transcendental truths do not require the existence of 
the object they are about for their truth, it should also be the case 
that if the object exists, it has the property indicated by the 
predicate. But if this is so, we have a quite simple and more 
perspicuous formulation for the transcendental truth that Socrates 
is human: If Socrates exists, Socrates is human. This is a 
conditional truth, conditional on the existence of Socrates. But if 
we substitute this way of formulating the transcendental truth for 
“Socrates is human” in the argument above, we just arrive at the 
standard solution.  
The argument between Fine and the proponents of the standard 
solution should then not be thought to be one that concerns the 
substance of the solution: Both solutions work by conditionalizing 
the truth in the scope of the necessity-operator (Socrates is 
human), explicitly or implicitly, on the existence of the object it is 
about. The quarrel should be thought of as an argument where to 
locate the reasons for giving it such a reading, given that the 
surface form is not conditional. The standard solution locates the 
reasons for the conditional reading in an allegedly ambiguous 
necessity-operator, while Fine locates the reasons for giving the 
sentence a conditional reading in the predicate we use to form the 
sentence. 
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Hale’s solution: restricting quantifier-elimination 
Bob Hale’s solution is slightly different still. It rests on the insight 
that in the modal domain we need to take care what we quantify 
over, and suggests restricting the elimination rule for the universal 
quantifier: The universal quantifier should only be eliminable in 
contexts where the term that is eliminated for has a referent.  143
Essence attributions, on his view, should be possible, without this 
attribution entailing the existence of the object that has this 
essence. This observation seems licensed by the thought that in 
specifying what it is for a thing to be the thing it is, we need not at 
the same time make any commitment to the existence of the thing 
we are specifying the essence of. 
How does this solve Fine’s puzzle? Hale thinks that we should 
reject premise (1) as it stands, for it does not follow from its being 
the essence of Socrates to be a man, that Socrates is necessarily a 
man. For, as Hale puts it, “we should not accept (1) unless we are 
prepared to insist that there can be such a thing as what it is to be 
[Socrates] only if there is such a thing as [Socrates]. But it is not, 
in general, at all plausible to hold that there is such a thing as 
what it is to be X only if X exists, i.e. only if there is such a thing 
as X.”  Rather, what follows from its being part of the essence 144
of Socrates that he is a man, can be expressed more perspicuously 
by the following conditional attribution: Necessarily, for all x (If 
x=Socrates, then x is a man) . This conditional statement 145
 Hale (2013) p. 209ff.143
 Hale (2013) p. 215. Hale uses Aristotle, instead of Socrates as an example. To 144
stick with Socrates, the example Fine gives, all occurrences of ‘Aristotle’ in the 
quote have been replaced by ‘Socrates’. It obviously doesn’t make a difference 
to the basic point.
 Hale (2013) p. 216145
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doesn’t allow to straightforwardly deduce the undesirable 
conclusion that possibly, Socrates both is a man and doesn’t exist. 
For this to follow, it would have to somehow follow from the 
conditional that necessarily, Socrates is a man. This may be 
thought to be effected by an instance of the universal 
generalization, namely by taking x to be Socrates. In this case, it 
would follow that necessarily, if Socrates = Socrates, then 
Socrates is a man. Since Socrates=Socrates is necessary, it 
follows, that necessarily, Socrates is a man. To avoid this 
conclusion Hale suggests that we have to restrict the elimination 
rule for the universal quantifier, for by introducing the instance 
x=Socrates, we “illicitly smuggle in” the assumption that Socrates 
exists.  We should instead replace the standard rule by the 146
following rule of free universal quantifier elimination: “From ∀x 
A(x), together with an existence-entailing premise F(t), we may 
infer A(t), where t can be any term.”  The crucial difference is 147
the need for an existence-entailing premise for the instantiation to 
be allowed, and if we want to eliminate the quantifier in the 
modal context, we need a necessary existence entailing premise. 
But since no premise that entails that Socrates necessarily exists is 
true, the instantiation is not allowed. So the puzzle is solved by 
moving to a free logic. 
This solution, while taking a detour through the theory of 
quantifier elimination rules of a free logic, arrives at a conditional 
reading of premise one as well: It is not unconditionally 
necessarily true that Socrates is a man, but it is necessarily true 
that if Socrates exists, then he is a man. So the substance of the 
solution is the same as that of the standard solution, but instead of 
 Hale (2013) p. 209146
 Hale (2013) p. 209147
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making the conditional character of the necessary truth explicit, it 
puts the conditional in the quantifier elimination rules. So one 
may either make the conditional reading explicit, as in the 
standard solution, one may make it almost explicit via not 
requiring the existence of the object for the truth of the 
proposition, or one may make it implicit in the quantifier 
elimination rules. Which way we go does not change the 
substance of the solution. The difference lies in the diagnosis of 
what gives rise to the truth not depending on the existence of the 
object referred to by the name: By amending the quantifier 
elimination rules, we can stick to the surface subject-predicate 
form, and by making the conditional explicit, we can keep the 
quantifiers, but have to amend the subject-predicate expression to 
be read as a conditional. Either way, it is not true unconditionally 
that necessarily Socrates is a man, it is merely necessarily true 
that if he exists, he is a man. 
Necessary existence in the current framework 
The essentialist truth expressed by the sentence “Socrates is 
human” is necessarily true, according to the present theory, if the 
reference realizing properties of the singular representation 
⌜Socrates⌝ and the general representation ⌜human⌝ are such that 
they guarantee the satisfaction of the requirements for truth. This 
can only be the case, I will argue, if the requirements for truth do 
not require that the singular representation ⌜Socrates⌝ has a 
referent. If the requirements for truth require the existence of 
Socrates, the representation is not necessarily true. This is because 
nothing can guarantee that anything has the reference realizing 
properties of Socrates. Consequently, the satisfaction of 
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requirements for truth which require the existence of a referent 
cannot be guaranteed by reference realizing properties of 
constituent representations. And so no representation requiring 
such a thing can be necessarily true.  
To make this more explicit, I will go through the example used 
above, the necessarily true representation expressed by the 
sentence “Socrates is human”.  For the representation expressed 148
by “Socrates is human” to be necessarily true, the reference 
realizing properties determined by ⌜Socrates⌝ and ⌜human⌝ must 
be related such that the requirements for truth are guaranteed to be 
satisfied. Whatever else the reference realizing properties 
determined by the representation ⌜Socrates⌝ may include, let us 
for present purposes assume that they do include the property of 
being human. Thus, something is a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, only if 
it is human. 
Correspondingly, we may assume that the reference realizing 
property of ⌜human⌝ is given by the trivial reference realizing 
property of being human. Thus something is a referent of 
⌜human⌝, if and only if x is human. 
The sentence “Socrates is human” has a subject-predicate 
structure and so it may seem that the requirements for truth are 
analogous to representations expressed by other sentences with 
this structure, like “bachelors are unmarried”. So a first shot at the 
requirements for truth for the representation expressed by 
“Socrates is human” are as follows: 
 Again it does not matter whether this particular essentialist truth is true, as 148
any other example could be used to make the point.
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⌜Socrates is human⌝ is true, iff the referent of ⌜Socrates⌝ is a 
referent of ⌜human⌝. 
This statement of the requirements for truth, however, is not clear 
on whether there is no referent of ⌜Socrates⌝. Should the 
requirements count as satisfied, if there is no referent of 
⌜Socrates⌝? This would be analogous to sentences with subject-
predicate structure expressing a representation involving only 
general representations like “bachelors are unmarried”. Or should 
they count as not satisfied, if there is no referent of ⌜Socrates⌝? 
This latter option seems to cohere better with the common 
understanding of subject-predicate sentences involving names as 
entailing the existence of the object named, if they represent truly.  
By reformulating the right hand side of the biconditional, we can 
make these readings explicit. Each option corresponds to a 
different reading of the sentence expressing the representation. 
i) If something is a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, then it is a referent of 
⌜human⌝. 
ii) There is a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, and it is a referent of 
⌜human⌝. 
While the first reading does not require the existence of Socrates, 
for it is true if there is no referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, the second 
reading does require the existence of Socrates, for it is only true if 
there is a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝.  
Interestingly, only the first reading, the one not requiring 
⌜Socrates⌝ to have a referent, turns out to be necessarily true, 
given the reference realizing properties assumed for both 
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⌜Socrates⌝, and ⌜human⌝. For if the reference realizing 
properties are as given, then, if there is a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, it 
is also a referent of ⌜human⌝. So the relationship between the 
reference realizing properties guarantees the satisfaction of the 
requirements for truth, if the requirements for truth are given as in 
i) above. 
The requirements for truth as given in ii) are not guaranteed to be 
satisfied by the reference realizing properties, however, because 
there is no way to guarantee that there is an object with the 
relevant reference realizing properties.  
So the only reading on which it is true that the representation 
expressed by “Socrates is human” is necessarily true, is if we 
understand the sentence as expressing a representation with 
conditional requirements for truth along the lines of i). This result 
is parallel to both the standard solution and to Fine’s solution of 
the puzzle of necessary existence, because it is the mark of 
transcendental truths, that they do not require the object they are 
about to exist to be true.  
This result, however, was not arrived at by considering linguistic 
evidence purporting to identify either an ambiguity in the word 
‘necessarily’ or by distinguishing between different kinds of 
predicates, but by showing that only the conditional reading 
provides us with a necessary truth. This is consistent with both the 
standard solution, and Fine’s solution, as they may both be 
viewed as different theses about how our language succeeds in 
expressing two different representations with the same sentence, 
each with their own requirements for truth. The present theory can 
stay neutral on linguistic issues, as long as some conditional 
reading is available at all. What the theory is committed to, is that 
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only if the requirements for truth do not require the existence of a 
referent, can there be a necessary truth involving singular 
representations. This also implies that no representation 
representing something to be a necessary existent will turn out 
true on the present theory. Whether this is a feature or a bug of the 
theory, will be discussed in the section on mathematical truths. 
In the following examples of necessary truths involving singular 
representations, I will assume that the requirements for truth are 
conditional analogously to the ones outlined in i). 
Mere possibilia 
Just as there are contingently existing objects, there seem to be, at 
least as a manner of speaking, contingently non-existing objects. 
These objects do not exist, but they might have existed.  149
Examples are the sister I could have had, the planet Vulcan, the 
possible fat man in the doorway, and so on. What is puzzling 
about such mere possibilia, is that there seems to be a sense in 
which they do exist, for we seem to talk as if they do. But, of 
course, merely possible ‘objects’ do not exist, because they exist 
merely possibly.  So what are these mere possibilia, and how 150
does the current theory account for them?  
First, it is to be noticed that the basic considerations about 
reference hold even if no object satisfies the reference conditions 
 Talk of possible objects is already quite misleading, for it seems to imply that 149
there actually are objects which are merely possible. This should not be assumed 
from the outset, of course, and as I will argue, should be treated as a manner of 
speaking. I will, however, follow common usage and talk of possible objects 
here, and sometimes put the term ‘object’ in scare-quotes to highlight that it 
should not be read as implying that there really are objects which happen to be 
merely possible.
 Since actual objects are also possible objects in virtue of being actual, I 150
follow common usage and talk of merely possible objects to talk about non-
actual objects.
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for a referential representation. The reference determining 
properties for the representation ⌜Vulcan⌝, for example, 
presumably determine some reference realizing properties that are 
just not had by anything.  Still, they could have been had by 151
some object, for Le Verrier could have been correct that there is a 
planet which explains the changes in the perihel of Mercury. So 
we may conclude that a representation represents a merely 
possible object, so to speak, if nothing has the reference realizing 
properties determined by the representation, but it is not 
impossible that something has these reference realizing 
properties. 
This observation helps to think of merely possible ‘objects’ as not 
quite so puzzling. For we represent possible objects just like 
actual objects, we just sometimes fail to represent anything that 
exists with our representations, though we might. What 
distinguishes possible from actual objects is, unsurprisingly, that 
the possible objects do not exist, but may have existed.  
Still it may seem puzzling how we can quantify over all these 
objects that do not exist. We seem to be saying on the one hand 
that there are possible objects, but on the other hand that these 
possible objects are not the referents of our representations. To 
see how this puzzle may be solved, let us consider in slightly 
more detail the example of the possible object Vulcan. 
Vulcan is a merely possible ‘object’, Vulcan does not exist, but it 
could have existed. So the reference determining properties of the 
representation ⌜Vulcan⌝ determine some reference realizing 
 There may be some doubts that singular terms without a referent can have 151
determinate reference conditions. This potential worry will be discussed later. 
Here I merely note that we should be able to distinguish between names that 
purport to refer to an object and those that just fail to be representations at all.
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properties, which are not had by anything. Still, and this is what 
makes it puzzling, we speak as if something may have the 
relevant reference realizing properties, for we speak of the 
possible object Vulcan, and this possible object seems to have 
them. 
The first thing to note about Vulcan is that not all true 
representations involving ⌜Vulcan⌝ require for their truth that 
there is an object with the relevant reference realizing properties. 
Just as in the case of Socrates’ being human, the truth of the 
representation expressed by “Vulcan is a planet” need not require 
the existence of Vulcan for its truth, it may just require it to be the 
case that if there is something that has the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜Vulcan⌝, then it is a planet. So there is no need to 
worry about having to accept the existence of mere possibilia to 
make some representations involving reference to non-actual 
objects true. It is for the same reason that we need not worry 
about the necessary existence of Socrates, even though we 
attribute a property to him he necessarily has. The truth of these 
representations just does not require the existence of the object 
they are about.  
While this much may be granted, explicit reference to mere 
possibilia, as in “there is a possible planet between Mercury and 
the sun” or as in “Vulcan is a possible planet” may remain 
puzzling. For here we seem to be saying explicitly of something 
that merely possibly exist, that it exists. To dispel this puzzle, we 
can once more distinguish between two representations that may 
be expressed by these sentences. The first requires for its truth the 
existence of a possible planet between Mercury and the sun, and 
is therefore false. The second does not require for its truth that 
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there is a possible planet between Mercury and the sun, but 
merely that it is not necessarily not the case that there is a planet 
between Mercury and the sun.  
So sentences apparently involving reference to possible objects 
can be understood either as representations which require for their 
truth the existence of merely possible objects or they can be 
understood as representations only requiring that it is not 
impossible that the singular representation apparently referring to 
the possible object has a referent. This can be made more explicit 
by reformulating the sentences above as “Possibly, there is a 
planet between Mercury and the sun” and as “Possibly, Vulcan is 
a planet”.  
Is it plausible to read quantification of possibilia in this way? Is 
this really what we are representing, when we speak of possible 
objects? The reason for thinking that this really is the most 
charitable interpretation of our possibilist discourse comes from 
considering what it is to be a merely possible object: It is partly to 
be an object that does not exist.  So if the truth of the 152
representations expressed by the sentences above would require 
the existence of a possible object, then they turn out to be false, 
for possible objects do not exist. The reading which does not 
require the existence of possible objects, however, can interpret 
the sentences as expressing a truth, for it is clearly not necessarily 
not the case that there could not have been anything with the 
relevant reference realizing properties.  
 This may be disputed by philosophers who make a distinction between 152
different ways of existing. Williamson (2013), for example, argues that we 
should distinguish between existing concretely and abstractly, and possible 
objects that exist abstractly. But then Williamson also thinks that everything 
exists necessarily, a thesis which can be safely denied on the present theory.
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So the most charitable interpretation, given that possible objects 
do not exist, is the interpretation on which their existence is not 
required for the truth of the representations expressed by the 
sentence. This case is further bolstered by considering impossible 
‘objects’, ‘objects’ which could not have existed in the next 
section, for sentences involving apparent reference to them can be 
treated analogously to sentences involving apparent reference to 
mere possibilia. 
Much of the philosophical debate around possibilia is conducted 
within a possible-worlds framework. Here the debate is often 
framed as a debate between actualists, philosophers who deny the 
existence of possibilia, and possibilists, who take possibilia to 
exist. Given that both parties to the debate accept a possible world 
analysis of necessity and possibilia, the actualists are committed 
to finding actualistically acceptable substitutes for possible 
objects. Since possible worlds are one special kind of possible 
object, actualists in this debate are usually ersatzists, trying to find 
substitutes in the actual world to go proxy for merely possible 
objects. Possibilists have commonly had the upper hand in this 
debate, as there are commonly severe problems with the 
suggested proxy-reductions.  The difficulties the proxy-153
actualists have in finding adequate substitutes for possible objects 
should not be surprising given the poor explanatory prospects of 
reductive ersatzism outlined in the first part.  
The present position also denies the existence of possibilia, but it 
does not suffer from the defects of standard proxy-actualist 
positions, because it is not committed to a possible-worlds 
analysis of necessity. Since there is an explanation of necessity 
 For an overview of actualist and possibilist positions see Menzel (2016), for 153
further criticism of the standard actualist proxy-reductions see Fine (2005)
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(and accordingly possibility) without possible worlds, we can use 
this explanation of necessity to understand our quantification over 
possible worlds and possibilia generally.  
Here is how Kit Fine, who suggests a similar reformulation in 
terms of necessity and possibility, puts the point: “Many 
philosophers seem to have followed Lewis in supposing that they 
must either go with proxy reduction (‘ersatzism’) or accept 
possible worlds realism. But this is a false dilemma. For as I have 
indicated in previous work, it is possible to provide a 
straightforward non-proxy reduction of possibilist discourse. The 
basic idea is to take modality as primitive and to treat the 
possibilist quantifier ‘there is a possible object x’ as equivalent to 
‘possibly there is an object x’[…]”  The suggested translation, 154
Fine admits, is not always quite as straightforward, but the basic 
idea is the same that was outlined here: Mere possibilia are to be 
understood in terms of possibility, and not vice versa. 
To sum up, reference to mere possibilia need not be taken to be a 
miracle. It can be understood like reference to everything else. It 
just sometimes so happens that a reference relation fails to hold, 
because there is nothing with the appropriate reference realizing 
properties, but there could have been. This is as it should be, for 
actual objects are also possible objects, and so their treatment 
should not differ markedly from merely possible objects. The 
difference is just that in the case of merely possible ‘objects’ 
nothing has the relevant reference realizing properties.  
 Fine (2005) p. 224-225.154
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Impossible objects 
An impossible object, I will argue, is best understood in the same 
vein as a possible object, but as one which does not possibly exist. 
So it will be false to say of an impossible object that it possibly 
exists. Nonetheless there seem to be some truths about impossible 
objects, for example that they cannot exist. This may seem 
puzzling, but the understanding of possible objects from above 
helps to dissolve this puzzle. 
A classic example of an impossible object is a square circle. It is 
commonly taken to be impossible that anything can be both 
square and a circle, consequently the square circle (necessarily) 
does not exist. Nonetheless it seems true that it is in the nature of 
the square circle to be both square and a circle. How can all this 
be the case? The first step is to give talk about impossible objects 
an appropriate reading. Just as merely possible objects, they do 
not exist, and so are not objects at all. Possible objects could have 
been objects, but are not, while impossible objects lack the 
possibility of having been objects. We should take quantification 
over impossible objects to be a manner of speaking, just as talk of 
mere possibilia is a manner of speaking. Both are not objects, 
because they do not exist, it is just that there are some modal 
truths involving representations that purport to have them as 
referents. In the case of possible objects, it is possible that 
something with the characteristics of the possible object exists, 
and in the case of impossible objects it is not possible that 
something with the characteristics of impossibles object exists. 
Let me show how this works in the present framework. It is true 
that there are no square circles, if there is no referent of the 
representation ⌜square circle⌝, and this is necessarily true, if 
something about the reference realizing properties precludes that 
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anything has the reference realizing properties of ⌜square circle⌝. 
Let us assume that the reference realizing properties determined 
by ⌜square circle⌝ are that something which is a square circle, is 
both square and a circle. Since everything which is a square is not 
a circle, these properties cannot be had by anything, and so it is 
necessarily true that nothing is both square and a circle.  
Even though necessarily, nothing is a square circle, there are some 
true representations about square circles. One of them is the truth 
that a square circle is both square and a circle. This seemingly 
paradoxical result can be explained with the strategy outlined for 
possibilia. Consider first the requirements for truth of the 
representation expressed by the sentence “the square circle is 
square and a circle”, once more conceived of as not requiring the 
existence of the object referred to by the representation in subject 
position for their truth. 
⌜the square circle is square and a circle⌝ is true, iff if there is a 
referent of ⌜square circle⌝ , then it is a referent of ⌜square⌝ and a 
referent of ⌜circle⌝.  
These requirements are guaranteed to be satisfied in virtue of the 
reference realizing properties of ⌜square circle⌝, for we can 
assume them to be the following: Something is the referent of 
⌜square circle⌝, iff x is square and x is a circle. 
The treatment of impossible objects is analogous to the treatment 
of possible and actual objects. What is special about them is that 
the representations attempting to represent such objects determine 
reference realizing properties which cannot be had by anything. 
Still, that these reference realizing properties are determined as 
they are, gives rise to necessary truths about square circles, for the 
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requirements for truth of the appropriate representations are 
guaranteed to be satisfied by the reference realizing properties.  
I argued that quantification over possible objects as well as over 
impossible objects should be treated in essentially the same way 
and that talk about possibilia and impossibilia can be taken to 
state a regular modal truth which asserts the possibility or 
impossibility of the existence of some object. This renders talk of 
mere possibilia and impossibilia unmysterious: It is like talk of 
any other object, just that either the object we purport to refer to 
happens to not exist, or cannot exist. This explains why there can 
be truths involving non-existent objects, and why it is still true 
that these objects do not or even cannot exist. 
Reference realizing properties for non-existent objects? 
In the discussion it was assumed that the reference determining 
properties of singular representations which purport to refer to 
something, but where this something fails to exist, do determine 
reference realizing properties, which are not had by anything.  
This may be doubted, for it may be thought that in order to get 
determinate reference realizing properties, at least for singular 
representations, an object has to exist. For how are there enough 
reference determining properties of the representation to ever 
determine uniquely identifying reference realizing properties, if 
the object does not exist? In the case of existing objects it may at 
least somehow be explained how a causal theory of reference 
succeeds in determining a unique referent, but how can this work, 
if there is nothing there to which the name can be given? In other 
words, how do we succeed in singularly referring to non-existent 
objects? 
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On one reading this problem just does not arise. For we do not, 
and cannot, refer to nonexistent objects. This is because a 
reference relation can only hold between a representation and an 
object, if the object exists. And non-existent objects do not exist. 
So there is no problem about referring to non-existent entities, 
since no referential representation can refer to non-existent 
entities.  
Still, we do sometimes use referential representations which 
happen not to refer to anything in (sometimes true) truth-
evaluable representations. For this to be the case, the reference 
determining properties must be such that they determine some 
reference realizing properties, which are then not had by anything. 
To clarify these remarks, let me give an example: 
Suppose that Leverrier introduced the name Vulcan thus: “I call 
the planet between the sun and Mercury, which explains the 
perturbations of Mercury’s perihel by the name ‘Vulcan’.” With 
this reference fixing description, he intended to fix the reference 
of ‘Vulcan’ to a unique planet between the sun and Mercury. If the 
naming had succeeded, that is, if there had been such a planet, 
then the name ‘Vulcan’ would have referred to it. Also, most of 
the properties used to pick out the referent would, in this case, not 
have been essential to being Vulcan, for Vulcan may, after having 
been so named, been hit by something and thrown to a different 
orbit, such that it was no longer between the sun and Mercury. 
Also it may have turned out that this planet, even though it exists, 
did not in fact explain any perturbations in Mercury’s orbit. Still 
Leverrier may have succeeded in giving a name to it, which 
henceforth represents that planet, and therefore determines some 
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reference realizing properties. In the simplest case, this would 
have been the property that it is the same planet as Vulcan.   155
The trouble is that there simply is no such planet, and we can 
appeal to no planet to which the object referred to, is identical 
when giving the reference realizing properties. So what may the 
reference realizing properties of ‘Vulcan’ be?  
A partial, but slightly unsatisfying answer is to assume that the 
reference determining properties simply do not suffice to specify 
the reference realizing properties which would pick out an object 
and so the name could not refer to any object. So one may be lead 
to the conclusion that it is not even possible that Vulcan exists, 
because there is no way to refer singularly to Vulcan.   156
This problem and the negative conclusion is discussed by Kripke 
for non-actual natural kinds which he also takes to be subject to a 
causal account of reference:  Kripke asks us to consider 157
Unicorns. Unicorns do not exist, they are a mythical species. So 
prima facie it is unclear how reference to them is fixed. Contrast 
this with existing species like Tigers. Tigers are not defined by 
their superficial properties, but by their actual internal structure, 
which may not be known to the people who introduced the word 
‘tiger’ by pointing to a specimen of the species tiger. Unicorns, in 
contrast, do not exist and so there is no actual unique unicorn-
species with a certain internal constitution, which could be 
 What it takes to be the same planet is of course left open here, and in need of 155
further clarification. Some general suggestions were made in the semantic 
preliminaries. 
 This result seems to be quite general, if we allow the objects that actually 156
exist a role in reference determination, as is arguably the case in a causal theory 
of reference. For the role in reference determination will not be filled by 
anything if the object one attempts to give a name to, does not exist and so 
reference for a unique object will not be determined.
 Kripke (1980) p. 23/24 and 156-158.157
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named. Kripke writes: “regarding the several distinct hypothetical 
species, with different internal structures (some reptilic, some 
mammalian, some amphibious), which would have the external 
appearance postulated to hold of unicorns, one cannot say which 
of these distinct mythical species would have been the 
unicorns.”  No distinct species could be picked out with the 158
word ‘unicorn’, and thus nothing could possibly be a unicorn.  
Note that at no point is Kripke denying that something could have 
turned out to be denoted by the word ‘unicorn’. However, as it 
stands, no such object was indicated, and so it does not suffice to 
represent a species, for it is lacking the connection to an existing 
specimen of the species necessary for unique reference-fixing.   159
The same, so one may argue, goes for particulars. Here is how 
Barcan Marcus makes a similar point: “In summary, modal 
discourse need not and should not admit possibilia despite the 
elegance of the generalization. Dispensing with possibilia is 
grounded not in the unavailability of criteria of identification but 
rather in the fact that identity is a relation for objects already 
given. Putative possibilia are not fleshed out with that 
complement of properties, relations, and a locus in the actual 
 Kripke (1980) p. 156-157.158
 The point may be made more precise in a two-dimensional semantic 159
framework, as it is used, for example, to make sense of indexicals: If uttered at a 
different possible world, the word would have a certain reference fixed, which is 
then rigid over all possible worlds, that is, if we consider another world as 
actual, the word would have had a referent. However, given that no reference is 
fixed in the actual world, the word does not refer to anything in every possible 
world, if considered as counterfactual. The applicability of the framework, 
however, depends on a division of the reference determining properties into 
those we hold fixed while considering other worlds as actual, and those which 
vary across those worlds. This division is not available, if we move from words 
to representations, for representations are individuated by the reference realizing 
properties they determine.
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order—or, if material, in the physical order—that would enable 
them to count as objects at all.”  160
Treating reference to possibilia in the way Kripke and Barcan 
Marcus do, and to deny that there could be a referent to (singular) 
representations representing something that does not exist on the 
grounds that no determinate reference is achieved, if no referent 
exists, seems to leave us with a host of new puzzles, however. In 
the representation-framework, the suggestion would amount to 
the claim that the reference determining properties of 
representations do not suffice to determine reference realizing 
properties. But if so, how can we say that such representations are 
even meaningful representations? And if they do not determine 
reference realizing properties, how do they give rise to apparent 
truths expressed by sentences like “unicorns do not exist”? A 
sentence expressing a necessary truth on Kripke’s account. 
Nonetheless there is an important insight in Kripke’s and Barcan 
Marcus’ remarks. We cannot easily refer to objects which merely 
possibly exist. So how can the insights of Barcan Marcus and 
Kripke be accommodated without having to suppose that names 
like ‘Vulcan’ could not have referred to anything at all? 
There may be a way to accommodate these insights without 
having to abandon representing mere possibilia. For even if no 
referent is picked out at an attempted baptism, it need not be 
assumed that no reference realizing properties are determined at 
all. After all, in the spirit of the current framework and the 
discussion of possibilia above, it can be expected that some 
reference realizing properties are determined which just happen to 
not be had by anything. For we do want to make a distinction 
 Marcus (1995), p. 213.160
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between names or other alleged representations that fail to have 
certain representational properties, and those that do have 
representational properties, but which fail to have a referent, that 
is, a distinction between objects which fail to be fully 
representational, and representations which do not have a 
referent.  161
If there is no referent, the reference realizing properties cannot 
rely on the existence of an object referred to, still there is 
something that can be said of them. Take again Vulcan as an 
example: Since it was introduced to explain the changing perihel 
of Mercury, we may assume that its reference realizing properties 
are something like this: being the unique planet between the sun 
and Mercury which explains the changes in the perihel of 
Mercury. Since no planet actually is such that it explains this, 
Vulcan does not exist. Still, it could have been the case that there 
is such a unique planet, if a planet had explained the changes in 
the perihel of Mercury. Given that the reference realizing 
properties are as suggested, it is necessarily true that if Vulcan 
exists, then it explains the changes in the perihel of Mercury.  
There may be two related worries with this proposal. First, the 
proposal looks very similar to a description theory of names along 
Russellian lines, which is problematic. Second, it may seem 
implausible that it is essential to a planet that it explains 
something, for could it not be that Vulcan existed, but did not 
explain the changes in Mercury’s perihel? I will answer both 
worries in turn. 
Since the current approach does not say anything about which 
theory of reference gives rise to reference realizing properties, the 
 The first would be quite literally meaningless, the latter would have 161
discernible representational properties. 
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present solution does not lead to the acceptance of a description 
theory of names. So many problems with this theory are not 
relevant to the present discussion. Nonetheless, there may be a 
worry about rigidity, for if the reference realizing properties do 
not include the identity-property of being identical to Vulcan, then 
rigidity is not guaranteed, and so it may be that the representation 
‘Vulcan’ does not refer to the same object in every counterfactual 
situation. To see this, consider the following two counterfactual 
situations: 
1) There is a planet, Vulcan, between the sun and Mercury, which 
explains the changes in its perihel. 
2) There is a planet between the sun and Mercury, which explains 
the changes in its perihel, which is not Vulcan, but another planet. 
The counterfactual situation in 1) is just what we would expect to 
be a possibility on the present suggestion, and it is, for according 
to the description given, something has the reference realizing 
properties of ‘Vulcan’, that is, something is the planet between the 
sun and Mercury, which explains the changes in its perihel. 
However, 2) would be impossible, provided the token 
representation ‘Vulcan’ is of the same type as the others used 
above, for the planet in 2) would also have to be Vulcan in virtue 
of having Vulcan’s reference realizing properties. This potential 
problem ties in with the second worry, which says that it seems 
implausible to attribute to a planet the essential properties of 
being such that it explains something.  
Both worries, however, may be assuaged by reminding the 
objector that Vulcan is not actually a planet, it is merely possible 
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that there is a planet by the name of Vulcan, even though it is 
necessary that if Vulcan exists, then it is a planet.   162
Consider how the rigidity-worry arises in the case of existing 
objects: We have a definite description which in the actual world 
succeeds at picking out something, for example the description 
‘The planet closest to the sun’. We also have a name ‘Mercury’, 
which refers to the planet Mercury, the planet closest to the sun, 
in some suitable sense, directly. When considering counterfactual 
situations, the reference of these two expressions used as 
representations can come apart. Venus and Mercury, for example, 
could have switched places, and so in that counterfactual 
situation, the planet closest to the sun would be Venus and not 
Mercury. This shows that the representations ⌜the planet closest 
to the sun⌝, and ⌜Mercury⌝ are not representations of the same 
type.  
In the case of Vulcan, however, there is nothing to which we 
could refer directly, there is nothing to which an object in a 
counterfactual situation could be identical to, for Vulcan doesn’t 
exist. So no reference is determined that could come apart from 
the description ‘the planet that explains the changes in the perihel 
of Mercury’. This gives us a way of understanding Barcan 
Marcus’ remark that “identity is a relation for objects already 
given”.  The notion of rigid designation makes sense only if 163
there is an object that we can, in a suitable sense, refer to directly, 
for in this case the reference realizing properties of the description 
used to identify the object, and those of the name can come apart. 
 For this to make sense, that Vulcan is not actually a planet must be read in an 162
existentially committing way, such as not to contradict the necessity of Vulcan 
being a planet, if it exists.
 Marcus (1995) p. 213.163
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If there is no object we could name, there is no way for the 
reference realizing properties of a name and a description to come 
apart. Consequently there is no sense to be made of the worry that 
the reference realizing properties proposed above are too 
descriptive, for there are no two different sets of reference 
realizing properties, one belonging to the name and one to the 
description. The impossibility of there being another planet which 
also explains the changes in the perihel of Mercury (if it exists), 
but is not identical to Vulcan, is thus well justified: there are no 
grounds for denying that this planet is Vulcan. 
So my response to Kripke-style worries about reference to mere 
possibilia is to admit that the reference realizing properties 
determined by representations of mere possibilia are not quite as 
determinate as those of actually existing objects. This, however, 
does not mean that no reference realizing properties are 
determined at all. Rather, some reference realizing properties need 
to be determined for such referential representations to figure in 
meaningful representations at all. 
Summing up 
This concludes the interlude on truth-evaluable representations 
involving referential representations which fail in referring to an 
object or objects. It prepares the ground for the discussion of 
further examples involving singular representations for which the 
puzzle about necessary existence may be thought to arise. I 
proposed that we should take necessarily true representation 
involving singular representations to not require for their truth the 
existence of a referent of the singular representation. Rather, we 
should construe the requirements for truth analogously to those 
given in the case of representations involving only general 
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representations. On this construal, the representation is a 
conditional claim, conditional on the existence of the object 
referred to, and thus true even if the object in question does not 
exist.  
The main reasons for this position are two: First, it avoids the 
troublesome conclusion that everything necessarily exists. 
Second, it is the conditional reading on which essence attributions 
turn out necessarily true, while the unconditional reading does not 
return necessary truths.  
This resolution of the puzzle of necessary existence has further 
advantages, because it allows us to give a unified treatment of 
actual objects, mere possibilia, as well as impossible objects.  
2. Necessarily True Representations Involving Singular 
Representations 
Identities 
Identities involving two singular representations are commonly 
considered to be necessarily true. So the present theory should 
yield that these really turn out necessary, given reasonable 
assumptions about reference determination. I will start with a 
simple example and move on to a slightly harder one. 
Simple identities involving two singular referential 
representations, for example the representation expressed by the 
sentence “Tobi is Tobi” is necessarily true. To show that the 
present theory yields this result, we first need the requirements for 
truth of the representations. I suggest we should take them to be 
as follows: 
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⌜Tobi is Tobi⌝ is true, iff the referent of ⌜Tobi1⌝ is the referent of 
⌜Tobi2⌝.  164
These requirements for truth will be guaranteed to be satisfied, 
and thus the representation necessarily true, just in case the 
reference realizing properties determined by both singular token 
representations are the same, that is, just in case the 
representations are of the same type. In this case the referent of 
the first will be guaranteed to be the referent of the second. 
That these two referential representations are of the same type 
should be uncontroversial, but it can also be shown, if we assume 
a simple causal theory of reference: Lets assume that both 
singular representations are part of the same chain of uses going 
back to some initial baptism, where Tobi was baptized by the 
name ‘Tobi’. If this is so, then the first representation used, 
⌜Tobi1⌝, inherits its reference realizing properties from the use of 
the same name before and the second representation, ⌜Tobi2⌝, 
inherits its reference from the first. So it follows immediately that 
both representations determine the same reference realizing 
properties and that they are therefore guaranteed to have the same 
referent. Consequently, the requirements for truth are guaranteed 
to be satisfied.  165
Clearly, however, these simple examples, while occurring once in 
a while, are not the only possible way in which a true identity can 
be expressed and also not the most informative way. More 
 Here we must take care to keep the two token referential representations 164
‘Tobi’, and ‘Tobi’ apart, thus I add a 1 to the first occurrence in the truth-
evaluable representation, and a 2 to the second.
 A simple causal theory along these lines is almost certainly not tenable for all 165
names. Presently it serves well as an illustration, but as the famous Madagascar-
cases show, there can be shifts of reference along a causal chain (Evans 1982).
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interesting examples are sentences that, even though they merely 
express an identity, manage to tell us something new: The most 
famous example is the representation expressed by the sentence 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus”. The first step in adjudicating whether 
the representation thus expressed is necessarily true according to 
the present theory is again to give the requirements for truth. They 
are analogous to the ones above: 
⌜Hesperus is Phosphorus⌝ is true, iff the referent of ⌜Hesperus⌝ 
is the referent of ⌜Phosphorus⌝. 
Once again, the representation with these requirements for truth is 
necessarily true, just in case the referential representations 
determine the same reference realizing properties, that is, if they 
are of the same type. The example differs from the example 
above, because it is not as obvious that both representations 
determine the same reference realizing properties. 
To see how they might determine the same reference realizing 
properties, let us assume once more a simple causal theory of 
reference of the kind outlined in the semantic preliminaries. Since 
the representation tokens ⌜Hesperus⌝ and ⌜Phosphorus⌝ are not 
links in the same causal chain leading back to the same baptism, 
we cannot just say that the reference realizing properties are 
identical independently of what their content is, rather, we have to 
look at what the reference realizing properties are, to see whether 
they are indeed identical.  
The reference conditions which state the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜Hesperus⌝ will be assumed to be analogous to 
those given for singular representations in the first chapter of this 
part. Thus I take them to be something like the following: 
Something is the referent of ⌜Hesperus⌝, iff it is the same planet 
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as the one indicated at the initial baptism of Hesperus. Equally, 
the reference conditions for ⌜Phosphorus⌝ are something like the 
following: Something is the referent of ⌜Phosphorus⌝, iff it is the 
same planet as the one indicated at the initial baptism of 
Phosphorus.  
The way the identity-property is described does not tell us yet 
whether the same planet was present at both baptisms, as the two 
baptisms are distinct events. But there is a way to find out: We 
follow the planet from one baptism along its spatiotemporal 
trajectory, and see whether it is the same as the one baptized at the 
other baptism. Something similar arguably happened, when it was 
discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus: astronomers followed the 
planet’s spatiotemporal trajectory, and realized that Phosphorus is 
indeed Hesperus.  166
Since it is in fact the same planet that was present at both 
baptisms, the reference realizing properties of ⌜Hesperus⌝ are 
identical to the reference realizing properties of ⌜Phosphorus⌝, as 
the identity-property which is part of the reference realizing 
properties is the same. And so the referent of ⌜Hesperus⌝ is the 
same referent as the referent of ⌜Phosphorus⌝. Consequently, the 
requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied by how the 
reference of both representations is determined and the 
representation turns out to be necessarily true.  
The desired result is conditional on the plausibility of the 
suggested reference realizing properties, but it does not depend on 
 Of course they did not go back in time to find out and also did not have to. 166
They knew what the referent of each name was at a certain time and place, they 
just didn’t know that it was the same as another one observed at another time 
and place.
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these very reference realizing properties being the reference 
realizing properties of the representations expressed by the words 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. Rather, what needs to be the case is 
merely that both words are used as representations of the same 
type, a result that is plausible independently of the exact reference 
realizing properties, given that both are names for Venus. 
I argued that identities, if true at all, turn out to be necessarily true 
on the present explanation of necessary truth, provided the 
referential representations involved are of the same type. 
However, since the truth-evaluable representations involve 
singular representations, the remarks from the last section apply: 
The representations only express necessary truths, if the existence 
of the referents of the referential representations is not required 
for the truth of the truth-evaluable representations. So a 
necessarily true identity does not imply the existence or necessary 
existence of the object which is said to be identical to itself. 
Essence attributions 
Essentialist truths, necessarily true representations attributing a 
property to an object referred to by a singular representation, have 
only relatively recently come back into the focus of philosophical 
debates, but there is a quite substantial consensus that at least 
some such essence attributions are necessarily true. The stock 
examples are attributions of kinds or origins, like “Socrates is 
human” or “Aristotle has the origin he actually has”, both of 
which supposedly express necessarily true representations. 
It is controversial which attributions of essential properties are in 
fact true. It has, for example, been questioned whether origin is 
indeed an essential property of people, or whether objects are the 
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kind of thing they are necessarily.  The details of these disputes 167
and disagreements, are not of concern to the present project. 
Rather, what needs to be shown is that the theory accounts for 
some such essence attributions, given assumptions about 
reference realizing properties and requirements for truth the 
proponent of a given essentialist thesis would accept. In other 
words: The theory should, at least in principle, be able to account 
for essence-attributions. 
The stock example I will use is the representation expressed by 
the sentence “Socrates is human”. Once more the starting point 
are the requirements for truth of this representation. We may 
suppose that they are the following: 
⌜Socrates is human⌝ is true, iff the referent of ⌜Socrates⌝ is a 
referent of ⌜human⌝. 
The truth-evaluable representation is necessarily true, if the 
satisfaction of these requirements is guaranteed by the reference 
realizing properties of ⌜Socrates⌝ and ⌜human⌝. The satisfaction 
of these requirements is guaranteed if the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜human⌝ are among the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜Socrates⌝, for in this case, anything that is a 
referent of ⌜Socrates⌝ is a referent of ⌜human⌝. So assuming for 
simplicity that the reference realizing properties of ⌜human⌝ are 
given trivially by the property of being human, being human must 
be among the reference realizing properties of ⌜Socrates⌝ for the 
representation to be necessarily true. 
 For a wide ranging discussion and critique of the different essentialist theses 167
one may hold, see Mackie (2006).
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That being human is plausibly among the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜Socrates⌝ was already argued for in the semantic 
preliminaries. But let me rehearse the reasons why this is 
plausible: First, if being human is essential to being Socrates, then 
Socrates has the property of being human throughout his 
existence. But since reference realizing properties are also 
properties an object has throughout its existence, at least a 
necessary condition for being a reference realizing property is 
satisfied by the property of being human. Second, the natural kind 
the object is a member of is a good candidate for ‘tracking’ the 
object’s spatiotemporal trajectory and as such it is a good 
candidate for being a reference realizing property.  
So I assume that the reference conditions giving the reference 
realizing properties for ⌜Socrates⌝ are as follows: 
Something is the referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, iff it is the same human 
as the one present at the initial baptism. 
Once more a caveat is in order: I am not claiming that these are 
the actual reference conditions of the representation expressed by 
the word ‘Socrates’. All I am claiming is that if some very simple 
causal theory of reference is true, and if the essentialist is right in 
claiming that Socrates is essentially human, then it is plausible 
that the reference conditions are along the lines suggested. So it is 
open to dispute whether the particular essentialist claim that 
Socrates is human is indeed true, but it follows from the 
assumption that a reference relation holds partly in virtue of 
properties of the referent that some attributions of properties to 
Socrates turn out necessarily true. More specifically, those 
essentialist claims will turn out necessarily true, which attribute to 
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Socrates the reference realizing properties determined by 
⌜Socrates⌝. 
Since it is part of the reference conditions of ⌜Socrates⌝ that he is 
human, and it is the trivial reference condition of ⌜human⌝ that it 
refers to whatever is human, whenever ⌜Socrates⌝ refers to 
something, so does ⌜human⌝. Consequently ⌜Socrates is human⌝ 
is necessarily true according to the account, provided the 
requirements for truth as well as the reference conditions are as 
specified.  
As in the case of identities, the necessary truth of ⌜Socrates is 
human⌝ only follows on the account, if the requirements for truth 
do not require the existence of a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝ for the 
truth of the truth-evaluable representation. For it does not follow 
from the reference realizing properties of ⌜Socrates⌝ that there is 
something that has these properties. So the requirements for truth 
should be formulated more perspicuously as follows: 
⌜Socrates is human⌝ is true, iff, if there is a referent of 
⌜Socrates⌝, then this referent is a referent of ⌜human⌝. 
This is, I explained earlier, a desirable feature of the account, as it 
avoids the necessary existence of everything that has an essential 
property, but still accounts for the necessary truth of essence 
attributions. 
I argued that the present theory can account for the necessary 
truth of essence attributions, and that this is not markedly 
different from the account of the necessary truth of 
representations involving only general representations: In both 
cases the requirements for truth are guaranteed to be satisfied by 
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the reference realizing properties of the constituent referential 
representations, provided these requirements for truth do not 
require that the referential representations have a referent.  
What is left to account for in this chapter are mathematical truths, 
which are commonly also taken to be necessarily true. This is the 
task of the next section. 
Mathematical truths 
Mathematical truths present a somewhat special challenge to the 
present theory, as it is among other things controversial what the 
referents of number-terms are, whether numbers exist at all, and 
how the meaning of the mathematical operators should be spelled 
out. I cannot and will not solve all these problems here, I will 
merely propose one way in which a suitable subset of 
mathematical truths may turn out to be necessarily true on the 
present account. This should give the reader some idea of how the 
account can be used to cover further mathematical truths. The 
basic assumption concerning mathematic truths will be a form of 
realism about them: mathematical truth is a regular kind of truth. 
Mathematical representations are true in virtue of the referents of 
the referential representations standing in the appropriate 
relationships to each other. Thus mathematical truth is not to be 
equated with, for example, provability, etc. A consequence of this 
account will be that mathematical entities like numbers do not 
exist necessarily, even though mathematical truths, even those 
apparently involving existence claims, may turn out necessarily 
true. I will, after outlining the basic account, defend this possibly 
controversial consequence. 
Paradigmatic mathematical statements are identities, for example 
the following: 2=2, 2+3=5, 21/7=3. But not all mathematical 
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statements are of this sort. There are different relations that hold 
between numbers, for example the greater than or smaller than 
relation, giving rise to statements like the following: 2<5, 4>3. 
Apart from these, there are statements apparently stating the 
existence or non-existence of some number: There is no greatest 
natural number; there are two prime numbers smaller than 5; there 
are two numbers which solve the equation x2 +5x+5=0, and so on.  
All of these statements seem to express representations that are 
necessarily true. To show how the current theory may yield the 
desired result, that is, the necessary truth of mathematical 
representations, I will move from the simple examples of 
identities to the more complicated quantified statements, all along 
assuming that the number terms do represent numbers, whatever 
numbers may be.   168
The simplest example are identities involving just one number 
term on each side of the identity sign: “2=2”. These examples can 
be treated in the same way as regular object-identities: Whatever 
determines the reference of the representation ⌜2⌝, the reference 
determining properties of the representation on each side of the 
identity determine the same reference realizing properties and so 
both are guaranteed to refer to the same thing: the number 2. 
Given the requirements for truth for identities outlined above, 
⌜2=2⌝ turns out to be necessarily true on the present account. 
This example is easy, but what about more complicated 
mathematical representations? For example the representation 
 I will not have much to say on what the referents of number-words are. One 168
may, for example, think of numbers as properties of collections, or properties 
(cardinalities) of sets of objects, and of our number words as referring to these 
properties. A possible suggestion, I am sympathetic to, is made in Moltmann 
(2013)
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represented by “2+2=4”. The basic form is still an identity, but 
this time the left hand side apparently involves two singular 
representations as well as ‘+’. Since what is supposed to be true is 
an identity, and identities are true if the representations on either 
side of the identity have the same referent, we should take the 
entire expression ‘2+2’ to express a representation referring to the 
number four. We can think of 2+2 as a rigid description of the 
number 4: Just like we can pick out people by invoking a position 
relative to other people, “The person next to John”, we can pick 
out numbers by invoking their position in the number series 
relative to others. This much should be uncontroversial, but how 
does this give rise to the necessity of the representation? For the 
representation to be necessarily true, it needs to be the case that 
⌜4⌝ and ⌜2+2⌝ have the same reference realizing properties, that 
is, that they are representations of the same type.  
We may, roughly following Peano, think of the reference 
conditions of natural numbers as being given relative to the 
number 0 in terms of being the successor of 0. Following this 
thought, the reference conditions of ⌜4⌝ are that the referent of 
⌜4⌝ is the fourth successor of 0. Similarly, we may think of the 
reference conditions of ⌜2+2⌝ as being given in the following 
way: the function x+2 picks out the second successor to the 
number which stands for x and ‘2’ picks out the second successor 
of 0. So the whole term picks out the second successor of the 
second successor of 0. Consequently the reference conditions for 
the representation ⌜2+2⌝ are that the referent is the fourth 
successor of 0. It is now obvious how the identity is bound to be 
true: the reference realizing properties of both, ⌜4⌝ and ⌜2+2⌝ are 
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identical, and so the requirements for truth are guaranteed to be 
satisfied.  
So if the reference conditions given here are plausible in outline, 
at least basic identities in mathematics can be treated analogously 
to other identity statements, and turn out necessarily true on the 
current theory.  
One may be slightly concerned about a feature of this analogy, 
however. In the case of identities of ordinary objects, the 
necessity which the account could and should account for was 
necessity conditional on the existence of the object that is 
supposed to have a property necessarily. In the mathematical case, 
however, this may be taken to be too weak, for it is often taken for 
granted that numbers and other abstract mathematical objects, 
exist necessarily.   169
The necessary existence of numbers, however, is not a 
consequence of the present account, and could not be, for no 
reference condition can guarantee its own satisfaction. This may 
not cause much trouble in the case of identities, for at least they 
do come out as necessarily true, if conditional on existence, but 
other mathematical representations seem to be existence claims, 
and so apparently require the necessary existence of numbers for 
their necessary truth. 
I will tackle this problem head on, and argue that it is an 
acceptable consequence of the current theory that mathematical 
objects do not come out as existing necessarily. What does turn 
out to be necessary, however, is, as in the case of essence 
 For arguments in favor of the necessary existence of numbers see Tennant 169
(1997), as well as Hale and Wright (1994). For an opposing view see Field 
(1989) and Hellman (1989). Field as well as Hellman, however, have much 
stronger views than me, for their view is that numbers do not even actually exist. 
The present theory is committed to no such thing.
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attributions, a conditionalized understanding of mathematical 
representations. This may be seen as a partial validation of 
mathematical if-then-ism.  It should be noted, however, that 170
currently no stance is taken on whether numbers actually exist, or 
on how all mathematical statements should be understood. As in 
the case of ordinary objects, some mathematical statements may 
also be interpreted as requiring the existence of numbers for their 
truth, but in so far as they do, they are not necessarily true, even if 
they may be actually true in virtue of the actual existence of 
numbers. So the claims here should be read as saying that if 
mathematical representations are to be necessarily true, then 
existence claims of particular numbers are to be understood as 
conditional on the existence of numbers.  
Let us look at a concrete example of a true mathematical 
existence claim: There is a natural number which is prime and 
smaller than 3. The most natural understanding of this statement 
is that it states the existence of a natural number which satisfies 
two conditions, being smaller than 3, and being a prime number. 
So the requirements for truth, if taken at face value, should be 
something like this: 
⌜There is a natural number which is prime and smaller than 3⌝ is 
true, iff there is a referent of ⌜natural number⌝ that is both a 
referent of ⌜prime number⌝, and ⌜smaller than 3⌝.  
 Putnam (1967) coined the term. The view is quite controversial as it seeks to 170
give a translation-manual of mathematical statements into statements conditional 
on the existence of numbers. The present view endorsed here need not make 
such a strong and controversial claim. The present commitment is merely that in 
so far as mathematical representations are necessarily true, they must not require 
the existence of any object for their truth. It is left open that some mathematical 
statements, especially in applied mathematics, do require the existence of 
numbers for their truth (whatever numbers may be).
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However, as noted, these requirements for truth involve an 
explicit existence claim and thus cannot follow from the reference 
conditions of the constituent representations. So there is no way 
for these requirements for truth being guaranteed to be satisfied 
by the reference realizing properties of the referents.  
Consequently it may seem that some mathematical truths do not 
turn out necessarily true on the present theory. This verdict, 
however, is only partially correct, for it is indeed not the case that 
the necessary existence of mathematical objects, or any object for 
that matter, follows from the present theory. However, a 
mathematical truth closely related to the existence claim does turn 
out to be necessarily true on the present theory: The claim that if 
the natural numbers exist, then there is a natural number among 
them that is both prime and smaller than three. Since the 
antecedent of this claim can be taken for granted when working 
on mathematical questions, the non-necessary unconditional 
existence claim can be viewed as a kind of short hand for the 
conditional claim which is necessarily true.  
To see how the conditional claim turns out necessarily true, it 
helps to look back at essence attributions to ordinary objects. The 
representation expressed by the sentence “Socrates is human”, 
requires for its truth that if there is a referent of ⌜Socrates⌝, then 
it is a referent of ⌜human⌝. This, it was claimed above, is 
guaranteed to be the case in virtue of the reference realizing 
properties of ⌜Socrates⌝ and ⌜human⌝. Since the requirements 
for truth are conditional on the existence of Socrates, it does not 
follow from them that necessarily, Socrates exists and is human. 
However, a slightly different existence claim follows from the 
essence-claim: the claim that if the humans exist, then there is 
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something which is Socrates and which is human.  This claim 171
follows, because it simply strengthens the antecedent of the 
conditional which is necessarily true. 
In the mathematical case we can view the conditional that all 
numbers exist as a presupposition, or common assumption, of the 
mathematical enterprise, which is not made explicit. So we can 
view the claim that there is a prime number smaller than 3 as 
making the conditional claim, that if the natural numbers exist, 
then there is a prime number smaller than 3. To show that this 
really is necessarily true, we can proceed analogously to the 
Socrates case: We show that a conditional claim with a weaker 
antecedent is true and strengthen the antecedent. The claim which 
can be shown to be necessarily true is that if the number two 
exists, then it is a natural number that is both smaller than three, 
and prime, from which it follows that if the natural numbers exist, 
then there is a number that is both smaller than three and prime. 
First, we need the requirements for truth for this representation: 
⌜The number two is a natural number which is prime and smaller 
than 3⌝ is true, iff if there is a referent of ⌜2⌝, then it is a referent 
of ⌜natural number⌝, ⌜smaller than 3⌝, and ⌜prime number⌝. 
What has to be shown next, is that these requirements for truth are 
indeed guaranteed to be satisfied by the reference realizing 
properties.  
 It is slightly unclear how this particular existential claim should be 171
understood in the present framework. Above existence claims were treated in the 
requirements for truth as requiring that there is a referent for a representation. 
Here the existence claim is much more general, for it says not merely that some 
human exists, but that all humans exist. This is analogous to the claim that the 
natural numbers exist, meaning that all natural numbers exist. I suggest we treat 
this as requiring that there is a referent for every possible type of representation 
of a natural number, or of a human being respectively.
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The reference conditions stating the reference realizing properties 
for ⌜2⌝, are, we may assume in analogy to ones suggested above, 
that the referent of ⌜2⌝ is a natural number that is the second 
successor of 0. Further, we need reference conditions of ⌜smaller 
than 3⌝, and ⌜prime number⌝. Here are the suggestions following 
the standard definitions: 
Something is a referent of ⌜prime number⌝, iff it is a natural 
number greater than 1, and divisible only by itself, and 1. 
Something is a referent of ⌜smaller than 3⌝, iff it is a natural 
number not equal to 0, such that if added to the referent, it is 
equal to 3. 
Now we can see how the requirements for truth are guaranteed to 
be satisfied: ⌜smaller than 3⌝, provided that natural numbers 
exist, refers to 0,1, and 2. And ⌜prime number⌝ has the number 2 
as a referent, if it exists. So, if something is the referent of ⌜2⌝, it 
is the referent of ⌜prime number⌝,⌜smaller than 3⌝, and 
(trivially) of ⌜natural number⌝.  
Since the truth of the representation ⌜The number two is a natural 
number which is prime and smaller than 3⌝ is sufficient for the 
truth of the claim that if the natural numbers exist, then there is a 
natural number which is both smaller than 3 and prime, it also 
turns out necessarily true. 
These examples are not very complex, and merely a first 
suggestion of how the present theory may be able to account for 
the necessity of mathematical truths. The examples at least show 
that the present theory has the resources to account for the 
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necessary truth of mathematical representations conditional on the 
existence of numbers. Before moving on, I discuss one final 
worry: 
One may be concerned that in the last example above, I am 
endorsing a form of mathematical if-thenism, or fictionalism, the 
view that we should understand all mathematical statements as 
conditional on the existence of numbers. But if-thenism is not a 
particularly popular thesis, for it seems to go against the most 
natural reading of ordinary mathematical statements. We just do 
not seem to conditionalize in the way advocated when making 
such statements.  172
It should be noted, however, that I do not make such a strong 
claim. It is consistent with the discussion above that ordinarily 
mathematical statements should not always be understood 
conditionally. Even if understood unconditionally, the statements 
may be true, because numbers do actually exist. However, these 
statements will not be necessarily true, for the current theory of 
necessity denies the necessary existence of anything. What is 
necessarily true, is the conditional claim and combined with the 
truth of the antecedent, the truth that natural numbers exist, the 
existence involving claim follows.  
But why, one may ask, should we accept that the requirements for 
truth of mathematical truths should change from requiring the 
existence of numbers to being conditional on the existence of 
numbers, if we put a modal operator in front of it? After all, we do 
 This straightforward criticism seems to be considered by some to be 172
uncontroversial enough to dismiss the position without further argument. See for 
example Balaguer (2015). But see Moltmann (2013) for a detailed analysis of 
our everyday number talk.
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use the same form of words in the modal and in the non-modal 
context.  
The answer is that a ‘weak’ reading of the necessity, conditional 
on existence, is the most plausible one for two reasons. First, we 
may draw an analogy to other cases of weak necessities, for 
example identity claims of and essence attributions to ordinary 
objects. Here the conditional reading, even though not explicit in 
the form of the statement, is quite natural, for we want to preserve 
the thought that ordinary objects exist only contingently, a truth 
inconsistent with the necessity of the unconditional reading. This 
gives us reason to think that the necessity of identity claims are to 
be understood as not requiring the existence of referents of the 
singular representations contained in them for their truth. If this 
applies to ordinary objects, it seems that it should not be excluded 
in the mathematical case. To the contrary, it seems that unified 
requirements for the truth of identity claims are quite desirable.  
Second, it is only conditional requirements for truth that can be 
guaranteed to hold in virtue of the reference realizing properties. 
So the only mathematical claims that do turn out necessarily true 
are the ones not requiring the existence of numbers. This is a 
consequence of the present account of necessity which implies 
that nothing exists necessarily, for no reference condition can 
guarantee its own satisfaction.  So given the current theory is 173
true, a necessity claim involving a mathematical truth should be 
read as a weak necessity, conditional on the existence of numbers, 
if we want to be able to interpret it as true.  
 This is not to say that existence cannot be an essential property of some 173
object, it is only to say that this does not imply the existence of the object which 
has existence as an essential property.
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This second argument depends on the plausibility of the proposed 
theory, and so my opponent may well try to use the impossibility 
of accounting for necessary existence as an argument against the 
theory on the grounds that mathematical objects do exist 
necessarily. This move, however, will only have sufficient 
support, if a theory can be presented on which necessary existence 
can be explained and at the same time a plausible resolution for 
the problem of necessary existence can be found. 
To conclude, the current theory implies that mathematical truths, 
in so far as they require for their truth the existence of numbers, 
are not necessarily true. However, if read conditionally, as not 
requiring the existence of numbers for their truth, mathematical 
truths do turn out to be necessarily true according to the present 
explanation. This weak reading is plausible by analogy to identity 
claims involving ordinary objects, and does not commit the 
proponent of the current theory to an overly general view about 
how all mathematical claims should be understood. 
Summing up 
The above examples have illustrated how the suggested 
explanation of necessity applies to a range of necessary truths, 
and how the framework allows for a unified treatment of a 
number of potential puzzles surrounding necessary existence, 
possibilia, and impossible objects. I will here consider how far the 
discussion has proceeded, how much this should contribute to our 
confidence in the proposed explanation of necessity, and what 
remains to be shown in the following chapters. 
I developed a general framework in which the core concepts can 
be understood. This framework provided the basic concepts for an 
explanation of necessary truth: Reference realizing properties, and 
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requirements for truth. The reference realizing properties are 
those properties of a referent which are constitutive of the 
reference relation between a referent and a referential 
representation. What these properties are, or would have to be for 
a reference relation to hold, is determined by the reference 
determining properties of a referential representation. The 
requirements for truth are the requirements a truth-evaluable 
representation places on the referents of the constituent referential 
representations for its truth. 
In some cases, the reference realizing properties determined by 
the referential representations are such that they guarantee the 
satisfaction of the requirements for truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation. In such a case the truth-evaluable representation 
cannot fail to be true, it is necessarily true. So the appropriate 
relationship between reference realizing properties and 
requirements for truth explains necessary truth in cases where the 
appropriate relationship holds.  
The examples in this chapter were supposed to illustrate how the 
explanation of necessity works in a range of cases, but they were 
also supposed to raise confidence in the extensional adequacy of 
the theory, that the proposed explanation covers the standard 
cases of the most fundamental kind of necessity: metaphysical 
necessity.  
Along the way I argued that the general outlook provided by the 
theory allows for a unified treatment of existing objects, merely 
possible ‘objects’, and impossible ‘objects’. A puzzle about 
necessary existence, arising from the existence of necessary truths 
about contingently existing objects is quite naturally resolved 
along the standard lines, because only necessary truths about an 
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object that do not require the object’s existence for their truth turn 
out necessarily true on the present theory of necessity. 
I take it that the discussion of the examples has shown that there 
is at least no principled obstacle to the proposed explanation 
covering all kinds of representations that have commonly been 
taken to be metaphysically necessary. As such it is not limited to 
simple subject-predicate constructions like the Kantian approach, 
and it is also not limited to necessities involving merely general 
referential representations, but can, at least in principle, account 
for essence-attributions and identities. The latter is made possible 
by the fact that in the general framework, there is no difference in 
kind between the reference relation that holds between a general 
representation and its referents and a singular representation and 
its referent, as in both cases the reference relation holds 
constitutively in virtue of properties of the referent and properties 
of the representations.  
To demonstrate how the present theory accounts for these diverse 
necessary truths, I made some assumptions about the particular 
reference realizing properties. These assumptions were made 
along plausible lines, utilizing some common assumptions about 
reference-determination. However, they did remain assumptions, 
and I would be hard pressed to pretend that these assumptions are 
fully correct for the representations used. So it may be that some 
of the assumptions do turn out false on closer inspection of what 
really determines reference for these representations.  
This, however, should not be damaging to the overall account, for 
while it may show that some particular representations do not turn 
out necessarily true, a true account of how reference is really 
determined will yield a recipe for constructing a host of necessary 
truths. So what a failure of these assumptions should prompt, is a 
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revision of our preconceptions about what is necessarily true, 
rather than a rejection of the proposed explanation. 
The reader may not yet be quite convinced by this assessment, so 
the next chapters are designed to bolster trust in the theory by 
showing that it is best conceived of as an account of what has 
been known as metaphysical necessity. 
In the next chapter, I will argue that the necessity in question can 
and should be taken to be the basic kind of necessity from which 
other, weaker alethic necessities such as nomic necessity can be 
understood. Following this discussion of how the explanation fits 
with the varieties of necessity, I will compare the present 
explanation to essentialism, which is uncontroversially a theory of 
metaphysical necessity. I argue that the present proposal can be 
viewed as a form of essentialism, one which does not take 
essences to be primitive, but gives an account of what essences 
are: the essential properties of an object are the reference realizing 
properties determined by the singular representation referring to 
it. 
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Chapter 7: Varieties of Necessity 
In the last chapters I proposed an explanation of what has been 
called metaphysical necessity by invoking an appropriate 
relationship between reference realizing properties and 
requirements for truth of a representation. Metaphysical necessity, 
however, is not the only kind of necessity that needs explaining, 
and so in the following I will show how the present theory may 
explain other varieties of necessity such as nomic or practical 
necessity.  I will argue that a classical relativization strategy is 174
most naturally combined with the overall account to explain 
necessities weaker than metaphysical necessities, and that there 
are good reasons for adopting it. Stronger necessities than 
metaphysical necessity, for example logical necessity, can be 
accounted for by restriction. To discern the challenges an account 
of other kinds of necessity faces, I will first have a look at the 
structure of alethic modality. Second, I demonstrate how the 
current theory accounts for the different kinds of modality before 
two challenges are confronted. The first challenge is to give a 
principled reason for taking metaphysical necessity (in the sense 
in which the necessity in question explained by the current 
account is metaphysical necessity) as the fundamental kind of 
necessity from which the others are explained. The second is a 
challenge, for example voiced by Kit Fine and Marc Lange, who 
claim independently of each other that natural necessity is not 
metaphysical necessity relative to the laws of nature, but a 
 The only kinds of necessity which will be considered are well-behaved 174
alethic necessities, those for which it holds that if necessarily p, then p, which 
are weaker than metaphysical necessity. This excludes all non-alethic necessities, 
but also some alethic necessities such as epistemic necessity, which is, at least 
partially, stronger than metaphysical necessity.
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different kind of necessity, on the grounds that a relativization 
strategy does not capture the distinctive necessity of natural or 
nomic necessity.  175
1. The Structure of Modality 
Different kinds of alethic necessity can be ordered according to 
their strength. Metaphysical necessity is a fairly strong kind of 
necessity, while practical or nomic necessity are weaker in taking 
more propositions to be necessarily true.   176
The structure of modality can be nicely represented in terms of 
possible worlds: Imagine that all possible worlds there are, 
represent all the possibilities there are in the widest sense. 
Whatever is true in all of them is, let us assume for the moment, 
metaphysically necessary, and whatever is true in some of them is 
metaphysically possible. When talking about these possible 
worlds and quantifying over them, we can restrict our quantifiers 
and only talk about a subset of all these possible worlds. In this 
subset, there are also some truths which are true in all of the 
worlds of the subset, and some that are true only in some of them. 
 Fine (2002), Lange (2009).175
 Talk of weaker or stronger kinds of necessity as well as talk of restricted and 176
unrestricted possibilities can sometimes be slightly confusing, for the terms are 
used in different ways (In 2D-semantics, for example, the distinction means 
something quite different). So here is how I will use the terms: Some kind of 
necessity N1 is strictly stronger than another N2, iff all truths that are necessary 
according to N1, are a proper subset of all truths which are necessary according 
to N2. Corresponding to this definition of the strength of a kind of necessity is a 
distinction between more or less restricted kinds of possibilities. A possibility of 
kind P1 is more restricted than a possibility of kind P2, iff all truths which are 
possible according to P1, are a proper subset of all truths which are possible 
according to P2. Given the interdefinability of necessity and possibility relative 
to the kind of necessity at issue, restriction is related to strength in the following 
way: The stronger the necessity the more unrestricted the corresponding 
possibility.
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These are the truths that are necessary or possible respectively 
relative to that subset. We can find many such restrictions on the 
set of all possible worlds, but the ones we might care about most 
are the ones that are made according to certain principles. So for 
example, if we care about what is possible or necessary given the 
laws of nature, we choose that subset of all possible worlds, in 
which our laws of nature hold, and then go on to evaluate for 
necessity and possibility on the subset restricted in this way. This 
same procedure, just with different subsets of all the worlds 
picked out, works for other alethic modalities as well, for example 
for practical necessity, and gives us a nice picture in which we can 
order the necessities we care about according to their strength:  177
 Note that it may be that there is not quite such a neat ordering, as the sets of 177
worlds to which we restrict our quantifiers may not all be subsets of each other. 
But this complication need not concern us here. What is important is merely that 
the sets of worlds we restrict ourselves to, is a subset of all metaphysically 
possible worlds.
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The picture may suggest that all kinds of weaker than 
metaphysical necessities are neatly contained in each other, but 
this need not be the case. Even though it is plausible that the 
nomic necessities are a subset of the practical necessities, for 
example, and that metaphysical necessities are a subset of both, it 
may be that other weaker kinds of necessity do not exhibit this 
neat containment structure, depending on what they are 
relativized to. 
Given this quite general structure of necessity, with metaphysical 
necessity at its core, the question arises how we can account for 
the other kinds of necessity. The picture already offers 
suggestions of how this may be done: If we have an explanation 
for one kind of necessity, we may define the others either by 
restriction or relativization.  One may, for example, take the 178
metaphysical necessities as the core necessities and define natural 
necessity and possibility by relativizing to the laws of nature: 
Natural possibilities are those truths which do not yield 
metaphysical impossibilities if conjoined with the laws of nature. 
One may, however, also take some weaker kind of necessity as 
primitive, for example natural necessity, and define the stronger 
necessities by restriction. In this spirit, we may conceive of the 
metaphysically necessary truths as the subset of the naturally 
necessary truths which are, in some sense, metaphysical truths. 
The two strategies may of course also be combined in accounting 
for different kinds of necessity. 
Both strategies can be used to defend modal monism, the view 
that all (well behaved) alethic modal truths have, in a sense to be 
 For a further exploration of the different strategies, see Fine (2002).178
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specified, the same source.  For now, modal monism will be 179
assumed, because it is the dominant view, and alethic modalities 
do seem to have a lot in common. Challenges to this assumption 
will be discussed in due course.  
2. Explaining the Varieties of Necessity 
The fundamental kind of necessity is, I will argue, metaphysical 
necessity as explained by the current account. Weaker kinds of 
necessity, such as nomic necessity, can be explained by 
relativization, and stronger kinds can be explained by restriction. 
Let us start with weaker kinds of necessity and take nomic 
necessity as an example. Nomic necessities are those truths, 
which are metaphysically necessary, given that the laws of nature 
hold. So we may define them by relativizing to the laws of nature: 
(Def. nomic necessity -) A representation R is nomically 
necessarily true, iff the conjunction of the negation of R 
with the laws of nature is a metaphysical impossibility.  
or to put it in positive terms: 
 The term ‘modal monism’ is used in different ways in related debates. In 179
particular in the debate on the epistemology of modality, modal monism is the 
position that the space of epistemically possible worlds does not exceed the 
space of metaphysically possible worlds. The difference between epistemic and 
metaphysical necessity, on this view, comes down to different ways in which we 
may consider other possible worlds. We can consider them either as actual, or as 
counterfactual. Modal monism in this sense is commonly associated with modal 
rationalism, and defended in some detail by David Chalmers (2012), who uses a 
two dimensional semantic framework to spell out his ideas. 
Modal monism in the present metaphysical discussion is not to be confused with 
this use in the epistemological debate. The kind of monism at issue presently 
concerns the ground of necessity. Accordingly, I leave the treatment of epistemic 
necessity to the side and merely offer some remarks on how to deal with it at the 
end of the present chapter.
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(Def. nomic necessity +) A representation R is nomically 
necessarily true, iff the conditional containing R as a 
consequent and the laws of nature as antecedent, is 
metaphysically necessary.  
Let me give an example to see how this works. Let’s assume for 
simplicity that there is only one law of nature and that it is the 
following: All swans a white. Then it should turn out to be 
nomically necessarily true, that if Johanna is a swan, then she is 
white. By our definition of nomic necessity, this is true, if and 
only if the following conditional is metaphysically necessary: If 
all swans are white, then, if Johanna is a swan, then she is white. 
Now it is fairly obvious that this conditional is metaphysically 
necessarily true, for the consequent is just an instance of the 
antecedent, and thus it is guaranteed that whenever the antecedent 
is true, the consequent is.   180
This way of explaining nomic necessity can be straightforwardly 
generalized to other weaker kinds of necessity by varying the 
antecedent of the metaphysically necessary conditional. So we 
may use the following schema to arrive at different kinds of weak 
necessity: 
(Weak Necessity Schema) A representation R is X-
necessarily true, iff the conditional containing R as a 
consequent and the conjunction of all X-truths as 
antecedent is metaphysically necessary.  
 I will not go into the details here. It has been shown above how the necessity 180
of truths of logic can be explained on the present account. The explanation can 
be applied in the present case as well.
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The schema can be used quite generally to define weaker kinds of 
necessity, as there is no special restriction on the X-truths that 
enter into the antecedent, except that they need to be true. 
While weaker kinds of necessity than metaphysical necessity are 
often of interest, they are not the only other kinds of necessity 
there are, for there may be necessities that are stronger than 
metaphysical necessity. One example is logical necessity. Logical 
necessities are metaphysically necessary, but not all 
metaphysically necessary truths are logically necessary. So we 
may define the logically necessary truths by restriction:  
Logically necessary truths are that subset of the metaphysically 
necessary truths, that are guaranteed to satisfy their requirements 
for truth in virtue of only the reference realizing properties of the 
logical relations.   181
Other more or less principled restrictions may be found as well to 
pick out a limited number from all metaphysically necessary 
truths. So in principle the present theory can account for the 
varieties of necessity in the standard way, by proceeding form 
metaphysical necessity by relativization or restriction. 
3. The first Challenge: Finding the Right Starting Point 
Given that the structure of necessity is as outlined above and that 
the present account can be used to explain weaker as well as 
stronger necessities in terms of metaphysical necessity, it remains 
to be shown that the right starting point for this explanation is 
 This proposal is incomplete, as the treatment of logical truths in the example 181
section showed that we should only conceive of statements of predicate logic as 
stating logical relations between propositions, that is, relations which hold 
merely in virtue of the truth values of the propositions. Either way, however, 
there is surely a way to pick out the relevant representations, which are to be 
considered for the appropriate restriction.
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metaphysical necessity. To defend this view, it will have to be 
shown both that there is no stronger kind of necessity which can 
plausibly be taken as the starting point of the relativization and 
that there is no weaker necessity which should be taken as the 
starting point for restrictions.  
The theory-independent considerations about the structure of 
necessity do give us some reason to take metaphysical necessity 
to be the right starting point for an account of weaker kinds of 
necessity. I will first give an argument to the conclusion that no 
necessity stronger than metaphysical necessity, as explained by 
the present theory, is a good starting point for an account of the 
varieties of necessity, and then proceed to argue that no necessity 
weaker than metaphysical necessity should be the starting point 
for a theory seeking to explain the varieties of necessity by 
relativization or restriction. 
An example for a stronger kind of necessity than metaphysical 
necessity is logical necessity. It is stronger, because there are 
some truths that are metaphysically necessary, which are not 
logically necessary. Examples are “All bachelors are unmarried” 
and “If Socrates exists, he is human”. Both of these truths are, we 
may assume, metaphysically necessary, but they are commonly 
not taken to be logically necessary, because we cannot establish 
their truth merely by considering their logical form. It is quite 
clear that if logical necessity is alethic, then every logical 
necessity is metaphysically necessary, but not the other way 
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around.  Since necessity and possibility are duals, we can define 182
“possibly p” as “not necessarily not p”. So what is not necessarily 
not logically necessary, is logically possible. Consequently, it is 
logically possible that if Socrates exists, then he is not human and 
it is logically possible that bachelors are married.  
However, there is absolutely no way in which it can be true that if 
Socrates exists, he is not human, and there is no way in which it 
can be true that bachelors are unmarried, even if this is not 
excluded just by the logical form of the sentence. So (narrow) 
logical possibility does not in any way guarantee that what is 
logically possibly true, is possibly true in an intelligible sense. 
What does this show? It shows that logical necessity is not the 
fundamental kind of necessity, because to arrive at what is 
possibly true in an intelligible sense, we need to relativize logical 
necessity to a number of metaphysical or conceptual ‘laws’. This 
would be undesirable, as we should expect an account of the 
fundamental kind of necessity to also tell us what is, in some 
intelligible sense, possibly true.  
This argument is not a knockdown argument, as there may be 
disagreement among modal monists as to what should be required 
of the fundamental kind of necessity. But it seems like a 
reasonable requirement that the notion of possibility it yields, 
should give us a sense of possible truth that is intelligible. If 
 It may be doubted that logical necessity is alethic, because some apparently 182
formally valid arguments are not truth preserving. Consider 1) Jakob fought god 
at Peniel, 2) I am Jakob, so 3) I fought god at Peniel. 3) is obviously not true, 
even if we take the premises to be true, but just considering logical form, it is 
valid. Of course, in artificial languages it is typically not allowed that the same 
word can be used as a name for more than one object, and so the argument 
cannot get off the ground, but this is already a restriction on the meaning of the 
names used, and so form alone cannot guarantee truth-preservation. This 
complication, however, will not be considered further.
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effective, the argument does not just speak against taking logical 
necessity to be the fundamental kind of necessity, but against 
taking any kind of necessity stronger than metaphysical necessity 
to be fundamental, as there will be some truths to be counted as 
possible in that sense which absolutely cannot be true.  This 183
suggests that we should not take any notion of necessity stronger 
than metaphysical necessity, in the sense explained by the current 
theory, to be the fundamental notion of necessity.  
The reader may object to this argument on the grounds that it begs 
the question against anyone seeking to take a stronger notion of 
necessity as his starting point. For according to the philosopher 
taking, for example, narrow logical necessity to be fundamental, it 
will turn out to be genuinely possible that, say, Socrates is not 
human, and that bachelors are married. 
This would be true, if we would consider this question 
independently of the available explanation of metaphysical 
necessity offered and in particular independently of the 
framework offered for this explanation. For given this framework, 
there is no way for a representation representing Socrates to not 
be human to be true and there is no way for a representation to be 
true that represents bachelors as married. So no sense can be 
made of the possible truth of such a representation and 
consequently the argument that the kind of possible truth 
corresponding to logical necessity remains unintelligible stands. 
The proponent of a stronger kind of necessity as fundamental 
would have to show how the correlative notion of possibility is 
still a notion of possible truth. I doubt that this can be done. 
 Another prominent kind of necessity stronger than metaphysical necessity is 183
for example broadly logical necessity, which includes, in addition to the 
narrowly logical truths, the conceptual truths.
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What remains to be shown is that no notion weaker than 
metaphysical necessity should be taken as fundamental. If we take 
a weaker notion of necessity than metaphysical necessity to be 
fundamental, there will be some truths which are (intelligibly) 
possibly true, but impossible in the weaker sense of possibility. 
This is the flip-side of the objection against taking stronger than 
metaphysical necessities to be fundamental, and it suggests that 
taking metaphysical necessity to be fundamental yields a more 
uniform account of all weaker kinds of necessity. While this again 
does not constitute a knockdown argument, it is suggestive. 
Let us assume that natural necessity is weaker than metaphysical 
necessity. If so, then there are some natural impossibilities which 
are still possible in an intelligible sense. It is, for example, not 
naturally possible to travel faster than the speed of light, but it still 
seems to be possible, in the metaphysical sense, to travel faster 
than the speed of light. If natural necessity is the most 
fundamental kind of necessity, then it would seem to be unclear in 
which sense it is possibly true to travel faster than the speed of 
light. The sense in which it would be possibly true, would 
presumably be that it is not incompatible with a subset of the 
naturally necessary truths. But, even though it is true that the 
metaphysically possible truths are not incompatible with a subset 
of the naturally necessary truths, this does not seem to capture the 
sense in which it is possible to travel faster than the speed of light, 
for this seems to be a genuinely possible truth, not just compatible 
with a subset of all fundamentally necessary truths, but 
incompatible with all of them taken together. 
The general lessons to be learned from these remarks is the 
following: If one wants to be a monist about necessity, then one 
should take as one’s starting point the kind of necessity which is 
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weak enough to have a correlative notion of possibility that only 
includes truths that can possibly be true in an intelligible sense, 
and it should be strong enough to capture the sense in which it is 
possible in the widest sensible sense for something to be the case. 
The kind of necessity which satisfies these two conditions, I have 
suggested, is metaphysical necessity as it is captured by the 
current account of metaphysical necessity. All weaker kinds of 
necessity can then be captured by relativization, and all stronger 
kinds by restriction in the way outlined above. This will yield an 
account of the varieties of necessity that is elegant, simple, and 
captures the sense in which metaphysical necessity is fundamental 
to all necessities.  
One may at this point object to the latter part of the argument on 
the grounds that it is misguided to think that it is, in an intelligible 
sense, possible to travel faster than the speed of light, as we 
should take the laws of nature to be metaphysically necessary, and 
therefore take it to be in no sense possible to travel faster than the 
speed of light.  On this view, the class of metaphysical 184
possibilities would be much narrower than suggested above. The 
first thing to note in response to this worry is that even if it was 
true that the natural necessities are all metaphysically necessary, 
the observations above would hold, for in this case metaphysical 
necessity would be coextensive with natural necessity, and so 
natural necessity would be the strongest kind of necessity whose 
correlative notion of possibility represents genuine possibilities 
and the weakest kind such that the correlative notion of possibility 
includes all possibilities which are in the most inclusive, 
intelligible sense possible. The only disagreement with the 
 The view that the laws of nature are necessarily true is for example defended 184
by Shoemaker (1998)
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proponent of the metaphysical necessity of natural laws would be 
about which truths to count as metaphysical necessities. But this 
is a dispute that does not need to be decided here, as these 
substantive question will have to be decided by a more in depth 
inquiry into the referential representations used to refer to the 
objects and properties appearing in the laws of nature. It is 
perfectly compatible with the present account that the laws of 
nature, or at least some of them, do indeed turn out to be 
metaphysically necessarily true. For this to be the case, it would 
have to be part of the reference conditions for, say, having a mass 
m, that the object which has mass m behaves according to the 
inverse square law. It is possible that we do have representations 
which have such demanding reference conditions, but it is, I 
submit, not very likely to be true that our actual use of terms of 
the type ‘having mass m’ refer only to objects that obey the 
inverse square law.  
This is a side-issue to the current debate, however. The purpose of 
this section was to defend metaphysical necessity, the kind of 
necessity explained by the present theory, as the monist’s best 
starting point for accounting for the varieties of necessity. This is 
in principle compatible with the natural necessities being 
coextensive with the metaphysical necessities.  
The best starting point for the monist about the varieties of 
necessity is, I hope to have shown, metaphysical necessity. From 
this principled starting point, both stronger and weaker kinds can 
be defined by restriction and relativization respectively. The 
assumption throughout was that monism is true. This, however, 
has been contested by eminent voices, who have argued that 
different kinds of necessity have different sources and should 
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therefore be kept distinct.  This challenge is discussed in the 185
following. 
4. The Second Challenge: Different Sources of Necessity? 
Monism about the varieties of necessity was and is the standard 
view. Possible world theories, for example, start with the class of 
all metaphysically possible worlds and explain weaker necessities 
with contextually induced variations in the worlds we quantify 
over. This is not an accident. The monist view is popular, because 
it nicely captures the structure of alethic modality as it was 
outlined above: It seems to be the case that the metaphysical 
necessities are a subset of the nomic necessities, which in turn 
seem to be a subset of still weaker necessities such as practical 
necessity. And correlatively, the naturally possible worlds are a 
subset of the metaphysically possible worlds. For the monist this 
structure is readily explained, for it is implied by the account: 
nomic necessity, for example, is arrived at by relativizing to a 
smaller portion of all possible worlds according to some criterion. 
The current theory, even though it does not invoke possible 
worlds, equally easily explains this structure, since it also arrives 
at weaker necessities by relativization. 
If one were to deny monism, one would either have to deny this 
structure or alternatively find a way to explain why it seems to be 
the case that all metaphysical necessities are also nomic 
necessities. It is at least not obvious how such a strategy may 
proceed, if the source of necessity is different for different kinds 
of necessity, so there is reason to be a monist by default.  
 Most notably Fine (2002). For detailed critical discussion of Fine see Leech 185
(2015).
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Still, monism has been challenged, and convincingly so. Kit Fine 
offers two somewhat related challenges to it. First, he tries to 
show that the structure of modality is not as would be predicted 
by an account which proceeds by relativization of metaphysical 
necessity and thus that relativization-accounts are extensionally 
inadequate.  Second, he suggests that no relativization-account 186
will capture the special nomic force of natural laws. The latter of 
these criticisms has been made by a number of other authors as 
well, notably by Marc Lange.  As the challenges are connected, 187
I will discuss them together in what follows.  188
Fine’s counterexamples proceed by attempting to show that 
worlds in which laws hold that do not have a subject matter to be 
governed by these laws, lead to contradictory assessments of what 
is possible in these worlds.  I simplify the examples somewhat, 189
but the central point, as well as how to challenge it, will come out 
quite clearly: Consider two worlds, one (w1) governed by, say, the 
inverse square law, a second (w2) governed by the inverse cube 
law. It seems nomically possible for both worlds to not have had 
any matter in them, which could be governed by these laws, so an 
empty world (v), is a possibility for both of them, and so at that 
world it would be a nomic necessity that the inverse square law 
holds, and it would be a nomic necessity that the inverse cube law 
holds. But if world v is a (nomic) possibility for w1 and it is a 
(nomic) possibility for w2, then w1 as well as w2 should be 
(nomic possibilities) for v. But if both are a nomic possibility for 
v, then w1 should be a nomic possibility for w2 and vice versa, 
 Fine (2002, 2005)186
 Lange (2009)187
 A detailed discussion of Fine’s points can be found in Leech (2015). The 188
current discussion cannot be quite as detailed.
 Fine (2005) p. 243ff189
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which is impossible, as it is precisely an impossibility in w2 that 
the matter be governed by the inverse square law, and vice versa 
for w1. So relativization apparently leads to contradiction.  
This argument, however, will not do. For it implicitly equivocates 
between different nomic possibilities and necessities : the nomic 190
necessity relative to the inverse square law, and the nomic 
necessity relative to the inverse cube law. These are different 
natural necessities, and the empty world, which is a world in 
which both laws (trivially) hold, cannot work as a bridge between 
the two. Both w1 and w2 are nomic possibilities for world v, but 
they are so in two different senses, one in the sense that the 
inverse square law is a nomic necessity, the other in the sense that 
the inverse cube law is a necessity. The fact that the two spaces of 
possible worlds in which these two different laws hold overlap at 
the empty world, does not give us any license to move from the 
one to the other. One may object that it seems strange from the 
standpoint of the empty world that it should somehow preclude 
the possibility of w2, and vice versa for w1. But there is in fact 
nothing strange about that at all: The empty world, in virtue of 
trivially verifying all natural laws, of course does not by itself tell 
us which of them we should hold fixed when considering what is 
possible given some of these laws. But we do not consider which 
truths to relativize to from the standpoint of the empty world, 
precisely because it does not give us any good guidance on which 
truths to hold fixed, and also because it would be quite boring. In 
any case, it would be a different kind of nomic necessity, and not 
the one we care about when considering nomic necessity relative 
to the laws which hold at w1 or w2.  
 See Leech (2015) p. 14ff for a detailed analysis of Fine’s argument and her 190
diagnosis of why it doesn’t work, which has inspired my own diagnosis.
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To put the point slightly differently: By relativizing necessity to 
the laws of nature which hold at the actual world, one does not 
commit to these laws being laws from the point of view of all 
worlds in which they are true (they are not laws from the point of 
view of the empty world), one only commits to the fact that the 
law is true at these worlds. After all, there is more to being a law 
than just being a true generalization.   191
With this alleged counterexample out of the way, there still 
remains a challenge about how well the choice of truths, which 
nomic necessity is relativized to, is motivated. This issue may 
have been in part what motivated the attempted counterexample 
in the first place.  
Here is what Fine has to say about the matter: “The general 
problem is that a definition of natural necessity as a form of 
relative necessity will tend to make the necessity of the 
propositions with respect to which the necessity is relative a 
trivial or insubstantial matter; yet we are inclined to think that the 
necessity attaching to the laws and the like is not of this trivial 
sort.”  Marc Lange similarly argues that the modal force of laws 192
is not captured by a relativization-account: “If being “naturally 
necessary” were nothing more than being a consequence of the 
laws, then for the laws to boast merely of their natural necessity 
would leave us unimpressed.”  193
The problem seems to be one that attaches to any relative-
necessity account: The truths we relativize metaphysical necessity 
to will be necessary in the relative sense in a somewhat 
 Even David Lewis’ Humean account of laws requires the true generalizations 191
that are to count as laws to be part of a best system that explains the going-ons at 
the world. See Lewis (1973).
 Fine (2002) p. 247192
 Lange (2009) p. 48 193
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insubstantial way, because we can just make them necessary by 
taking them to be the truths we choose to relativize to. So the 
necessity bestowed on the natural laws by the relativization 
account seems to be just a matter of our choice. I could, for 
example, think up a new kind of necessity relative to the truth that 
there is a cup of coffee on my desk, in which case it would be 
coffee-cup-on-the-desk-necessary that there is a cup of coffee on 
my desk.  
I do admit that there is a sense in which it is true that the necessity 
of the laws of nature is a relatively insubstantial matter on the 
present account of nomic necessity. But in the sense in which I do 
admit it, it is quite plausibly so. In a different sense the necessity 
of the laws of nature should not be a trivial matter, but in that 
sense the laws of nature are not a trivial matter even on the 
relativist account. 
The sense in which the necessity of the laws of nature should not 
be an insubstantial matter, is the sense in which it is an 
insubstantial necessity that it is necessary that the coffee cup is on 
my table, relative to the truth that the cup is on my table. One can, 
in this way, make up all kinds of necessities and make necessary 
any truth by just relativizing the necessity to these truths. So what 
is necessary in all these different senses, (coffee-on-the-table-
necessity, raining-outside-necessity, etc.) is up to us, and as such 
not a substantial matter: we just make it up by relativizing 
appropriately. Clearly, nomic necessity should not be up to us in 
that way.  
Luckily it isn’t. For what turns out to be a law of nature is not up 
to us in any sense. What the laws of nature really are, is a 
substantial question, it is independent of what we make up, and 
we invest quite a bit of time and resources trying to find out about 
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it. So it seems the reasons for choosing the laws of nature to be 
the truths to relativize nomic necessity to, is not trivial after all. If 
the similarity between cases of stipulated relativization and 
relativization to natural laws was a worry, one can be assured that 
there is a substantial difference between the cases.  
It must be admitted, however, that laws of nature are not laws of 
nature in virtue of having a special modal force, if natural 
necessity is to be explained via relativization. Rather, the 
direction of explanation is the other way around: The laws of 
nature have their modal force, that is, are nomically necessary, in 
virtue of being laws of nature. This, however, can hardly be taken 
to be a problem for the relativization strategy, as there are well 
established accounts of laws of nature which do not make 
reference to a special kind of modal force in explaining what laws 
of nature are. 
The best known account of laws along these lines is the best 
system account.  On this account, a universally quantified 194
proposition is a law of nature at a world, if it is both true, and a 
part of the simplest and strongest, for short, the best system 
systematizing all physical going-ons at a world.  This account 195
does not make use of a modal criterion to individuate laws and 
consequently the direction of explanation advocated by the 
relativization account would be preserved.  
Another account of laws which is also compatible with the 
proposed direction of explanation is, despite its name, 
Armstrong’s necessitation account of laws.  According to this 196
account a statement of the form “all Fs are Gs” is a law just in 
 Most famously defended by Lewis (1973).194
 Lewis (1973) p.73. 195
 Armstrong (1983)196
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case being an F necessitates being a G, where necessitation is a 
relation between universals, which explains the universal 
generalization. In contrast to the regularity view, it is not the 
regularity and some pragmatic considerations that make a law a 
law, but the fact that the regularity is accounted for by the 
necessitation relation holding between universals. That this 
necessitation relation holds between universals is itself a 
contingent matter, and so the laws are not themselves 
metaphysically necessary. 
Lewis’ and Armstrong’s account, while well known accounts of 
laws of nature, are not the only theoretical options for explaining 
what natural laws are while avoiding to make use of a special 
kind of necessity. The proponent of a relativization account will 
have to endorse some such option. 
It is worth noting, that theorists who have stressed that laws of 
nature should have a stronger connection to the modal realm, have 
often argued that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary.  197
On such an account, there would be no difference between 
metaphysical and nomic necessity, there would just be more 
metaphysical necessities than we expected. I mentioned above 
that this may be the case, but that I take it to be a fairly 
implausible view of what is involved in the reference realizing 
properties of the representations occurring in law-statements. 
Since such a view eradicates the distinction between metaphysical 
and nomic necessity it would still be compatible with the 
relativization strategy. 
A philosopher who seeks to occupy a middle ground between 
those taking laws of nature to be accidental and necessary only in 
 Shoemaker (1998)197
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so far as they are the basis of relativization, and those taking the 
laws of nature to be metaphysically necessary is Marc Lange. He 
proposes to think of laws as distinguished from mere accidents by 
a particular modal property: “maximal persistence under 
counterfactual suppositions”  What it is to be a law is to be 198
stable in this sense. Lange thinks that there are contextual 
variations which explain an ordering of weaker to stronger, but 
relative to such a context, the maximally persistent propositions 
are genuinely necessary in virtue of being counterfactually stable. 
The beauty of this account is that it seems to unify two apparently 
incompatible demands on laws: On the one hand laws are 
supposed to be accidental, on the other, they are supposed to be 
necessary. Maximal stability in varying contexts explains how 
both can be the case.  
However, it is not quite clear that the proponent of a relativization 
strategy cannot adopt a version of Lange’s criterion for 
individuating laws, but deny that he has identified the direction of 
explanation correctly. For Lange thinks that counterfactual 
stability explains necessity, and this in turn explains lawhood. But 
one may reasonably cut out the middle man: counterfactual 
stability may be the epistemic mark of lawhood, but the necessity 
of laws may then be explained by them serving as the basis of 
relativization. This way of explaining the connection between 
counterfactual stability, lawhood, and necessity seems plausible, 
because it allows for an explanation of the counterfactual 
stability: The laws are stable, because they are the background 
according to which we evaluate counterfactual scenarios. They 
 Lange (2009) p.90198
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serve as constraining conditions which we take to be necessary 
for the purpose of counterfactual reasoning.  
These remarks suggest an answer the proponent of a relativization 
strategy may give to Lange, which takes seriously the 
observations about a connection between counterfactual stability 
and laws, but denies that this is what is definitive of lawhood.  I 199
take it that this shows that monism about necessity remains a 
viable position in the face of Lange’s criticism. 
Summing up 
In the above discussion I have defended monism about the 
varieties of necessity: the position that the source of the varieties 
of (well behaved) alethic necessity is metaphysical necessity. 
Weaker kinds of alethic necessity can be explained by 
relativization to certain other truths. Stronger kinds can be picked 
out by restriction to a subset of the metaphysically necessary 
truths. Two challenges to the relativization-account were 
considered. First an apparent counterexample was considered 
which could be shown to be ineffective. Second, I discussed the 
more serious challenge that laws are laws in virtue of being 
necessary, and not vice versa. I argued that while this challenge 
should be taken seriously, there is good reason for the modal 
monist to hold on to her position. 
 A general argumentative strategy for the monist can be made out here: take 199
whatever the proponent of the genuine necessity of laws proposes as explaining 
the special natural necessity of the laws which in turn is supposed to explain 
their lawhood, cut out the middle man, and take the feature to directly explain 
what laws are. Then explain the necessity by relativization. The effectiveness of 
this strategy depends on how plausible the identified feature is as an explanation 
of necessity or lawhood respectively.
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I want to use this last paragraph to consider the implications of 
the discussion on the overall project of giving an explanation of 
necessity. The chapter attempted to show that the proposed 
explanation of necessity does not only give an explanation of one 
variety of necessity, but that the explanation can serve as an 
explanation of the source of other varieties of necessity, for 
example, nomic necessity. The strategy used to argue for this was 
rather orthodox, and involved taking the modal monist’s 
perspective, and defining weaker kinds of necessity by 
relativization and stronger kinds by restriction. The proposed 
explanation of metaphysical necessity, however, provides us with 
a principled starting point for relativizing and restricting: It is the 
strongest notion of necessity which still provides for an 
intelligible notion of possible truth and it is the weakest notion 
such that it provides for everything that is, in the widest 
intelligible sense, possibly true. So there is some good reason to 
be confident that the proposed explanation of metaphysical 
necessity can be used as the basis for an explanation of a range of 
other varieties of alethic necessity. This would give the theory, 
apart from its potential as an explanation for metaphysical 
necessity, considerable further explanatory power.  
A challenge to this may be mounted by those who take the 
varieties of necessity to have different sources. I examined this 
position criticized it on the grounds that it would detract from the 
generality and thus from the explanatory power of the proposed 
explanation of necessity. However, it would in principle be 
compatible with the present theory of metaphysical necessity that 
nomic necessity has a different source. There may be more than 
one explanation for why some truth cannot fail to be true. So 
while my official position is monism about the varieties of well-
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behaved alethic necessity, nothing in the theory itself commits me 
to monism. I take monism to be independently plausible, 
however. 
Before moving on to the discussion of essentialism and its 
interesting connection to the present theory, a short note on 
epistemic necessity is in order. Epistemic necessity is commonly 
characterized as that which has to be the case, given what we 
know; and epistemic possibility as that which we cannot exclude 
on the basis of what we know.  
I said above that the strategy of restriction and relativization only 
works in cases of well-behaved alethic necessities. Epistemic 
necessity is not such a well-behaved alethic necessity, because it 
includes some truths as necessary which are metaphysically not 
necessary (the known contingent truths), and it excludes some 
metaphysical necessities as not necessary, because we do not 
know every metaphysical necessity. So the correlative 
possibilities, the truths we cannot exclude on the basis of what we 
know, will include some metaphysical impossibilities. Here is an 
example: it may be that we lack knowledge of the planets of our 
solar system and that for all we know Hesperus is not Phosphorus. 
From the given epistemic standpoint, this seems like a genuine 
possibility, but it is not, because it is metaphysically impossible. 
So epistemic possibility does not align nicely with metaphysical 
possibility.  
Here is a suggestion on how this epistemic necessity may 
nonetheless be captured:  
A proposition p is epistemically necessary for thinker a, iff p is 
known by thinker a, or it is known to be implied by what is 
known (by thinker a). Epistemic possibility is then defined as the 
dual of epistemic necessity: A proposition p is epistemically 
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possible, iff it is not epistemically necessary that it is not the case 
that p. 
This formulation is sensitive to what a thinker knows to be 
implied by what he or she believes, and so it leaves open the 
possibility that a speaker is ignorant of the consequences of his or 
her beliefs as well as being ignorant about the modal status of 
what he or she knows. This account would divorce epistemic 
necessity and possibility from metaphysical necessity and 
possibility, as the account is relative to the epistemic capacities of 
a thinker. It can only be a suggestion, however, for a thorough 
treatment of epistemic modalities would require more space than 
can be given here. For present purposes, I merely suggest that we 
should take epistemic modality to be largely independent of 
metaphysical modality.  200
 Modal rationalists like Chalmers would likely disagree, but I must leave this 200
discussion for a different time.
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Chapter 8: Essence and Representation 
Essentialists take necessity to be explained by the essence of 
things, by those properties of objects which the object in question 
could not loose without ceasing to be the object it is. This 
essentialist explanation of necessity has some striking similarities 
to the present proposal and so a comparison between the two will 
be fruitful.  
The connection between meaning and essence and their respective 
connection to definitions and necessary truth has been noted by 
eminent philosophers. W.V.O. Quine, a harsh critic of both 
essence and meaning, for example, states the connection between 
meaning and essence as follows: “Meaning is what essence 
becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and 
wedded to the word.”  And Kit Fine, a proponent of an 201
essentialist theory of necessity, notes that we may understand 
what essences are in terms of giving a real definition of what an 
object is. But according to Fine, defining a term and giving a real 
definition of an object “is not merely parallel but […], at bottom 
the same.”  202
The present explanation of necessary truth in terms of reference 
determination does not trade in meanings, but focuses on what it 
takes for reference to occur, and it is not interested in giving 
definitions, but rather in what objects have to be like to be the 
referents of representations. But even with this new understanding 
 Quine (1951a) p. 22. Associating the notion of meaning with essences, is also 201
a rhetorical move by Quine to move meaning into disreputable company. His 
skepticism towards both meaning and essences has not stood to changing 
philosophical fashion, however, and so his remarks are here cited for their 
content only.
 Fine (1994) p.13.202
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of analyticity, the similarities between the notions are quite 
obvious.  
I want to make an even stronger point, however. I will argue that 
the present theory can be viewed as giving an essentialist account 
of necessity in virtue of explaining what essences are. By doing 
so, it also provides us with an explanation of how essence gives 
rise to necessity, an explanation orthodox essentialist proposals 
lack. 
To convince you of this strong connection, I will first introduce 
the orthodox essentialist explanation of necessity. Second, I argue 
that such essentialist accounts have a shortcoming, because they 
fail to make clear how the necessary truths are true in virtue of the 
essence of the objects they are about. Third, I will show how the 
present theory can fix this by both giving an account of what 
essences are as well as explaining how essence gives rise to 
necessity. 
1. Essence and Modality 
Essence, Kit Fine forcefully argued, cannot be explained by 
necessity.  Rather, he suggests, necessity should be explained by 203
essence: “It seems to me that far from viewing essence as a 
special case of metaphysical necessity, we should view 
metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence. For each class 
of objects, be they concepts or individuals or entities of some 
other kind, will give rise to its own domain of necessary truths, 
 The counterexamples to a modalist account of essence is by now well-known 203
and so I will not discuss it here in detail. The idea of the counterexample is that 
while some properties may be necessarily had by an object, these properties are 
intuitively not essential to the object (for example being such that 2+2=4), and 
so it is not sufficient for being an essential property of an object that the property 
is a necessary property of the object.
!244
the truths which flow from the nature of the objects in question. 
The metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified with 
the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all 
objects whatever”  So according to Kit Fine, the metaphysically 204
necessary truths are the ones which are true in virtue of essence, 
those which flow form the nature of things.  
This explanation of necessity by essence is not without its 
attractions, for it apparently provides us with an explanation of 
necessity that is not in need of postulating possible worlds, be 
they abstract or concrete. Also, the explanation does not have to 
be primitivist about some modal notion, and it uses a 
philosophical notion now widely accepted as interesting in its 
own right, that is, essence. Further, if essence indeed cannot be 
explained by necessity, then there seems to be little room for 
explaining the apparent connection between the two, except by 
taking essence to explain necessity.  Accordingly, the idea was 205
taken up by a number of philosophers: Bob Hale, for example, 
writes: “It is necessary that p because it is true in virtue of the 
natures of X1, . . . , Xn that p” , and Jonathan Lowe equally 206
weighs in: “essences are the ground of all metaphysical necessity 
and possibility”.   207
This attractive essentialist explanation of necessary truth leaves 
open two questions, however. First, if essence is not to be 
explained by modality, what is it to be an essential property? 
 Fine (1994) p. 9.204
 There are further options apart form one explaining the other, or vice versa. 205
Either the apparent connection between the two could be a mere coincidence, 
but, much more interestingly, a third element may explain both. The explanation 
of modality and essence outlined in what follows can be understood as being an 
explanation of the connection between the two by a third element.
 Hale (2013) p. 145206
 Lowe (2008a) p. 23207
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Second, what is truth in virtue of essence supposed to be? While 
there may be no urgent need to give an answer to the first 
question, as explanation has to stop somewhere and we may 
already have sufficient grasp of what essentiality consists in 
through the notion of real definition, the second question is more 
urgent, for it concerns the core explanatory claim of the theory 
and it is not obvious that the essentialist theory, as it stands, has 
an answer to it. So let me move straight to the core explanatory 
claim of essentialist theories of necessity. 
The essentialist idea is that necessary truths like the one expressed 
by “Socrates is human” are necessarily true (if Socrates exists), 
because it is true in virtue of it being essential to Socrates that he 
is human. This surely has a nice ring to it, but on closer inspection 
it looks slightly mysterious how the ‘because’ in this explanation 
is justified. For “Socrates is human” does not seem true in any 
special way. It is just true in virtue of Socrates being human. The 
fact that being human is essential to Socrates adds nothing to the 
explanation of the truth of the proposition. So it seems that the 
fact that being human is an essential property of Socrates is not 
involved in an explanation of the truth of “Socrates is human” 
rather, it is the mere fact that Socrates is human that is involved in 
the explanation of the truth of “Socrates is human”. What role the 
fact that being human is essential to Socrates plays in the 
explanation of the truth remains unclear. To get this challenge into 
focus, I will first compare it to a related objection to theories 
utilizing the notion of truth in virtue of meaning, before making a 
seemingly natural proposal for a solution, and showing why this 
solution doesn’t work. 
The problem is reminiscent of an objection commonly leveled 
against the notion of truth in virtue of meaning, and there widely 
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accepted as decisive, which says that there is no such thing as 
truth in virtue of meaning, because it is, in the appropriate sense, 
the world which makes a sentence true, not its meaning. All 
meaning does, is tell us what a sentence says, but what makes it 
true is that what it says really is the case. Consequently there is no 
such thing as truth in virtue of meaning.   208
A similar argument seems warranted in the case of truth in virtue 
of essence: The fact that some property of an object is an essential 
property of it is irrelevant to the explanation of the truth saying of 
the object that it has this property. Whether it is true that Socrates 
is human doesn’t depend on him being essentially human, it 
merely depends on him being human. So there is no such thing as 
being true in virtue of essence, provided “truth in virtue of 
essence” is a special way of being true, different from regular 
ways of being true. Here Quine’s observation that meaning and 
essence are two faces of the same coin, comes back to haunt the 
essentialist. 
Maybe, however, the essentialist has a way to answer the 
objection the proponent of truth in virtue of meaning doesn’t 
have. Maybe the suggestion is weaker than I interpreted it. Maybe 
it is not that “Socrates is human” has a special way of being true, 
maybe being true in virtue of the essence of something just means 
that the proposition is true in virtue of Socrates being human, plus 
the fact that being human happens to be an essential property. 
This suggestion does not exhibit the problem just outlined, for it 
does not claim that there is a special way of being true. It is just 
 As was outlined in some detail above, Boghossian (1996) gives the now 208
standard articulation of this worry. But he is neither the first nor the last to use it 
to argue against truth in virtue of meaning. See for example Lewy (1976), 
Williamson (2006). For the most famous criticism of analyticity as truth in virtue 
of meaning, see Quine (1951).
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that the properties of Socrates which make the proposition true 
also happen to be among his essential properties. So we may 
separate the facts that make true the proposition (Socrates’ being 
human), from the facts that make it necessary (Socrates being 
essentially human). This seemingly natural solution, however, is 
problematic, because it does not explain how the fact that being 
human is an essential property of Socrates gives rise to the 
necessity of the proposition. If truth in virtue of essence was a 
special way of being true, this would at least suggest that this 
special way of being true gives rise to a special mode of truth, but 
since there is no special way of being true, no hint is given as to 
how the status of being an essential property gives rise to 
necessary truth.  
Note that I am not denying that if it is essential to Socrates that he 
is human, then the proposition expressed by Socrates is human is 
necessarily true. We may well be able to pair every necessary 
truth with some essentialist truth and find them to be logically 
equivalent. The problem is that an explanation of how essence 
gives rise to necessity is lacking, and thus the account lacks in 
intelligibility. 
If standard essentialist proposals do not properly explain how 
essence gives rise to necessity, how are we to understand the 
claim that essence gives rise to necessary truth? I suggest that the 
essentialist should adopt the explanation of necessity given by the 
present theory, and think of essences as the reference realizing 
properties determined by singular representations. This will allow 
for an illuminating reading of the slogan ‘truth in virtue of 
essence’. 
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2. Essences as Reference Realizing Properties 
With the help of reference realizing properties, we can give an 
account of what the essential properties of something are: The 
essential properties of an object are those of its properties which 
realize, or would realize, the reference relation between the object 
and a singular representation referring to it. This identification of 
essences with reference realizing properties allows for a 
clarification of the essentialist explanation of necessary truth.  
That the identification is warranted can best be seen when 
considering how we may characterize essential properties as well 
as reference realizing properties. The essential properties of an 
object can be characterized as properties an object could not loose 
without ceasing to be the object it is.  Reference realizing 209
properties can similarly be characterized as properties the referent 
of a singular representation could not loose without ceasing to be 
the referent of the representation. So provided that Socrates is the 
referent of the representation ⌜Socrates⌝, if and only if Socrates 
exists, both the essential properties of Socrates and his reference 
realizing properties are properties he could not loose without 
ceasing to be Socrates. That essential properties and reference 
realizing properties are both properties an object could not loose 
without ceasing to exist suggests that an identification is 
warranted, even if the epistemic possibility remains open that the 
essential properties differ from the reference realizing properties, 
and are just (necessarily) co-instantiated.  
 This characterization, as well as related ones (the properties that constitute an 209
object’s identity, the nature of an objecte, etc.) are commonly not intended as 
analyses of essence, nor as constitutive explanations, but merely as elucidations 
that help us understand, and pick out what essences are.
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I will try to argue against remaining doubts by pointing out the 
explanatory advantages of the identification. The first and 
foremost advantage is that the identification provides us with a 
genuine explanation of necessary truth in terms of essences. If the 
reference realizing properties of objects are their essential 
properties, then the explanation of necessity can proceed along 
the lines suggested above. Assume, for example, that it is essential 
to Socrates that he is human and that it is therefore a reference 
realizing property of Socrates, determined by the singular 
representation ⌜Socrates⌝, that he is human. Given this, it is 
necessarily true that Socrates is human, because the requirements 
for truth of the truth-evaluable representation ⌜Socrates is 
human⌝ are guaranteed to be satisfied. This is the sense in which 
necessity flows from essence: The essence of Socrates, the 
relevant reference realizing properties of Socrates, explain why 
the requirements for truth of the representation ⌜Socrates is 
human⌝ are guaranteed to be satisfied. 
In contrast to the proposal of how essence and modality may be 
connected according to the orthodox essentialist which just noted 
that an essential property was involved in the truth-making, a 
genuine explanation of how this guarantees the truth of the 
representation can be given along the lines of the present theory: 
A representation cannot fail to be true in virtue of the appropriate 
relationship between requirements for truth and reference 
realizing properties.  
One further advantage of taking essences to be reference realizing 
properties should be mentioned here. Essentialists occasionally 
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say things like “essence precedes existence” . What is meant by 210
this, is that the fact that some object has a certain essence is not 
conditional on its existence, even though the instantiation of the 
essence is a condition on the existence of the object. This is 
supposed to allow for the possibility of non-existent objects 
having essences as well.  But this talk of essence preceding 211
existence is slightly mysterious. In what sense does something 
have an essence without existing? Identifying essential properties 
with reference realizing properties explains in which sense 
something can have an essence without existing: Since what the 
reference realizing properties of a singular representation are, is 
determined by the reference determining properties of a 
representation, there is no need for an object actually having these 
properties for there to be a fact of the matter what properties such 
a referent would have, if it was the referent of that 
representation.  So while the reference realizing properties are 212
not instantiated, it is nonetheless determined what they would be 
if the relevant object existed. Thus there is good sense to be made 
of essence preceding existence. 
The explanatory advantages of moving from essences to reference 
realizing properties, and preserving some central essentialist 
tenets without incurring the problems of more orthodox 
essentialist proposals, may not yet have convinced the committed 
essentialist. For the essentialist may take the present proposal to 
 Lowe (2008a)210
 It is not mandatory for the essentialist to insist that non-existent objects have 211
essences. But to be able to account for necessary truths about non-existent 
objects, there seems to be some pressure to do so.
 As was discussed above, there may be some doubts that singular reference is 212
possible without the existence of an object. This is an open question, which 
should not impede on the present point, however.
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be so far removed in spirit from his own project that an 
identification is too much of a stretch. If the reader should be of 
such a conviction, I merely ask her to acknowledge the similarity 
to the essentialist proposal as well as the explanatory merits of the 
explanation of necessity in terms of reference realizing properties. 
Summing up 
Comparing essentialism to the present theory revealed that the 
theories are closely related. I have tried to convince you that one 
may even take the present theory to be an improvement on the 
orthodox essentialist theory, because it both offers an explanation 
of what essences are, and of how essences explain necessary 
truth. Essences may be identified with the reference realizing 
properties singular representations determine. 
The connection between meaning and essence has been noted 
before and Quine rightly identified the two notions as two faces of 
the same coin. So it is not surprising that the essentialist theory of 
necessity encounters problems similar to those of traditional 
accounts of necessary truth in terms of meaning. Traditional 
accounts of necessity in terms of meaning sought to explain 
necessity by identifying it with truth in virtue of meaning. This 
view is untenable, because necessary truths just are not true in 
virtue of meaning. But truth in virtue of essence is also 
mysterious, because it is unclear what it is to be true in virtue of 
essence. So the move from the word to the world, while 
understandable, does not, by itself, succeed in giving a 
satisfactory explanation of necessary truth.  
Essentialists are right in looking to the world for an explanation of 
necessary truth, and away from the words and their meanings. But 
by looking for essences in the objects, independently of the 
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representations, essentialism subscribes to a problematic view of 
the relationship between representation and world as two distinct 
realms: the realm of representation, and the realm of the world. 
This sharp distinction was already the reason why an explanation 
of truth in virtue of meaning failed. Moving the explanation of 
necessary truth from the realm of words and meanings to the 
realm of objects and essences does not succeed, because what is 
needed is an explanation of how representations and what they 
represent work together to produce reference, truth, and the 
modes of truth. This synthesis is made possible by the proposed 
framework which allows for the identification of essences with 
reference realizing properties. 
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Chapter 9: Evaluating the Explanation of Necessity 
The previous chapters developed and defended the theory of 
necessity which I take to give a good explanation of metaphysical 
necessity. I want to use this chapter to summarize and emphasize 
the points which speak in the theory’s favor. Here is the main 
reason for believing the theory to be a good theory of necessity: 
The theory offers a non-circular, illuminating and intelligible, as 
well as general explanation of metaphysical necessity that appears 
extensionally adequate, accounts for puzzles about possibilia and 
necessary existence, explains what essences are and along the 
way makes only minimal assumptions about the nature of 
representation and its connection to the world. I take these to be 
reasons for taking the explanation to be a good explanation, but 
let me go over each point in turn. 
1. Non-Circularity 
A philosophical explanation, I argued in the first part, should give 
a non-circular, intelligible, and general constitutive explanation of 
a philosophical phenomenon. That is, it should tell us what it 
takes to be X, where X is the phenomenon to be explained. 
Giving such an explanation may involve conceptual analysis, but 
need not, as there just may not be the conceptual or linguistic 
resources to analyse a concept into simpler parts. The case of an 
explanation of necessity is such a case. No (credible) explanatory 
analysis is available which illuminates what it takes for a 
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representation to be necessarily true.  Nonetheless, a 213
constitutive explanation of why a representation is necessarily 
true can be given. Such an explanation should, by identifying 
what it takes for a representation to be necessarily true, make 
clear what gives rise to necessary truth. A central condition on this 
explanation is non-circularity: The explanation should not again 
involve what is in need of explanation.  The official explanation 214
of necessary truth I proposed was the following: 
Explanation of Necessity: A necessarily true truth-evaluable 
representation is necessary, because the reference 
determining properties of the constituent referential 
representations determine the reference realizing properties 
such that the requirements for truth of the truth-evaluable 
representation are guaranteed to be satisfied. 
I already argued above that the proposed constitutive explanation 
of necessity is not circular. So let me rehearse this reasoning, 
 The proponent of possible worlds would argue that an illuminating analysis is 213
available, namely an analysis in terms of possible worlds. However, even 
granting the biconditionals expressing the analysis, it is not clear that this helps 
with philosophical explanation, for it must also be true for the analysis to 
contribute to an explanation that it makes clear what it takes for a representation 
to be necessarily true. If this is assumed for the analysis in terms of possible 
worlds, one is committed to the existence of a multiverse of possible worlds. A 
commitment which can be, and should be avoided. 
 We must take care not to confuse this non-circularity requirement on 214
constitutive explanation with the much more specific non-circularity requirement 
on conceptual analysis, for the two have a different rationale: A conceptual 
analysis cannot be true if it involves the analysandum in the analysans, for 
nothing can be both a proper constituent of a concept and the concept itself. 
Arguably this kind of circularity is quite rare, however, and usually the 
circularity charge against conceptual analyses is that the analysans involves 
some concept from the same ‘family’ as the analysandum and is therefore not 
properly illuminating.
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because the official explanation may at first glance appear 
circular, for it seems to say that a truth-evaluable representation is 
necessarily true, because it is guaranteed to be true. This would be 
rather unilluminating, for isn’t a guarantee for truth just necessary 
truth? 
Part of the charge should be admitted: being necessarily true just 
is being guaranteed to be true, and this by itself is unilluminating. 
However, the explanation also says how this guarantee for truth 
comes about, it explains what it takes for the guarantee of truth to 
be effected: The reference realizing properties determined by the 
constituent referential representations must stand in the 
appropriate relationship to each other and to the requirements for 
truth of the truth-evaluable representations. What this 
“appropriate relationship” is, depends on the requirements for 
truth of the truth-evaluable representation and so in order to state 
the explanation in a general way, this relation is picked out by its 
effect, that is, the guarantee for truth. Nonetheless, the appropriate 
relationship, which is ultimately constitutive of necessary truth, 
can be given for each (kind of) representation. The appropriate 
relationship between the reference realizing properties determined 
by two referential representations which require for their truth that 
the referents of one representation are among the referents of the 
other, for example, is that the reference realizing properties of the 
other are among the reference realizing properties of the one. 
Similar accounts can be given for other kinds of representations. 
I conclude that no circularity is involved in the present 
explanation of necessary truth. It is constitutive of necessary truth 
that there is an appropriate relationship between the reference 
realizing properties determined by the constituent referential 
representations and the requirements for truth of the truth-
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evaluable representation. What this appropriate relationship is, 
can be specified for each necessary truth without using modal 
notions. 
2. Intelligibility 
Intelligibility is the second criterion for a good philosophical 
explanation. It is admittedly a somewhat loose criterion, but there 
is nonetheless some sense to be made of it, and it should be 
recognizable, if an explanation meets it.  
Explanation is supposed to move us closer to an understanding of 
the phenomenon which is explained. It should help us to see how 
a certain phenomenon came or comes about.  This seems to hold 215
both for genealogical and constitutive explanations.  
Take, for example, a causal explanations: if we want to know why 
the light is on (causally), we want to be told something that makes 
us see how it came about that the light came on. The relevant fact 
which explains this in the present case, may be that someone 
switched on the lights. Together with our background knowledge 
that there is some appropriate causal mechanism connecting the 
switch and the light, this information allows us to see why the 
light is on.  
Constitutive explanations are not very different in this respect. 
While we do not want to be told about some causal mechanisms, 
we want to be told about the metaphysical ‚mechanism’. We want 
to be told that what is constitutive of a phenomenon is in place. If 
we want to know, for example, why (constitutively) there is a 
triangle on the sheet of paper, an explanation would list the 
constitutive features of being a triangle and say that they are in 
 ‘Comes about’ should here not only be read as causally becoming, but also as 215
constitutively coming to be.
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place: there is a triangle, because there is a closed figure with 
three sides on the sheet of paper. 
Since what we are looking for in philosophical explanations are 
constitutive explanations, what is needed from an intelligible 
explanation is that it helps us to see how the phenomenon to be 
explained comes to be. In the special case of necessary truth it 
should therefore allow us to see how it comes about that a 
necessary truth cannot fail to be true. The present explanation of 
necessity does just that. It describes the mechanism by which 
some representations cannot fail to be true: They cannot fail to be 
true, because necessarily true representations are so constituted 
that the relationship between the referents of the constituent 
representations required for its truth is bound to obtain in virtue of 
how reference of the constituents is determined. So we can see 
how the truth of a representation is guaranteed.  
Given the outlined (rather minimal) assumptions about truth and 
reference, it is no surprise any more that necessary truth arises. 
Some representations are guaranteed to be true in virtue of how 
reference determination and truth work together.  
One way to test the intelligibility of an explanation is to see 
whether the explanation provides us with a recipe for bringing 
about the phenomenon we want to explain. In the causal case, a 
good explanation allows us to reproduce the effect we wanted to 
explain, in the constitutive case it allows us to recreate the 
phenomenon we intend to explain.  
The given explanation of necessary truth passes this test. It 
provides us with a recipe for making representations that are 
necessarily true: We have to combine referential representations 
with adequately related reference realizing properties which they 
determine to form truth-evaluable representations with 
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requirements for truth that are guaranteed to be satisfied by the 
relationship holding between the reference realizing properties. 
Thus I conclude that the theory also satisfies the desideratum of 
intelligibility. It allows us to understand how necessary truth 
comes to be. 
3. Generality 
The third criterion which is supposed to tell us something about 
the theory’s quality is generality. Generality is a requirement for 
philosophical theories, because it is one of the tasks of philosophy 
to give general constitutive explanations of phenomena. So an 
explanation of necessary truth should explain how necessary truth 
arises generally and not just for a few isolated cases.  
As I mentioned in the first part, the criterion is a little elusive, 
because it applies only in so far as the phenomenon to be 
explained really is uniform: A phenomenon which at first appears 
uniform may turn out to require many different explanations and 
so it may turn out that generality is a misguided requirement on 
some explanations. Nonetheless, if a satisfactory general 
explanation can be given, its generality speaks in its favor, for it 
allows us to understand a wide range of cases, and holds true to 
the appearance that the phenomenon in question really is uniform. 
So is the present explanation of necessary truth a general 
explanation of necessary truth? I believe that the argument above 
shows that it is general in the appropriate sense, for the 
explanation is in principle applicable to every necessarily true 
truth-evaluable representation. The fact that it seems to capture 
standard examples of necessary truths in a uniform way is reason 
to believe that it is likely to apply to the other relevant cases. I 
thus think it is safe to say that the present theory is general in the 
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intended sense, for it makes sense of the phenomenon of 
necessary truth quite generally. 
4. Extensional Adequacy 
Extensional adequacy is a minimal requirement for successful 
philosophical theories. The requirement itself derives its force 
from being a strict requirement on conceptual analyses. There the 
requirement is that the biconditional used to state the analysis 
must be true. If cases can be found where either the left-hand side 
or the right-hand side of the biconditional turn out to be false, 
while the other is true, then this demonstrates that analysans and 
analysandum represent two different phenomena. The present 
explanation, however, is not a conceptual analysis. So applying 
the standard of extensional adequacy to the present theory is not 
as straightforward. Nonetheless, we can make some sense of the 
requirement. For it should still be the case that the explanation 
only explains, that is, renders necessarily true, all and only those 
representations that are necessarily true.  
If the explanation is the true explanation, this criterion is trivially 
satisfied, but to test whether it has claim to being the true 
explanation, we can see whether it renders the standard examples 
of metaphysically necessary truth necessarily true. If it doesn’t, 
we are either wrong in our opinions about the clear cases, or, 
which is more likely, we are not explaining what we are trying to 
explain. So it is important that the theory covers the clear cases, 
the cases we take to be paradigms of metaphysical necessity. 
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These clear cases are what sometimes runs under the label of 
‘broadly logical truths’, as well as ‘essentialists truths’.   216
There are three reasons to take the theory to be extensionally 
adequate. First, examples show that it explains the necessary truth 
of paradigmatic truths from all these domains. Second, the 
explanation of necessity yields a notion of necessity which is the 
strongest notion of necessity that still provides for an intelligible 
notion of possible truth, and the weakest notion such that it 
provides for everything that is, in the widest intelligible sense, 
possibly true. Third, elements of the explanation can be taken to 
give an account of what essences are, the explanans of a theory of 
necessity which is relatively widely accepted as being 
extensionally adequate. Let me go over these three reasons in 
slightly more detail. None of the arguments is quite decisive, but 
together I believe that there is strong reason to suppose that the 
theory is extensionally adequate, that is, that it really is an 
explanation of metaphysical necessity. 
The first reason for taking the theory to explain metaphysical 
necessity is that it covers standard examples of necessary truths. 
In the previous chapters, examples of logical truths, conceptual 
truths, mathematical truths, and essence attributions were all 
shown to, at least in principle, be covered by the proposed 
explanation. This shows that there is no domain of standard 
examples of necessary truths which are not, at least in principle, 
 The terminology is not quite uniform in the debate. For some, metaphysically 216
necessary truths just are the broadly logical truths, for others the broadly logical 
truths are only conceptual and logical truths, and not essentialist truths. Be that 
as it may, however, a theory of metaphysical necessity should be able to account 
for the necessity of standard cases of conceptual truths, logical truths, and 
essentialist truths.
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covered by the present account. There may be two weak points in 
this argument from examples.  
First, a few examples may not sufficiently raise confidence in the 
claim that the explanation is applicable to all necessary truths. 
This first weak point, however, is itself quite weak, for given that 
the examples are paradigms of their respective domains, there 
seems to be little reason to believe that the explanation does not 
apply to further examples as well.  
Second, the examples relied on assumptions of what the 
respective reference realizing properties determined by the 
referential representations are. These assumptions are integral to 
the success of the explanation, and so there may be doubts that 
these assumptions are sufficiently justified.  
I relied on two ways of justifying the assumptions. First, I 
appealed to our understanding of the representations expressed by 
the example sentences and our intuitions about what it takes to be 
the referent of the constituent representations. I take it that the 
assumptions based on this were at least plausible. It may be that a 
more detailed linguistic analysis of the example sentences shows 
that the representations expressed by the sentences are different 
from the representations I suggested they express. So it may turn 
out that the representations commonly expressed by the example 
sentences are constituted by different referential representations 
which determine different reference realizing properties or that 
the requirements for truth turn out to be different. If so, then it 
may be that some of the examples do not turn out necessarily true 
on the present account. However, in this case we would have to 
ask ourselves whether our intuitions about the necessity of the 
standard examples did not rely on the same misunderstanding of 
the sentences as the present explanation. And so it may turn out 
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that while some of the example sentences do not commonly 
express a representation that is necessarily true according to the 
present theory, there is a representation expressed by a similar 
sentence which is indeed rendered necessarily true by the present 
theory.  
In light of the further reasons for extensional adequacy, I trust that 
a more detailed linguistic understanding of which representations 
are expressed by sentences will help to validate, and to make 
more precise, the sketchy account of reference realizing properties 
and requirements for truth given in the examples-section above. 
The second reason for taking the theory to be explaining genuine 
metaphysical necessity was discussed in the chapter on the 
varieties of necessity: The kind of necessity explained by the 
present theory is the strongest kind of necessity which still yields 
an intelligible corresponding notion of possible truth. This, I 
suggested, should be exactly what we would expect from 
metaphysical necessity and consequently there is good reason to 
take the present theory to be a theory of metaphysical necessity. 
Let me quickly go over the argument again: Anything which is 
not necessarily not the case is possibly the case. So each variety 
of necessity has its own corresponding notion of possibility. 
However, if there is a notion of necessity stronger than the 
necessity explained by the present theory, the corresponding 
notions of possibility cannot be construed as being possibly true, 
for there are bound to be some allegedly possible representations 
that just cannot be true. Here is an example: Take the 
metaphysical impossibility that there are married bachelors. It is 
metaphysically impossible, because the requirements for truth of 
the representation representing that there are married bachelors 
cannot be satisfied in virtue of how the reference of the 
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constituent representations is determined. But that there are 
married bachelors is a logical possibility, because it is not a 
logical necessity that there are no married bachelors. However, 
since the requirements for truth cannot be satisfied, there is no 
sense to be made of the logically possible truth of a representation 
representing that there are married bachelors: the representation, 
if it is to be the representation it is, cannot be true in any 
intelligible sense of true.  
This example is not an isolated case. Any kind of necessity 
stronger than the necessity explained by the present theory will 
yield a corresponding notion of possibility which cannot be 
interpreted as possible truth. The reason for this is that the 
explanation of necessity is directly connected to what is required 
for the truth of the representation. So anything that is not possible 
according to the present theory cannot be true simpliciter. Since 
this is just what metaphysical necessity is supposed to be, the 
strongest kind of necessity which still yields an intelligible notion 
of possible truth, the present theory should be taken to explain 
metaphysical necessity.  
This reasoning relies on certain assumptions about what 
metaphysical necessity should be, namely that is the strongest 
notion yielding an intelligible notion of possibility. This may be 
challenged. I take it, however, that the explanation of necessity 
captures two quite intuitive aspects of metaphysical necessity 
which are present in the criterion given: First, that what is 
metaphysically necessary is true no matter what. Second, that 
what is metaphysically possible is possibly true in the widest 
possible sense. 
The third reason for taking the explanation to account for 
metaphysical necessity is that it can be viewed as underwriting an 
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essentialist theory of necessity which is commonly taken to be 
extensionally adequate. I claimed that essences can be identified 
with the reference realizing properties determined by singular 
representations. Why? Because the reference realizing properties 
are those properties an object has, if it is the referent of the 
singular representation referring to it, so given that a singular 
representation refers to an object, if and only if the object exists, 
the object has these reference realizing properties, if and only if it 
exists. This also has a modal dimension: If an object would loose 
the reference realizing properties, then it would no longer be the 
referent of the singular representation, and given that the singular 
representation refers to the object as long as it is the object it is, it 
would no longer be the object it is. This characterization of 
reference realizing properties is parallel to the characterization of 
essential properties as those properties which an object could not 
loose without ceasing to be the object it is. So while the essential 
and the reference realizing properties may be two distinct or 
merely partially overlapping sets of properties, which are both a 
subset of the properties an object necessarily has (if it exists), it 
seems that the obvious way to go is to identify the essential 
properties with the reference realizing properties, especially given 
that an explanation of what essences are and how they give rise to 
necessity is needed. 
These three reasons speak in favor of taking the theory to really 
be a theory of metaphysical necessity, a theory that explains why 
the truths that are metaphysically necessary cannot fail to be true. 
None of these reasons is a knockdown argument, and all depend 
to a certain extend on assumptions which may be challenged. All 
three together, however should raise the confidence in the theory’s 
extensional adequacy. 
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5. Puzzles Solved 
Bertrand Russell famously claimed that “a logical theory may be 
tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles” . And so I want 217
to take his advice and bring to mind again the unified solutions 
the present theory offers to some puzzles in modal metaphysics, 
namely puzzles about necessary existence, mere possibilia, and 
impossible objects. If the proposed explanation of necessity is 
accepted, it offers a quite natural solution to these puzzles. Since 
it can account for the truth of talk about mere possibilia, it may 
also be viewed as a properly actualist theory of modality. This is a 
desirable feature, not least for allowing an answer to an apparent 
dilemma for an explanation of necessity posed by Simon 
Blackburn.  218
Let me rehearse the puzzles and how the theory and the 
framework in which it is developed solves them. First, there is the 
problem of necessary existence: If it is necessarily true that 
Socrates is human, then it seems that it is equally true to say that 
necessarily, Socrates exists. For it seems to be a requirement on 
the truth of Socrates’ being human that he exists. Socrates, 
however, is a contingent being. He does not exist necessarily. This 
leaves us with a puzzle, for it cannot be that Socrates both exists 
necessarily and contingently. The present theory offers a solution. 
For on the present theory it is not necessarily true that Socrates is 
human, provided the representation ⌜Socrates is human⌝ requires 
the existence of Socrates for its truth. It is, however, necessarily 
true on the present theory that Socrates is human, if the 
representation does not require for its truth that Socrates exists. So 
 Russell (1905) p. 484217
 Blackburn (1993)218
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the theory does not imply that Socrates necessarily exists, thereby 
solving the puzzle. That one should take the representation 
expressed by “Socrates is human” to not require for its truth the 
existence of Socrates, in so far as the sentence is supposed to 
express a necessary truth, is plausible on a very basic application 
of the principle of charity: One should, as far as possible, interpret 
someone as speaking the truth. Since it is only necessarily true, 
according to the present theory, that Socrates is human, if this 
doesn’t require Socrates’ existence for its truth, the sentence 
should be interpreted as expressing this representation. 
The puzzles about mere possibilia and impossible objects are 
solvable once we accept that some representations do not require 
the existence of the object they are about for their truth. What is 
puzzling about mere possibilia, objects that do not actually exist, 
but may have existed and impossible objects, objects that do not 
exist and could not have existed, is that there are some 
(necessary) truths about them which seem true, but at the same 
time the truth of such representations seems to require the 
existence of these very objects. Since it was acknowledged in the 
solution to the puzzle about necessary existence that some 
representations do not require for their truth that the object they 
are about exists, the existence of mere possibilia, or of impossible 
objects, is not required for the truth of some representations about 
them. Especially in the case of essence attributions to mere 
possibilia and impossible objects, no existence of the object is 
required for the truth of the representation. So there is sense to be 
made of talk of possibilia without having to admit that merely 
possible objects exist. 
The ability of the theory and the framework in which it is 
developed to give a satisfactory solution to these puzzles is thus a 
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further reason for taking the proposed explanation of necessary 
truth seriously. 
A further puzzle: Blackburn’s dilemma 
There is a further puzzle which has not been mentioned in the 
parts above, to which the present theory and its general 
framework allow a good and satisfying answer: Blackburn’s 
dilemma. The dilemma is supposed to show that no explanation of 
necessary truth can succeed, for either the explanans is itself 
necessary, then it seems that there is a residual necessity itself in 
need of explanation, or the explanans is contingent, then it seems 
that it could have been different and thus that it could have been 
the case that the explained necessity was not necessary after all, a 
conclusion which undermines the necessi ty of the 
explanandum.   219
It is not hard to get a sense that something must be wrong with 
this reasoning, but it is not easy to pinpoint exactly where it goes 
wrong. So let me look at the dilemma in slightly more detail, and 
propose a solution for it that shows that the modal status of the 
explanans is irrelevant to the explanation. This will fit nicely with 
the broadly actualist leanings of the present theory and its 
explanatory strategy. While the solution to this puzzle is inspired 
by the present explanation of necessity, it does not depend on it 
and can be used by philosophers who do not accept the proposed 
explanation. As such, the solution to this puzzle does not speak 
directly in favor of the present theory, but an answer is 
nonetheless desirable, especially since there have been some 
 Blackburn (1993)219
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doubts that a theory along the suggested lines could answer the 
challenge posed by the dilemma.  220
I will first start with the contingency horn of the dilemma, discuss 
possible answers, offer my solution, and argue that it also solves 
the necessity-horn of the dilemma. 
Blackburn’s dilemma - the contingency horn 
The argument for the contingency horn can be reconstructed in 
the following way in quasi-logical notation :  221
(1) p   Explanandum 
(2) p because q Explanation of p by q 
(3) ¬q → ¬p  Assumption: Plausible counterfactual   
   principle about  explanation 
(4) ◊¬q   Assumption: Contingency of q 
(5) ◊¬p   From (3) and (4)  
(6) ¬p   From (5) 
(7)p  From (1) by S4-Axiom (p → p),  
   contradicting (6) 
The argument is valid as it stands and it also seems, at first sight, 
intuitively plausible: Assume that some necessary truth p is 
explained by some contingent truth q. Since q is contingent, it 
could not have been the case that q. But if q had not been the case, 
 compare for example Hale (2013), who uses the dilemma to argue for his 220
brand of essentialism against a representation-based account.
 cf. Hale (2002), Hanks (2008), Lange (2008) and Morato (2014). Some 221
authors take p and q to stand for propositions, others take them to directly stand 
for facts. Nothing turns on the issue in what follows. 
‘’ is ‘necessarily, ‘◊’ is ‘possibly’, and ‘→’ is the counterfactual conditional.
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it would not have explained necessarily p. Therefore “it is 
possible that p” is not necessary. But if it is possible that p is not 
necessary, then it is not really necessary. Consequently, a 
contingent explanans cannot explain necessity. Note that the 
notion of explanation used here is quite general, and one may read 
‘p because q’, as ‘p is grounded in q’. Nothing in the argument 
and general reasoning depends on any specific conception of 
explanation. 
As has been pointed out by Hale and other authors following him, 
the contingentist seems to have two options to counter this 
argument.  First, she could reject the counterfactual dependence 222
of the explanandum on the explanans, second she could reject the 
step from 1 to 7 above by rejecting the so called S4-Axiom, that 
what is necessary is necessarily so. The second option appears to 
be the most straightforward solution, for it just seems to beg the 
question against the contingentist’s proposal that one should 
assume that what is necessary is necessarily so.  
However, there is independent reason to believe that the strategy 
of rejecting S4 is not helpful, for, as Hanks points out, there is a 
different version of the argument which does not make use of the 
allegedly controversial principle, but instead assumes that the 
explanation takes a different form.  An explanation of necessity 223
in terms of a contingent explanans may take the following form: 
p because (p because q). Informally, that may be understood as 
stating that p’s necessity is explained by the explanation of p in 
terms of q. Together with the plausible counterfactual principle 
about explanation, that if q would not have been the case, then p 
 Hale (2013)222
 See Hanks (2008) for an argument to this conclusion from which the 223
following is a summary.
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would not have been the case, it is easily derived that p is not 
necessary.  Here is how the argument goes: Since q may not 224
have been the case, it follows by counterfactual dependence of the 
explanandum on the explanans that p may possibly not have been 
the case. But if possibly not-p, then it is not necessary that p. This 
follows without any appeal to the allegedly controversial S4 
principle.  
This argument indicates that what is at issue in the present case is 
not the correct modal logic, but rather the correct form an 
explanation of necessity should take, as well as the principles it 
should follow. That S4 is a red herring can be seen best, when we 
translate the above arguments into talk of possible worlds. This 
will also indicate how an explanation of necessity in terms of 
something contingent should be understood. 
The right form of explanation 
The proponent of the contingency-horn of Blackburn’s dilemma 
thinks of an explanation of necessity in terms of contingencies in 
the following way: That something is true in all possible worlds is 
explained by contingent features in each possible world.  
Take first the form of explanation Hanks presupposes for his 
argument: p is true in all possible worlds because (p because q) is 
true in each possible world. Formulated in terms of possible 
worlds, it is immediately obvious that such an explanation of 
necessity can never work, if the explanans is contingent. For if the 
explanans, q, is contingent, then there is a possible world in which 
it is not the case that q, but if there is a possible world in which it 
is not the case that q, then, given the factivity of explanation, it is 
 Note that it would also be very implausible to reject the counterfactual 224
principle about explanation in the present case.
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also not the case in that world that p because q. Therefore, it is not 
the case that in every possible world it is the case that p 
(provided, that q’s obtaining is a necessary condition for p’s 
obtaining), but then p is just not necessary. 
The same holds for the simpler form of explanation p because q 
, where q is again contingent. In terms of possible worlds, this 
comes down to: in every possible world p, because in each world 
q. Which of course cannot be a good explanation, because q is not 
true in every possible world in virtue of being contingent. So how 
could it possibly explain p in worlds in which it is not true? 
Obviously it can’t, and therefore this explanation cannot work.  225
Both explanations, no matter what we fill in as p and q, can be 
seen to not get off the ground once they are spelled out like this, 
but there must be something wrong with any reconstruction of the 
contingentist explanation that attributes such an obviously wrong 
thesis to a proponent of this kind of explanation. It seems that this 
must be an extremely uncharitable reading and may indicate that 
the opponent is merely a straw man.  226
The form the contingentist’s explanation should take 
So what could an explanation of necessity in terms of a contingent 
feature of the world look like instead? The obvious solution is to 
explain the necessity of p via the obtaining of q in the actual 
 Lange (2008) suggest just such argument against the contingentist. (p. 225
125-126) 
 It must be admitted that the criticism is not directed against a straw-man, if 226
the opponent is a classical conventionalist. It is reasonable to interpret the 
conventionalist as endorsing this form of explanation.
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world. So the form of the explanation would be the following: 
p because @q (Necessarily p, because actually q).  227
If this is the correct form of explanation for a contingentist to 
choose, then it doesn’t follow any more that if q had not been the 
case, then p would not have been the case, because it is still true 
that actually q, which suffices to explain, according to the 
contingentist, that p is necessary. This way of reconstructing the 
form of explanation also fits the spirit of the contingentist 
proposal much better, for the contingentist is likely to also be an 
actualist, in the sense of believing that the facts of necessity (and 
possibility) are constrained by the way the actual world is.   228
This form of explanation blocks an argument to the conclusion 
that the contingentist falls prey to Blackburn’s contingency-horn. 
Lets see in some more detail how the argument, modeled on the 
anti-contingentist argument above, is blocked. We start with the 
same assumptions as above, with the form of explanation 
amended in premise (2*), and the counterfactual principle in (3*) 
amended accordingly. 
(1) p   Explanandum 
(2*) p because @q Explanation of p by q 
(3*) ¬@q → ¬p  Assumption: Plausible counterfactual   
   principle about  explanation 
(4) ◊¬q   Assumption: Contingency of q 
 Morato (2014) makes a similar proposal, by allowing for trans-world 227
relations of explanation. However, the present solution is much simpler than the 
solution presented by Morato.
 We must distinguish between existence-actualism, and the actualism currently 228
at issue, which I will call explanation-actualism. Existence-actualism is the 
thesis that only what is actual exists. The explanation-actualist is not committed 
to this strong thesis, for she can allow for the existence of possibilia, as long as 
their possibility is somehow grounded in the actual world.
!273
From these premises nothing interesting follows. All of them are 
assumed to be true, but we cannot use (3*) together with (4) to 
conclude that p is possibly not necessary, for while it is possible 
that not q, it is not possible that not actually q. (3*) is still true on 
standard accounts for the counterfactual conditional, because 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are trivially true. 
Consequently, there is no valid argument to the conclusion that no 
explanation of necessity in terms of something contingent is 
possible, if the form of explanation the contingentist utilizes, or 
should utilize, is as outlined above.  
This reconstruction of the argument also shows that the modal 
status of the explanans, q, does not play a role in the explanation 
of the necessity of p at all. Therefore, both the necessitist as well 
as the contingentist are off the hook. As long as q is actually true 
and the relevant explanatory relation holds, the explanation will 
not fall prey to the dilemma. Therefore, Blackburn’s dilemma 
cannot be used to argue against positions that assume an 
explanans that is necessarily true, as long as the explanation does 
not depend on the modal status itself, which would most likely 
make the explanation unsatisfactory on independent grounds.  229
I conclude that an argument against an explanation of necessary 
truth utilizing Blackburn’s dilemma cannot get off the ground, if 
the correct form of explanation is used. The contingentist is not 
committed to rejecting any principles of modal logic, such as S4 
and S5, and can equally accept a counterfactual principle about 
 The moral, that the necessity of the explanans does nothing to show that 229
necessity enters in an objectionable way into the explanation of itself, is also 
drawn by Hale (2002), who calls this kind of explanation ‘non-transmissive-
explanation’
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explanation, for the necessitist, on the other hand, no bad ‘residual 
must’ remains. 
The form of explanation in the current framework 
The present theory claims that necessary truth is ultimately 
explained by relations holding between the requirements for truth 
of a representation and the reference realizing properties 
determined by the reference determining properties of a 
representation. To show that it is not vulnerable to a Blackburn-
style argument, it needs to be shown that it does not exhibit an 
objectionable form of explanation. 
What explains the necessary truth of a representations is the 
relation that holds between properties of the truth-evaluable 
representation and properties determined by the reference 
determining properties of the representation. This is not itself a 
representation or proposition, but just a relation between 
properties. To state the explanation, however, one needs to 
represent this fact and this representation can be necessarily or 
contingently true. So the question about the modal status of the 
explanans is whether a representation of the fact that a certain 
relation obtains between the reference realizing properties and the 
requirements for truth is itself necessarily true. So provided the 
explanans is a representation stating some relationship between 
properties of the truth-evaluable representation and properties of 
the referential representations, is it necessarily true? At first it 
may seem that it is contingent, because it is a contingent matter 
whether the relationship between these properties holds. After all, 
reference is a contingent matter.  
But it is not quite as straightforward. For representations have 
their representational properties essentially and so a referential 
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representation cannot fail to determine the reference realizing 
properties and truth-evaluable representations cannot fail to have 
their requirements for truth. It remains a contingent matter to 
which objects a referential representation refers and it also 
remains a contingent matter what reference determining 
properties a certain word or thought has. But since representations 
are words cum meaning, or thoughts cum content, they have their 
representational properties essentially and so the relationship that 
holds between the requirements for truth and the reference 
realizing properties of the constituent referential representations 
holds necessarily. So contrary to what one may have expected, the 
explanans is necessarily true as well. Still, the explanation does 
not leave a residual must which would be in need of further 
explanation, because it is not the necessity of the explanans, but 
merely its truth that explains the necessity of the explanandum, 
and so necessity is not essentially involved in the explanation. 
Therefore the present explanation cannot be attacked using 
Blackburn’s dilemma. 
6. Explanation of Essence
A further reason for believing that the theory is a good 
explanation of necessary truth is that it allows for an account of 
what essences are. I already pointed out above that the account of 
essence provides some reason for taking the theory to be 
extensionally adequate, but the fact that it explains what essences 
are independently from its explanation of necessity gives rise to a 
further nice feature of the theory. For in this way, it is able to 
properly account for the relationship between essence and 
modality.  
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As Kit Fine famously pointed out, essence and necessity are 
closely connected, but it is not the case that essence can be 
explained by necessity.  Essence is a more fine-grained notion 230
than necessity. Fine concluded from this that rather than 
explaining essence in terms of necessity, we should explain 
necessity in terms of essence.  
The present explanation, in a sense, takes a third way, it accounts 
for what essences are and explains what necessity is in terms of 
reference realizing properties and requirements for truth. Essential 
properties just are the reference realizing properties determined 
by singular representations. This allows for both, an explanation 
of necessity and an account of essences that does not depend on 
the explanation of necessary truth.  
Consequently, Fine’s observation, which has convinced many of 
the merits of essentialism, can be taken seriously without having 
to take truth in virtue of essence as a primitive in the explanation 
of necessity.   231
I take this to be a significant advantage over theories of necessity 
which do not have an independent way of accounting for essential 
properties, but have to rely on a modalist account of essences 
instead. 
7. Minimal Assumptions 
The final reason why the theory gives a good explanation of 
necessary truth is that it proceeds from minimal assumptions 
about representations generally. These assumptions should be 
fairly uncontroversial, if one accepts that there are representations 
 Fine (1994)230
 This is desirable, because primitive essences have trouble giving an 231
illuminating explanation of how they give rise to necessary truth.
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and that these representations are either referential or truth-
evaluable.  To make this explicit, let me rehearse the 232
assumptions from which the account proceeds. 
I argued that when thinking about necessary truth, one should not 
merely think about language as one medium of representation, but 
about representations quite generally. So sentences and words are 
of interest to the theory only in so far as we conceive of them as 
representations: Objects which have their representational 
properties essentially.  
I argued at length that in order to make the discussion 
independent of the idiosyncrasies of language, one has to move 
away from the communication model underlying much study of 
language and instead move to representations viewed generally. I 
will not rehearse this discussion here, but only state the main 
assumptions I made to characterize representations.  
First we need to distinguish between referential representations 
and truth-evaluable representations. Truth-evaluable 
representations consist of referential representations and are true 
in virtue of the appropriate relationships between the referents of 
the constituent representations.  
This assumption should not be very controversial, for it is closely 
related to a picture underlying the standard Fregean view of 
predicates as functions from extensions to truth-values. One may 
then view the reference of a predicate as those objects which 
deliver the truth value true. However, Frege’s view, in a sense, 
skips the explanatory step of what gives rise to truth. Instead he 
opts for truth as an indicator of reference, and does not give an 
 A radical skeptic about representation might disagree, and presently I have 232
nothing to say to such a skeptic, safe that I take the skeptical position to be 
implausible on a global scale. 
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independent account of how reference is determined.  This is 233
not objectionable, if the goal is to give an analysis of language 
and how the elements of sentences systematically work together, 
given that the sentences formed with a predicate express 
representations with certain truth values. But it should be clear 
that the direction of determination, on the Fregean picture, is from 
truth to reference, and not the other way around.   234
If we care about how the truth of a truth-evaluable representation 
comes about and how this depends on the reference of the 
constituents, however, we cannot make reference depend on truth, 
rather we have to account for reference and then explain how this 
reference gives rise to truth. 
Following this line of thought and the direction of explanation, an 
account of reference of referential representations independently 
from its function in giving rise to truth must be given. So here are 
the relevant, very general assumptions about reference: 
Referential representations refer to objects. Singular 
representations, if they refer at all, essentially refer to only one 
object, general representations may refer to more than one object. 
The holding of a reference relation between a representation and 
some object or objects depends on both, properties of the 
 The doctrine that apart from reference there is a sense associated with a word 233
which determines reference is an add on to the functional analysis without which 
it would still stand.
 I am not arguing that Frege, and philosophers following Frege, missed that 234
point. Proponents of truth-conditional semantics, for example Davidson (1967), 
explicitly take truth to be prior to reference. Davidson’s concern, however, is 
largely epistemic: how can we interpret other speakers’ sentences given that they 
use them to speak the truth. So it may well be that the epistemic direction of 
determination (how we come to know which representation a sentence 
expresses) is from truth to reference, while the metaphysical direction of 
determination (how the truth of a representation depends on the reference of its 
constituents) runs from reference to truth.
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representation, and properties of the referent. Both, the 
representation of an object and the object must work together to 
give rise to the reference relation. I called the properties of a 
representation which play this role its reference determining 
properties and the properties of the object which play this role the 
object’s reference realizing properties. These properties are 
related, for the reference determining properties of a 
representation determine what the reference realizing properties 
of the object are, if a reference relation is established. This is not 
to say that the representation determines that the object which is 
the referent of the representation has these properties, the object 
has these properties quite independently from being referred to, it 
is just that if a reference relation holds between the representation 
and the referent, then the object has these properties. 
With this concepts of reference realizing properties and 
requirements for truth in hand it is a small step to an explanation 
of necessary truth. For it may now happen that the reference 
realizing properties determined by the referential representations 
are related such that the requirements for truth just cannot fail to 
be satisfied: the referents must exhibit the right kind of 
relationship required for the truth in virtue of how the reference of 
the referential representations is determined.  
The assumptions necessary for giving this explanation just follow 
from these basic considerations about reference and how 
reference and truth are related. The assumptions are quite 
minimal, because nothing specific has to be assumed about how 
reference really is determined for a specific referential 
representation or kind of representation. So in principle, the 
theory is compatible with any more specific theory of reference 
determination. 
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To sum up, the only assumptions needed for producing an 
explanation of necessary truth are first, that representations are 
the appropriate objects for which necessary truth should be 
explained, second that reference and truth are related such that 
truth (metaphysically) depends on reference, third, that the 
holding of the reference relation depends on properties of the 
representation and properties of the referent. With these 
ingredients an account of necessary truth follows quite naturally. 
This concludes the discussion of why I take the present 
explanation of necessary truth to be a good philosophical 
explanation of necessary truth: It is a good explanation, because it 
is a non-circular, illuminating and intelligible, as well as general 
explanation of metaphysical necessity that appears extensionally 
adequate, accounts for puzzles about possibilia and necessary 
existence, explains what essences are, and, along the way, makes 
only minimal assumptions about the nature of representation and 
its connection to the world. 
!281
Conclusion 
I have argued for an explanation of metaphysical necessity in 
terms of how reference determination and requirements for truth 
interact. I hope to have convinced you that the explanation is 
interesting and offers a range of explanatory benefits. I already 
used the last chapter to summarize the findings and to argue that 
the explanation is philosophically fruitful and illuminating. I want 
to use these concluding remarks to clarify the present theory’s 
connection to analyticity, before giving an outlook of how the 
resources developed here may be put to use in answering 
questions related to the present investigation.  
Analyticity and the present theory of necessity 
The present explanation diverges quite radically from attempts to 
explain necessity in terms of analyticity in the twentieth century, 
but it has strong connections to an older account of analyticity: 
The Kantian account of analyticity in terms of concept-
containment. This account served as a blueprint for the general 
explanation of necessary truth, because it revealed how truth may 
in certain cases be guaranteed by how the reference of the 
constituent representations is determined. The Kantian 
containment-account of analyticity, however, only describes a 
special case and as such is too narrow to account for necessary 
truth generally, and so I expanded and generalized the picture to 
be in principle applicable to all representations. It is in virtue of 
this ancestry I take the present theory of necessary truth to at the 
same time give an account of analytic truth: Analytic truth, in the 
wide sense, just is necessary truth. 
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The move back to a broadly Kantian picture of analyticity as 
applying not to sentences, but to representations, also reveals 
what has gone wrong with accounts of analyticity that took 
analyticity to be truth of a sentence in virtue of its meaning. 
Accounts of truth in virtue of meaning took the wrong objects to 
be analytic: sentences individuated independently of the 
representations they express. Thus, a confusion arose between 
sentences that have some element of broadly linguistic meaning 
which guarantees that the sentence type always express some true 
representation and sentences which express a representation that 
is guaranteed to be true. Proponents of analyticity fallaciously 
identified conventional truth with necessary truth, but a 
convention that a certain sentence-type should always be regarded 
as expressing some true representation just does not suffice for 
necessary truth. 
That conventional truth and necessary truth do come apart is 
especially obvious in the case of sentences involving indexicals. 
Take the example “I am here”. Given that the constituent 
indexical expressions function such that ‘I’ always denotes the 
speaker of a context, and ‘here’ always denotes the place of the 
context, the sentence cannot fail to express a true representation, 
because whenever it is uttered by any speaker it expresses a 
truth.  The truth it expresses, however, is not necessarily true. At 235
each occasion of utterance, the sentence expresses a different 
representation which is contingently true. So legislating (directly 
or indirectly) that a sentence is always to express a true 
representation does not guarantee that it expresses a necessary 
 The indexical expressions ‘I’ and ‘here’ almost certainly do not function 235
according to this simple model in natural language, but for present purposes let 
us assume that it is true.
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truth, for one may equally well adjust the interpretation of the 
sentence such that it expresses some contingently true 
representation on each occasion of use. This explains why 
analyticity conceived of as a property of sentences, or as truth in 
virtue of meaning, is not a useful concept, if the goal is to explain 
necessary truth. 
We should thus distinguish between two different notions of 
analyticity, both of which have some historical precedent, but 
which have not always been clearly separated: Analyticity as a 
property of sentences and analyticity as a property of 
representations. The former notion of analyticity was prominent 
during much of the twentieth century, which is natural given the 
preoccupation with language in analytic philosophy during that 
time as well as the epistemic role analyticity was supposed to 
play.  
The latter notion goes back to Kant, for whom analyticity is a 
property that applies to judgments, which should not be conceived 
of as sentences, but rather as representations.  Kant, of course, 236
only had narrow analyticity in mind, analyticity as concept 
containment, but appropriately extending and generalizing the 
notion in an updated framework, leads to a wide notion of 
analyticity, which can be identified with necessary truth. 
The epistemology of modality 
There are two related questions that I have deliberately left open, 
because an adequate discussion would not have been possible 
here. The first is the epistemology of necessity, the second is 
 I do not want to claim that Kant had the same notion of representation in 236
mind as has been presented here. Nonetheless judgments are more similar to 
representations, than to mere sentences.
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which specific (kinds of) representations turn out to be 
metaphysically necessary. The omission of the latter is a 
consequence of the former and so I will in this section be 
concerned with the epistemology of modality. 
The epistemology of necessity, or of modality more generally, is a 
large field and to a certain extent it is independent of the 
metaphysics of modality. However, as Christopher Peacocke has 
argued quite convincingly, an epistemology and a metaphysics for 
a certain domain should meet what he calls “the integration 
challenge”.  The challenge is to have an account of the 237
epistemology of a domain which is fit to discover what the 
metaphysics say the phenomenon consists in. For if the 
epistemology and the metaphysics don’t integrate, there is the 
danger that either our epistemic practices are not geared towards 
discovering what really is the case, and therefore may not be 
reliable (or only reliable by accident) or that our metaphysical 
account does not describe the phenomenon we intended to 
describe and which we are trying to discover with our epistemic 
practices.  
In the special case of modality, our epistemic practices should 
therefore match the metaphysical account of what it takes for a 
truth to be necessarily true. Our practices for coming to know 
about what is (metaphysically) possible or necessary are rather 
diverse. We use thought experiments, we use real experiments, we 
use models, we use logic, we draw things, we imagine, we test for 
conceivability, and so on. All these methods, as is quite common 
in epistemology, are fallible for various reasons, but the search for 
metaphysical necessity and possibility is further complicated by 
 Peacocke (1999)237
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the fact that there are different kinds of necessity and so we may, 
for example, sometimes confuse nomic necessity with 
metaphysical necessity, its stronger cousin, or we may confuse a 
still stronger kind of necessity, for example logical necessity with 
metaphysical necessity, or we may confuse any of these with 
epistemic necessity. 
Traditionally, theories of necessity which appealed to analyticity 
had a seemingly persuading answer to the integration challenge: 
Since necessity is grounded in meaning, meaning is conventional, 
and conventions are known by the community of speakers, the 
necessary truths can be known by a priori reasoning from the 
conventions. That the story could not be quite so simple was 
shown by Kripke with his examples of a posteriori necessities, 
but it was still suggested by a few philosophers that the a 
posteriori character of these truths can be separated from the a 
priori principles which allegedly give rise to the necessity.  This 238
seemingly straightforward answer to the integration challenge 
may be taken to speak in favor of the theory, not least because it 
accounts for the cogency of a priori reasoning and is probably a 
reason why some still hold on to modified versions of it. 
However, since the underlying theory of necessity in terms of 
conventional truth is not tenable, an epistemology based on it 
should not be readily accepted. 
The present theory of modality does not lend this support to a 
priori reasoning, because the link between analyticity as a 
 See for example Sidelle (1989), who explicitly argues that a posteriori 238
necessities can be accounted for in this way by a conventionalist account. In a 
slightly different context, proponents of two-dimensional semantics like David 
Chalmers (2006) and Frank Jackson (2000) sometimes try to do something 
similar to defend the cogency of a priori reasoning in philosophy, although both 
do not endorse a conventionalist theory of necessity.
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property of representations and a priori reasoning is severed, and 
so it does not share the epistemic payoff with its conventionalist 
predecessors. 
But the present theory does leave us with some advice on how 
one may go about finding out about which representations are 
necessarily true. Since necessary truth is explained by the 
reference realizing properties of the constituent representations 
together with the requirements for truth, to know about the truth 
of a claim that a certain representation is necessarily true, we have 
to find out what the reference realizing properties determined by 
the referential representations are and what the requirements for 
truth are. This is something we may find out about in various 
ways. We already, for example, know quite a bit about the 
representations we use to communicate and about the 
representations we use to think about the world, so we may use 
this knowledge to assess necessity claims. But there is also room 
for a more sophisticated empirical study of representations that 
tells us something about how reference is determined and about 
what the reference realizing properties of some representations 
are. Also, linguistics may tell us something interesting about the 
representations expressed by the languages we use to 
communicate that can in turn be used to assess the necessity of a 
representation. Furthermore, scientific investigation may reveal 
what it really takes to be the member of a kind. And sometimes to 
come to know that a representation is necessarily true, it suffices 
to know something quite general about the representational 
system in which the representations occur: take for example the 
case of identities that are expressed by sentences involving the 
same name on either side of the identity sign. Since it is, with 
some exceptions, the case that the same name is used in the same 
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context to represent the same object, the two names are used as 
two representations of the same type, and so an identity expressed 
by the sentence is very likely to be necessarily true. In strongly 
regimented representational systems it may be even easier to 
come to know about necessarily true representations in this way. 
So there are many ways in which one may come to know about 
the necessity of a representation and this first cursory glance at 
the possibilities of finding out about it seems to indicate that none 
of the standard methods for finding out about modality is 
excluded by the present theory. But some guidance is offered. The 
methods must be fit to reveal the features relevant to explaining 
necessity. In order to find out about necessity, one must 
investigate the reference realizing properties determined by the 
representations, the requirements for truth, and something about 
their relationship.  
Thus there is some prima facie reason to believe that the 
epistemology the present theory of metaphysical necessity yields, 
integrates well with our de facto methods of finding out about 
modality, even if it does not deliver any validation or explanation 
of a priori reasoning. 
Much more would have to be done to develop these sketchy 
observations, but for now I hope it gives a first glimpse as to how 
the present theory may integrate with the epistemology of 
modality and how it may be used to decide some conflicts about 
which representations are metaphysically necessary. 
Essence and explanation 
I argued that the present theory, apart from explaining necessary 
truth, can be used to elucidate what essences are. With this 
account of essence in hand, one may be able to go one step further 
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and get a better understanding of what philosophical or 
constitutive explanations are.  
Recently the notion of grounding has gained some prominence in 
the philosophical debate. It is supposed to describe the relation 
holding between a fact and another which constitutively explains 
why the first obtains.  Above, when considering philosophical 239
explanations, I did not directly use the notion of grounding, but 
instead appealed to a pre-theoretical distinction between 
constitutive and genealogical explanations. In a constitutive 
explanation we want to be told what it takes for something to be 
the case, or what it takes for something to exist. But what is this 
constitutive “what it takes to be for something to exist or for 
something to be the case” exactly? It seems that the account of 
essence above gives us some guidance at least for one of the two 
questions. For the essence of something tells us what it takes for 
something to exist. And so an explanation for why something 
(constitutively) exists, should cite the essential properties of the 
object in question, that is, it should cite the reference realizing 
properties determined by the singular referential representation of 
the object.  
Given that the present account of essence in terms of reference 
realizing properties determined by singular representation is 
viable, the demands on a constitutive explanation more generally 
can be elucidated. For we can use the reference realizing 
properties of general referential representations to explain what it 
takes for something to be the case: What does it take, 
constitutively, to be a bachelor? There must be someone who is 
 There is some disagreement whether grounding should be conceived of as a 239
relation between facts. This debate can be neglected here. For more on this 
debate and on grounding generally see Correia and Schnieder (2012)
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both male and unmarried. Quite generally we can give an answer 
to what it takes for something to be the case, by citing the 
reference realizing properties determined by the general 
referential representations used to represent a fact. This unifies the 
two constitutive explanations of what it takes for something to 
exist, and of what it takes for something to be the case: in both 
cases an answer can be given by citing the reference realizing 
properties determined by the representations in question.  
If this connection between reference realizing properties and 
constitutive explanation can be sustained it would provide a 
unified understanding of essence, necessity, and constitutive 
philosophical explanation, which would be quite desirable.  
An example where this unity can be put to use is a debate in the 
discussion on grounding. There a debate has emerged about 
whether grounding can be explained in terms of essence, and 
counterexamples seem to suggest that this is not the case.  The 240
present understanding of philosophical explanation can agree that 
essence does not explain grounding generally, for it may not do so 
when we ask what it takes for something to be the case. However, 
one can insist that philosophical explanations should generally 
cite reference realizing properties. If we want an explanation of 
why something exists, we cite the reference realizing properties 
determined by the singular representation, that is, the essence of 
the object. If we want an explanation of why something is the 
case, we cite the reference realizing properties determined by the 
general representation. So a common feature, reference realizing 
properties, explains why essence and grounding are related, but 
essence fails to explain every grounding explanation. 
 For a defense of an analysis of grounding in terms of essence see Correia 240
(2013), for a dissenting view see Fine (2012)
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This unified picture of necessity, essence, and constitutive 
explanation may thus prove useful for further research, but more 
will have to be done to show that the initially appealing unity can 
be upheld. 
Metametaphysics - internal and external questions 
Rudolf Carnap made an influential distinction between internal 
existence questions and external existence questions.  The 241
internal existence questions are of the kind: “Is there beer in the 
fridge”, or “Does the Higgs Boson exist?”. They can be answered 
by straightforward empirical investigation, even if this empirical 
investigation may be quite complicated and the questions have a 
clear positive or a negative answer. These internal questions are, 
according to Carnap, to be distinguished from external questions, 
which cannot be answered in this way, but are to be answered by 
pragmatic considerations, considerations about whether talk about 
the type of entity introduced is useful to the (scientific) enterprise 
in question. Many philosophical existence questions, for example 
“Are there numbers?” or “Do abstract entities exist?”, fall in this 
category according to Carnap, and should be answered 
accordingly by considering whether the adoption of a linguistic 
framework in which we quantify over these entities is 
pragmatically acceptable. Carnap introduced the distinction with 
the explicit intention to make talk of abstract entities acceptable to 
empiricists and today the distinction is equally put to use to 




However, the distinction was criticized right after its introduction, 
and modern versions of it are criticized for similar reasons. Quine, 
for example, notes that it seems that external questions can simply 
be turned into internal questions by adopting a linguistic 
framework which allows us to quantify over the entities in 
question. So once we have a language that quantifies over 
numbers, the question “Are there numbers?” becomes an internal 
question and no longer a pragmatic choice over what we should 
talk about.  And so why could we not have a linguistic 242
framework which covers everything there is, and consider this to 
be the framework in which we ask philosophical questions of 
ontology? After all, philosophers doing ontology typically ask 
what there is in the widest possible sense, they do not just ask 
what is in the fridge.  
This criticism is rightly taken to be quite serious for the advertised 
deflationary understanding of ontological questions: Unwanted 
entities cannot just be excluded from one’s ontology by choosing 
a linguistic framework such that it excludes talk about some 
unwanted entities. However, something intuitively right about the 
distinction can possibly be salvaged with the help of the present 
theory. For the tools of the theory make sense of the intuition 
behind the distinction that before we can meaningfully ask 
whether something exists, we should have an idea of what it takes 
for this something to exist. What it takes for something to exist is 
that it has the reference realizing properties determined by the 
representation representing it. This makes sense of the internal 
question. Once we know what it takes for something to exist, we 
 See Quine (1951b) p. 69242
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can ask whether something has what it takes to be the thing in 
question. 
The external questions can then be conceived of as truly 
pragmatic questions about what of the many things in the world 
should be represented for the specific purposes at hand. With this 
understanding, however, philosophical questions about whether 
numbers exist or whether there are abstract objects, will not fall 
into the purview of external questions. Rather, what is required to 
answer them is a clarification of what it would take for numbers 
to exist or what it would take for abstract objects to exist and to 
see whether what it takes is indeed the case.  
However, some existence questions could still be read as being 
truly external. If a biologist, for example, asks whether there 
really are species, then the question may be construed as a 
question about whether it is useful for the biological enterprise to 
distinguish between animals along the line of species, or whether 
it might not be more fruitful to draw a different distinction. 
Equally, the sociologist might ask whether classes exist, because 
she believes that an analysis of societies along different 
dimensions is more fruitful. In both cases, it would be quite 
wrong to interpret the biologist as literally saying that there is no 
such thing as, say, dogs, or the sociologist as saying, that there is 
no working-class, rather, what they are saying is that neither 
species nor classes are very helpful in explaining what we want to 
explain in the relevant discipline, and that we should therefore 
look at different entities. 
This understanding of the internal-external distinction flows quite 
naturally from the understanding of representations and the 
reference realizing properties: The reference realizing properties 
are properties of an object and whether some object has these 
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properties is not a matter of whether they are represented by 
anything. So whether something exists is a matter that must be 
investigated by seeing whether anything really has what it takes 
for the object in question to exist. But that these particular 
properties are the properties constitutive of its existence, that they 
are what it takes for the object to exist, is determined by the 
representation used to talk about that object. In this sense, 
external existence questions depend on what we choose to 
represent. Talk of choice may be somewhat of an overstatement, 
however, for many times it is not really a matter of choice for us 
what the best way of talking about something is. This may rather 
be dictated by the way the world really is or by what a community 
of speakers in fact represents. Nonetheless, in the sense brought 
out here, it is a pragmatic question what we choose to represent. 
Making sense of the distinction in this way may bring some light 
into some philosophical debates about the existence of, say, 
abstract objects, for it may be that proponents on either side of the 
debate do not so much disagree about the internal question of 
whether anything has the reference realizing properties 
determined by the representation in question, they disagree about 
what it would take for abstract objects to exist. One side may take 
a quite undemanding view, another may require so much that it 
rightly seems impossible that it is satisfied by anything. By seeing 
what it is that is really represented by the representations 
allegedly referring to abstract objects, we can seek to resolve such 
disputes. 
The end 
The remarks in this conclusion show where the present 
explanation of necessary truth, and the foundation on which it 
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rests leaves room for further investigation, but I think it also 
shows that the move away from sentences and propositions in the 
traditional language-inspired framework, to a framework of 
representations and their relation to what they represent, apart 
from explaining necessary truth, has some promise to give fruitful 
answers to intricate philosophical questions: It may allow for 
advances in the epistemology of modality, it could potentially 
provide a unified picture of necessity, essence, and ground, and it 
gives some basis to the Carnapian intuition of internal and 
external questions, thus allowing to make better sense of age-old 
philosophical conundrums. 
I argued in some detail that one of the promises of the framework 
of representations, reference, and truth, holds true; the promise 
that it explains necessary truth. As for the others, I must now 
close the book, leaving the issues open. 
!295
Bibliography 
Adams, Robert M., (1974), “Theories of Actuality”, in Noûs, Vol. 
8, No. 3. p. 211-231. 
Almotahari, Mahrad, (2014), “The Identity of a Material Thing 
and its Matter”, in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 256, 
p. 387-406. 
Anderson, Lanier R., (2015), “The Poverty of Conceptual Truth, 
Kant’s Analytic/Synthetic Distinction and the Limits of 
Metaphysics”, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Armstrong, D.M., (1983), “What is a Law of Nature?”, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Armstrong, D.M., (1993), “The Identification Problem and the 
Inference Problem”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, Vol. 53, No. 2, p. 421-422. 
Ayer, Alfred J., (1936a), “Truth by Convention: A Symposium by 
A.J. Ayer, C.H. Whiteley, M. Black”, in Analysis, Vol. 4, No. 2/3, 
p. 17-32. 
Ayer, Alfred J., (1936b), “Language, Truth and Logic”, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Balaguer, Mark, (2015), “Fictionalism in the Philosophy of 
Mathematics”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 




Beaney, Michael, (2014) “Analysis”, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2016/entries/analysis/> 
Blackburn, Simon, (1993), “Morals and Modals” in Essays in 
Quasi-Realism, Simon Blackburn ed., Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Boghossian, Paul A., (1996), “Analyticity Reconsidered”, in 
Nôus, Vol. 30, No. 3, p. 360-391. 
Borghini, Andrea; Williams, Neil E., (2008), “A Dispositional 
Theory of Possibility”, in Dialectica, Vol 62, No. 1, p. 21-41. 
Bromberger, Sylvain, (2011), “What are words? Comments on 
Kaplan (1990), on Hawthorne and Lepore, and on the Issue”, in 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 108, No. 9, p. 486-503. 
Burge, Tyler, (1979a), “Sinning Against Frege”, in The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, p. 398-432. 
Burge Tyler, (1979b), “Individualism and the Mental”, in Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 4, Issue 1, p. 73-121. 
!297
Burgess, Alexis; Sherman, Brett, (2014), “Metasemantics: New 
Essays on the Foundations of Meaning”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cameron, Ross, (2010a), “On the Source of Necessity”, in 
Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Bob Hale and 
Aviv Hoffman (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Cameron, Ross, (2010b), “The Grounds of Necessity”, in 
Philosophy Compass, Vol. 5, No.4, p. 348-358. 
Cameron, Ross, (2012), “Why Lewis’s Analysis of Modality 
Succeeds in its Reductive Ambitions”, in Philosopher’s Imprint, 
Vol. 12, No. 8, p. 1-21. 
Carnap, Rudolf, (1952), “Meaning Postulates”, in Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 65-73. 
Carnap, Rudolf, (1947), “Meaning and Necessity”, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. Page References to the Midway 
reprint of the second edition (1988). 
Carnap, Rudolf, (1950), “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”, 
in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 4, No. 11. p. 20-40. 
Chalmers, David J., (2006), “Two-Dimensional Semantics”, in 
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, Ernie Lepore 
and Barry Smith (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
574-606. 
!298
Chalmers, David, J., (2012), “Constructing the World”, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Cohen, Jonathan; Michaelson Eliot, (2013), “Indexicality and The 
Answering Machine Paradox”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol.8, 
Issue 6, p. 580-592.  
Correia, Fabrice, (2006), “Generic Essence, Objectual Essence, 
and Modality” in Noûs, Vol. 40, No. 4, p. 753-767. 
Correia, Fabrice; Schnieder Benjamin (eds.), (2012), 
“Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of 
Reality”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Correia, Fabrice, (2012), “On the Reduction of Necessity to 
Essence”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 
84, No. 3, p. 639-653. 
Correia, Fabrice, (2013), “Metaphysical Grounds and Essence”, in 
Varieties of Dependence. Ontological Dependence, Grounding, 
Supervenience, Response-Dependence. Hoeltje, M.; Schnieder, B; 
Steinberg A. (eds.), Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, 
München: Philosophia, p. 271-296. 
Davidson, Donald, (1967), “Truth and Meaning”, in Synthese, 
Vol. 17, p. 304-324. 
Devitt, Michael; Sterelny Kim, (1999), “Language and Reality, 
An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language”, 2nd Edition, 
Cambridge Mass.: The MIT-Press. 
!299
Divers, John; Melia, Joseph, (2002), “The Analytical Limit of 
Genuine Modal Realism”, in Mind, Vol. 111, No. 441, p. 15-36. 
Divers, John; Melia, Joseph, (2003), “Genuine Modal Realism 
Limited”, in Mind, Vol. 112, No. 445, p. 83-86. 
Divers, John; Melia, Joseph, (2006), “Genuine Modal Realism: 
Still Limited”, in Mind, Vol. 115, No. 459, p. 731-740. 
Divers, John, (2014), “The Modal Status of the Lewisian Analysis 
of Modality”, in Mind, Vol. 123, No. 491, p. 861-872. 
Evans, Gareth, (1973), “The Causal Theory of Names”, in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 
Vol. 47. p. 187-225. 
Evans, Gareth, (1982), “The Varieties of Reference”, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Field, Hartry, (1989), “Realism, Mathematics and Modality”, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Fine, Kit, (1994), “Essence and Modality”, in Philosophical 
Perspectives, Vol. 8, Logic and Language, p. 1-16. 
Fine, Kit, (1995), “Senses of Essence”, in Modality, Morality, and 
Belief, Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Sinnott-
Armstrong, Walter (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
p. 53-73. 
!300
Fine, Kit, (2001), “The question of realism”, in Philosopher’s 
Imprint, Vol.1, No.1, p. 1-30. 
Fine, Kit, (2002), “Varieties of Necessity”, in Conceivability and 
Possibility, Gendler, Tamar Szabo; Hawthorne, John (eds.), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 253-281. 
Fine, Kit, (2003), “The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and its 
Matter”, in Mind, Vol. 112, No.446, p. 195-234. 
Fine, Kit, (2005), “Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Fine, Kit, (2012), “Guide to Ground”, in Metaphysical 
Grounding, Correia, Fabrice; Schnieder, Benjamin (eds.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 37-80. 
Fine, Kit, (2015), “Unified Foundations for Essence and Ground”, 
in Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 1, No. 
2, p. 296-311. 
Fine, Kit, (2016), “Identity Criteria and Ground”, in 
Philosophical Studies, 173, p. 1-19.  
Frege, Gottlob, (1884), “Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine 
logisch mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl”, 
Breslau: Verlag von Wilhelm Koebner. Page references according 
to: (1988), Christian Thiel (ed.), Hamburg: Meiner Verlag. 
!301
Frege, Gottlob, (1948), “Sense and Reference”, in The 
Philosophical Review, Vol.57, No. 3, Max Black (transl.), p. 
209-230. 
García-Carpintero, Manuel; Pérez Otero, Manuel, (2009), “The 
Conventional and the Analytic”, in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 78, No. 2, p. 239-274. 
Hale, Bob; Wright, Crispin, (1994), “A Reductio Ad Surdum? 
Field on the Contingency of Mathematical Objects”, in Mind, Vol 
103, No. 410, p. 169-184. 
Hale, Bob, (2002), “The Source of Necessity”, in Philosophical 
Perspectives, Vol.16, p. 299-319.  
Hale, Bob; Hoffmann, Aviv (eds.), (2010), “Modality: 
Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hale, Bob, (2013), “Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, 
Modality, and the Relations Between Them”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hanks, Peter, (2008), “A Dilemma About Necessity”, in 
Erkenntnis, Vol. 68, p. 129-148. 
Hanks, Peter, (2009), “Recent Work on Propositions”, in 
Philosophy Compass, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 469-486. 
!302
Harman, Gilbert, (1996), “Analyticity Regained?”, in Nôus, Vol. 
30, No. 2, p. 392 - 400. 
Hawthorne, John; Lepore, Ernest, (2011), “On Words”, in The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 108, No.9, p. 447-485. 
Heim, Irene; Kratzer, Angelika, (1998), “Semantics in Generative 
Grammar”, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.  
Hellman, Geoffrey, (1989), “Mathematics without Numbers”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hofmann, Frank; Horvath Joachim, (2008), “In Defence of 
Metaphysical Analyticity”, in Ratio, Vol. 21, p. 300-313. 
Jackson, Frank, (2000), “From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defense 
of Conceptual Analysis”, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jubien, Michael, (2009), “Possibility”, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kant, Immanuel, (1998), “Critique of Pure Reason”, Paul Guyer 
and Allen Wood (eds. and translation), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kaplan, David, (1977), “Demonstratives”, in Themes from 
Kaplan. Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 481-563. 
!303
Kaplan, David, (1990), “Words”, in Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Vol. 64, p. 93-119. 
Kennedy, Christopher, (2006), “Comparatives, Semantics of”, in 
Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, second Edition, 
Brown, Keith (ed.), Oxford: Elsevier, p. 690-694. 
Keefe, Rosanna, (2002), “When does Circularity Matter?” in 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 102, Issue 1, p. 
275-292. 
King, Jeffrey C.; Soames, Scott; Speaks, Jeff., (2014), “New 
Thinking about Propositions” Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Klein, Ewan, (1980), “A Semantics for Positive and Comparative 
Adjectives”, in Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 4. p. 1-45. 
Koslicki, Kathrin, (2012), “Essence, necessity, and explanation”, 
in Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, Tahko, Tuomas (ed.), 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 187-206. 
Kripke, Saul, (1959), “A Completeness Theorem in Modal 
Logic”, in Journal of Symbolic Logic, No. 24, p. 1-14. 
Kripke, Saul, (1963), “Semanitcal Considerations on Modal 
Logic”, in Acta Philosophica Fennica, No. 16, p. 83-94.  
Kripke, Saul, (1980), “Naming and Necessity”, Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 
!304
Lange, Marc, (2008), “Why Contingent Facts cannot Necessities 
Make”, in Analysis, Vol. 68, No. 2, p. 120-128. 
Lange, Marc, (2009), “Laws and Lawmakers”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Langford, C.H., (1942), “The Notion of Analysis in Moore’s 
Philosophy”, in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, Schilpp, P.A. 
(ed.), p. 321-342. 
Leech, Jessica, (2015), “The Varieties of (relative) Modality”, in 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 97, Issue 2, p. 158-180.  
Leech, Jessica, (forthcoming 2016), “The Mereology of 
Representations”, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 
116, No. 2.  
Lewis, David K., (1973), “Counterfactuals”, Victoria: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Lewis, David K., (1975), “Languages and Language”, in 
Minnesota Studies in the Philsophy of Science, Gundersond, Keith 
(ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p. 3-35. 
Lewis David K., (1983), “Philosophical Papers Vol I”, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, David K., (1986), “On the Plurality of Worlds”, Victoria: 
Blackwell Publishing. 
!305
Lewis David K., (1987), “Philosophical Papers Vol.II”, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, David K., (1996), “Elusive Knowledge”, in Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol.74, Issue 4, p. 549-567. 
Lewy, Casimir, (1976), “Meaning and Modality”, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Loewer, Barry M., (1997), “A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics”, 
in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Wright, Crisptin; 
Hale, Bob (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 108-126. 
Lowe, E.J., (2001), “The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, 
Identity, and Time”, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lowe, E.J., (2008a), “Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and 
the Errors of Conceptualism”, in Philosophia Scientiae, Vol 12, 
No. 1. p. 9-33. 
Lowe, E.J. (2008b), “Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence”, 
in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 62, p. 23-48. 
Mackie, Penelope, (2006), “How Things Might Have Been”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marcus, Ruth Barcan, (1947), “Identity of Individuals in a Strict 
Functional Calculus of Second Order”, in Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, Vol. 12, p. 12-15. 
!306
Marcus, Ruth Barcan, (1995), “Modalities”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Menzel, Christopher, (2016) “Actualism”, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/
entries/actualism/>. 
Millikan, Ruth, (1989), “Biosemantics”, in The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 86, p. 281-297. 
Moltmann, Friederike, (2013), “Reference to Numbers in Natural 
Language”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 162, Issue 3, p. 
499-536. 
Moore, G.E., (1903), “Principia Ethica”, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Moore, G.E., (1942), “A Reply to my Critics”, in The Philosophy 
of G.E. Moore, Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), p. 660-667. 
Morato, Vittorio, (2014), “Explanation and Modality: On the 
Contingency Horn of Blackburn’s Dilemma”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 
79, Issue 2, p. 327-349. 
Olson, Eric T., (2016) “Personal Identity”, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/
entries/identity-personal/> 
!307
Paul, Laurie A., (2006), “In Defense of Essentialism”, in 
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 20, Issue 1, p. 333-372. 
Peacocke, Christopher, (1999), “Being Known”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Plantinga, (1978), “The Nature of Necessity”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Putnam, Hilary, (1967), “Mathematics without Foundations”, in 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, No.1, p. 5-22. 
Putnam, Hilary, (1973), “Meaning and Reference”, in The Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. 70, No. 19, p. 699-711.  
Putnam, Hilary, (1975) “The Meaning of Meaning”, in Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7. p. 131-193. 
Quine, Willard van Orman, (1951a), “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 1. p. 
20-43. 
Quine, Willard van Orman, (1951b), “On Carnap’s Views on 
Ontology”, in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 2, No. 5, p.65-73. 
Quine, Willard van Orman, (1960), “Carnap on Logical Truth”, in 
Synthese, Vol. 12, No.4, p. 350-374. 
!308
Quine, Willard van Orman, (1976), “Truth by Convention” in The 
Ways of Paradox and other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 
Quine, Willard van Orman, (1986), “Philosophy of Logic”, 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Rey, Georges, (2013) “The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction”, in 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2015/entries/analytic-synthetic/> 
Roca-Royes, Sonia, (2011a), “Essentialism vis-à-vis Possibilia, 
Modal Logic and Necessitism” in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 6, 
Issue 1, p. 54-64. 
Roca-Royes, Sonia, (2011b), “Essential Properties and Individual 
Essences”, in Philosophy Compass, Vol. 6, Issue 1, p. 65-77. 
Rosen, Gideon, (2010), “Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding 
and Reduction”, in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and 
Epistemology, Hale, Bob; Hoffmann, Aviv (eds.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Russell, Bertrand, (1905), “On Denoting”, in Mind, Vol. 14, No. 
56, p. 479-493. 
Russell, Gillian, (2008), “Truth in Virtue of Meaning, A Defense 
of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction”, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
!309
Russell, Gillian, (2010), “A new Problem for the Linguistic 
Doctrine of Necessary Truth”, in New Waves in Truth, Wright, C., 
Pedersen, N. (Eds.), London: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 267-281. 
Salmon, Nathan, (1981), “Reference and Essence”, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 
Salmon, Nathan, (1983), “Frege’s Puzzle”, Cambridge Mass.: The 
MIT-Press 
Salmon, Nathan, (1993), “Analyticity and Apriority”, in 
Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 7, p. 125-133  
Schnieder, Benjamin, (2011), “A Logic for ‘Because’”, in The 
Review of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 4, No.3, p. 445-465. 
Searle, John R., (1983), “Intentionality”, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shalkowski, Scott, (1994), “The Ontological Ground of the 
Alethic Modality”, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, 
p. 669-688. 
Shoemaker, Sydney, (1998), “Causal and Metaphysical 
Necessity”, in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 79, p. 59-77. 
Sidelle, Alan, (1989), “Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A 
Defense of Conventionalism”, Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press. 
!310
Sidelle, Alan, (1991), “The Answering Machine Paradox”, in 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 525-539. 
Sidelle, Alan, (2009), “Conventionalism and the Contingency of 
Conventions”, in Noûs, Vol. 43, No. 2, p. 224-241. 
Sider, Ted, (2003), “Reductive Theories of Modality”, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics , M.J. Loux, D.W. 
Zimmermann, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.
180-208. 
Stalnaker, Robert, (2003), “Ways a World Might Be: 
Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays”, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stanford, Kyle; Kitcher Philip, (2000), “Refining the Causal 
Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms” in Philosophical 
Studies, Vol. 97, p. 99-129. 
Strawson, P.F., (1950), “On Referring”, in Mind, Vol. 59, No. 235, 
p. 320-344. 
Tennant, Neil, (1997), “On the Necessary Existence of Numbers”, 
in Noûs, Vol. 31, No. 3. p. 307-336. 
Thomasson, Amie L., (2007), “Ordinary Objects”, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
!311
Thomasson, Amie L., (2013), “Norms and Necessity”, in The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 143-160. 
Thomasson, Amie L., (2015), “Ontology made Easy”, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Trogdon, Kelly, (2013), “An Introduction to Grounding”, in 
Varieties of Dependence. Ontological Dependence, Grounding, 
Supervenience, Response-Dependence. Hoeltje, M.; Schnieder, B; 
Steinberg A. (eds.), Basic Philosophical Concepts Series, 
München: Philosophia, p. 97-122. 
Vetter, Barbara, (2015), “Potentiality: From Dispositions to 
Modality”, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wang, Jennifer, (2013a), “Modal Primitivism”, PhD Thesis, 
Published Online at Rutgers University Community Repository: 
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7282/T36T0K6Z 
Wang, Jennifer, (2013b), “From Combinatorialism to 
Primitivism”, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, 
Issue 3, p. 535-554. 
Wiggins, David, (2001), “Sameness and Substance Renewed”, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wiggins, David, (2012), “Identity, Individuation and Substance”, 
in European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No.1, p. 1-25. 
!312
Wildman, Nathan, (2013), “Modality, Sparsity, and Essence”, in 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 253, p.760-782. 
Williamson, Timothy, (2002), “Knowledge and its Limits”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, Timothy, (2006), “Conceptual Truth”, in Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume 80, No. 1, p. 1-41.  
Williamson, Timothy, (2010), “Necessitism, Contingentism, and 
Plural Quantification”, in Mind, Vol. 119, p.657-748. 
Williamson, Timothy, (2013), “Modal Logic as Metaphysics”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wilson, Jessica, (2014), “No Work for a Theory of Grounding”, in 
Inquiry: An interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 57, No. 
5-6, p. 535-579. 
Yablo, Stephen, (1992), “Review of: Necessity, Essence, and 
Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism”, in The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, p. 878-881.
!313
